1The Confederation is responsible for money and currency; the Confederation has the exclusive right to issue coins and banknotes.
2The Swiss National Bank, as an independent central bank, shall pursue a monetary policy that serves the overall interests of the country; it shall be administered with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Confederation.
3The Swiss National Bank shall create sufficient currency reserves from its revenues; part of these reserves shall be held in gold.
4A minimum of two thirds of the net profits made by the Swiss National Bank shall be allocated to the Cantons.
Article 99 regulates Switzerland's monetary and currency system. Only the Confederation may issue coins and banknotes (currency monopoly). The Swiss National Bank (SNB) conducts monetary policy as an independent central bank. In doing so, it must serve the overall interests of the country.
The SNB is independent but under the supervision of the Confederation. The Federal Council appoints the bank management. The SNB must hold sufficient currency reserves, partly in gold. At least two-thirds of the SNB's profits go to the cantons.
The currency monopoly means: Private or cantonal currencies are not permitted. The state must accept taxes in Swiss francs. The SNB's independence enables monetary policy without direct political interference. This is important for price stability.
The SNB can determine its monetary policy independently. However, it must take the economic situation into account. In major currency crises, it cooperates with other authorities. The gold reserve is intended to create confidence.
An example of SNB independence: If inflation rises, the SNB can raise interest rates even if the government does not want this. In this way, it protects the value of the Swiss franc.
The cantons receive their share of SNB profits each year. This varies depending on the SNB's success. When returns from currency reserves are good, the cantons receive more money.
The Constitution prohibits private currencies. Regional means of payment are also only permitted as vouchers, not as real money. This protects the stability of the Swiss franc.
Art. 99 BV
#Doctrine
#1. Genesis
N. 1 The Confederation's monetary and currency system has its roots in the Federal Constitution of 1874, which transferred the right to mint coins (Art. 38 old BV) and the right to issue banknotes (Art. 39 old BV) to the Confederation (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 1–3). The Swiss National Bank was founded in 1907 as an independent central bank modeled after the German Reichsbank, after earlier attempts at a state bank had failed due to popular resistance (Baltensperger, Der Schweizer Franken, pp. 128–152).
N. 2 The total revision of the Federal Constitution of 1999 brought together the various currency-related provisions in Art. 99 BV (BBl 1997 I 342). The Federal Council Message emphasizes the constitutional anchoring of SNB independence as a «conditio sine qua non for a credible and successful monetary policy» (BBl 1997 I 343). The constitutional legislator wanted to continue the proven system of an independent central bank while simultaneously ensuring democratic integration through the participation and supervision of the Confederation (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 4–6).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 3 Art. 99 BV stands in Section 7 «Financial and Economic System» and, together with Art. 100 BV (Economic Policy), forms the constitutional basis of the Swiss monetary system. The provision has systematic connections to Art. 94 BV (Principles of Economic System) and Art. 98 BV (Banks and Insurance) (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 7–8).
N. 4 Currency sovereignty is part of state sovereignty and closely linked to economic and foreign policy. Art. 99 BV concretizes the general federal competence in the area of foreign affairs (Art. 54 BV) for the currency domain and supplements the financial competence of the Confederation (Art. 126–135 BV) with the monetary policy dimension.
#3. Elements of the Provision / Normative Content
a) Currency Sovereignty of the Confederation (Para. 1)
N. 5 The comprehensive federal competence for «monetary and currency matters» includes, according to prevailing doctrine, the regulation of all aspects of the monetary system: currency unit, means of payment, monetary stability and international monetary relations (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 9–10; Ehrenzeller/Nobs/Vallender, St. Galler Kommentar BV, Art. 99 N. 5–7).
N. 6 The cash monopoly («exclusively») is absolute and categorically excludes cantonal or private currencies. Kaufmann/Utz (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 11–15) emphasize that this monopoly also covers regional currencies and private means of payment insofar as they perform monetary functions. The distinction from mere accounting units or voucher systems is made according to functional criteria (general acceptance, store of value function, medium of exchange function).
b) Independence of the National Bank (Para. 2)
N. 7 The constitutionally guaranteed independence of the SNB comprises, according to the doctrine of Cukierman/Webb/Neyapti (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 22), four dimensions: personal, functional, institutional and financial independence. This independence is, according to empirical studies, an essential prerequisite for the successful fulfillment of the price stability mandate.
N. 8 The obligation to the «overall interests of the country» is primarily concretized in the legal mandate for price stability (Art. 5 para. 1 NBA), but according to Kaufmann/Utz (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 31–41) does not exclude consideration of cyclical developments. The SNB must orient its policy toward the overall economy and may not unilaterally pursue particular interests.
N. 9 The «participation and supervision of the Confederation» manifests itself in the appointment of the bank management by the Federal Council (Art. 42 NBA), the approval of the business regulations and the accountability obligation toward the Federal Council and Parliament (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 22–30). This integration preserves democratic legitimation while maintaining operational independence.
c) Currency Reserves (Para. 3)
N. 10 The obligation to build «sufficient currency reserves» is a constitutional requirement without precise quantification. According to Kaufmann/Utz (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 42–82), adequacy encompasses both the level and the composition of reserves. The SNB has considerable discretion in determining the necessary reserve level.
N. 11 The gold reserve («part of these reserves shall be held in gold») is constitutionally mandatory, without establishing a minimum share. The historical significance of gold as a currency anchor is reflected in this symbolic constitutional requirement, with the SNB determining the specific level according to monetary policy considerations (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 78–82).
d) Profit Distribution (Para. 4)
N. 12 The two-thirds rule for cantonal shares in SNB net profit is a mandatory constitutional requirement. According to Kaufmann/Utz (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 83–88), distribution is made according to resident population (Art. 31 NBA). The remaining third flows to the Confederation, with the exact profit determination and use regulated in the NBA.
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 13 From the currency monopoly follows the exclusive legislative competence of the Confederation for all currency-related matters. The cantons are excluded from any regulation in this area (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Verfassungsrecht, N. 2844). Private currencies or means of payment that compete with the legal tender are unconstitutional.
N. 14 The constitutional independence of the SNB establishes, according to the doctrine of Ehrenzeller/Nobs/Vallender (St. Galler Kommentar BV, Art. 99 N. 22), a limited intensity of judicial review of its monetary policy decisions. Courts can only challenge evidently unlawful measures, but cannot review monetary policy appropriateness.
N. 15 The gold reserve requirement obliges the SNB to permanently maintain gold holdings. According to Kaufmann/Utz (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 80), a complete disposal of gold reserves would be unconstitutional. However, the level of the gold share lies within the proper discretion of the SNB.
N. 16 The constitutional entitlement of the cantons to two-thirds of the net profit is directly enforceable. Profit distribution occurs annually according to the determined distributable profit pursuant to the profit distribution agreement concluded between the Confederation and the SNB (Kaufmann/Utz, BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 85–87).
#5. Controversies
N. 17 The exact scope of SNB independence in systemically relevant crises is disputed. Kaufmann (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 40) takes the view that the joint responsibility of SNB and FINMA for system stability requires close cooperation. Critical voices in the doctrine (Nobel, Finanzmarktrecht, N. 847) see in this a potential threat to monetary policy independence through regulatory entanglements.
N. 18 The permissibility of central bank digital currencies (CBDC) under Art. 99 BV is doctrinally controversial. Proponents like Vischer (Geld- und Währungsrecht, p. 234) see CBDC as a technological evolution of cash covered by the currency monopoly. Skeptics argue with Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Verfassungsrecht, N. 2851) that CBDC raises new constitutional questions regarding data protection and negative interest rates.
N. 19 The minimum gold share is the subject of ongoing debates. While Baltensperger (Der Schweizer Franken, p. 412) advocates for a substantial gold share to preserve confidence, Nobel (Finanzmarktrecht, N. 892) and the majority of the doctrine emphasize the necessity of flexible reserve policy without rigid gold quota.
#6. Practical Guidelines
N. 20 In assessing new means of payment (cryptocurrencies, regional currencies), the functional distinction from legal tender is decisive. The three monetary functions are determinative: medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. If a private means of payment comprehensively fulfills all three functions, it violates the Confederation's currency monopoly.
N. 21 Judicial challenge of SNB monetary policy measures is subject to high hurdles. According to the Federal Administrative Court's jurisprudence (B-4364/2009), only the allegation of evident legal violations is possible. Appellants must concretely demonstrate how the SNB has clearly exceeded its discretion or violated its legal mandate.
N. 22 For the practice of profit distribution, the multi-year profit distribution agreement between the FDF and SNB is determinative. This sets the annual distribution amounts considering earnings situation and reserve formation. The cantons have a right to information about profit use, but no influence on profit determination.
N. 23 International currency agreements and membership in international monetary organizations (IMF, BIS) require coordination between the Federal Council and SNB. While foreign policy competence lies with the Federal Council (Art. 184 BV), operational implementation must preserve SNB independence (Richli, Internationale Verflechtung, pp. 156–178).
Art. 99 BV
#Case Law
#Independence and Official Statements by the SNB
BGE 145 I 175 of 10 December 2018 — Admissibility of official interventions by the Swiss National Bank in the campaign for the Sovereign Money Initiative The Federal Supreme Court confirmed the SNB's authority to express its opinion publicly in votes concerning its area of responsibility. As an independent central bank (Art. 99 para. 2 BV), the SNB was entitled to comment on the Sovereign Money Initiative, but was required to observe the principles of objectivity, transparency and proportionality. The decision specifies the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the SNB and its limits in the democratic process.
«According to Art. 1 of the Federal Act of 3 October 2003 on the Swiss National Bank (NBA; SR 951.11), the SNB is a special-law corporation. As an independent central bank, it conducts a monetary and currency policy that serves the overall interest of the country (Art. 99 para. 2 BV). In performing its duties, the SNB is bound by fundamental rights (Art. 35 para. 2 BV).»
The decision is valued in doctrine as an important contribution to specifying SNB independence, with Häner (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 25) emphasising that institutional independence must not lead to complete isolation from democratic discourse.
#Legal Nature and Tasks of the SNB
BGE 109 Ib 146 of 1 July 1983 — Legal nature of the SNB's due diligence agreement The Federal Supreme Court clarified the distinction between public and private law actions of the SNB. Even in private law activities, the SNB remains bound by its public law mandate and fundamental rights. The decision is fundamental for understanding the dual legal nature of the SNB as a special-law corporation with a public law mandate.
«Finally, it should be noted that the National Bank is naturally also bound by its public mandate in the broadest sense even where it acts as a corporation under private law, which means that in its private law activities it must observe constitutional fundamental rights by analogy.»
This case law is described by Ehrenzeller/Nobs/Vallender (St. Galler Kommentar BV, Art. 99 N. 18) as pioneering for the classification of the SNB as a bearer of public tasks.
Judgment 2A.312/2004 of 22 April 2005 — Dismissal of an SNB director The Federal Supreme Court confirmed the federal competence for the appointment and dismissal of SNB management board members. The decision clarifies the federal integration of the SNB while maintaining operational independence. The Federal Council's dismissal authority represents an important control mechanism that ensures the accountability of SNB leadership to democratic institutions.
#Monetary Policy Measures and Judicial Control
Judgment B-4364/2009 of the Federal Administrative Court of 18 November 2009 — Limits of judicial review of monetary policy The Federal Administrative Court found that monetary policy decisions of the SNB are subject to only very limited judicial review. The constitutionally guaranteed independence of the SNB (Art. 99 para. 2 BV) excludes comprehensive material control of its monetary and currency policy. The court can only object to evidently unlawful measures.
«The lower instance has for years been conducting a monetary and currency policy that does not serve the interests of the country.»
This restrictive intensity of control is predominantly supported in the literature, with Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Verfassungsrecht, N. 2847) emphasising the democratic legitimacy of SNB independence through the Constitution.
#Currency Sovereignty and Coin Issuance
BGE 103 III 6 of 7 September 1977 — Non-attachability of demonetised silver coins The Federal Supreme Court decided on the legal nature of coins after their demonetisation. The decisive factor was that the coins could be exchanged at the SNB at full face value. The decision underlines the SNB's monopoly in money supply and the continuing redemption obligation for demonetised means of payment.
Judgment 6B_1205/2015 of 7 January 2016 — Violation of currency sovereignty The Federal Supreme Court dismissed an appeal alleging a violation of Art. 99 BV through the use of certain means of payment. The decision confirms the exclusive federal competence for monetary and currency matters and the comprehensive freedom of the legislature in designing the payment system.
#Profit Distribution and Currency Reserves
Judgment 2C_541/2010 of 27 December 2010 — VAT treatment of the SNB The Federal Supreme Court confirmed the VAT treatment of the SNB as a public law entity. The decision is relevant for the interpretation of Art. 99 para. 4 BV (profit distribution), as it underlines the public law nature of the SNB despite its legal form as a corporation.
The Federal Supreme Court case law on Art. 99 BV is valued in doctrine as restrained but consistent. Waldmann (BSK BV, Art. 99 N. 42) emphasises that the courts respect the constitutionally intended independence of the SNB and only intervene in cases of evident legal violations.