1The Confederation shall take measures to achieve balanced economic development, and in particular to prevent and combat unemployment and inflation.
2It shall take account of economic development in individual regions of the country. It shall cooperate with the Cantons and the business community.
3In the field of money and banking, in foreign economic affairs and in the field of public finance, the Confederation may if necessary depart from the principle of economic freedom.
4The Confederation, the Cantons and the communes shall take account of the economic situation in their revenue and expenditure policies.
5To stabilise the economic situation, the Confederation may temporarily levy surcharges or grant rebates on federal taxes and duties. The accumulated funds must be held in reserve; following their release, direct taxes shall be individually refunded, and indirect taxes used to grant rebates or to create jobs.
6The Confederation may oblige businesses to accumulate reserves for the creation of jobs; it shall for this purpose grant tax concessions and may require the Cantons to do the same. Following the release of the reserves, businesses shall be free to decide how the funds are applied within the scope of the uses permitted by law.
Article 100 BV gives the Confederation the power to manage the economy. It is to ensure that economic cycles (the alternation between good and bad economic times) run smoothly. Particularly important are the fight against unemployment and inflation (rising prices).
The Confederation must take all regions of Switzerland into account. It works together with the cantons and the economy. In important areas such as monetary matters, foreign trade and public finances, it may even deviate from economic freedom if necessary.
All state levels – Confederation, cantons and municipalities – must adapt their expenditure and revenue to the economic situation. In bad times they should spend more, in good times they should save.
The Confederation has special tools at its disposal: It can temporarily impose tax surcharges or grant rebates. The money collected must be set aside and later returned or used for job creation. Companies can build up reserves for difficult times with tax benefits.
A practical example was the Corona aid: short-time work compensation, hardship aid for restaurants and loans for companies. These measures were based on Article 100 BV, even though special laws regulated the details.
Today, classical economic cycle management has become less important. The National Bank conducts monetary policy independently, and the debt brake limits the scope for large spending programmes. Nevertheless, Article 100 BV remains the most important constitutional basis for the Confederation's economic policy measures in times of crisis.
No. 1 Art. 100 FC largely corresponds to the former Art. 31quinquies oldFC, which was incorporated into the Constitution in 1947 as part of the economic articles (Federal Gazette 1946 II 875). The provision received its current form during the total revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999, whereby the Confederation's core competences for economic cycle control remained unchanged (Federal Gazette 1997 I 354). The constitutional provision constitutes one of the few explicit exceptions to the principle of economic freedom and authorises the Confederation to undertake a broad spectrum of economic policy interventions.
No. 2 The emergence of the economic cycle articles is closely linked to the experiences of the global economic crisis of the 1930s and economic reconstruction after the Second World War. The constitutional legislator wanted to provide the Confederation with the necessary instruments to better manage future economic crises (Federal Gazette 1946 II 905). The popular vote of 6 July 1947 led to the adoption of the economic articles with a clear majority.
No. 3 Art. 100 FC stands in the 7th section of the 3rd title of the Federal Constitution on «Economy». The provision forms, together with → Art. 94 FC (principles of the economic order) and → Art. 27 FC (economic freedom), the constitutional foundation of the Swiss economic order. As lex specialis, Art. 100 FC takes precedence over the general principle of economic freedom and legitimises state interventions motivated by economic policy (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Swiss Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 2016, No. 3421).
No. 4 The provision shows close connections to → Art. 101 FC (foreign economic policy), → Art. 102 FC (national economic supply), and → Art. 103 FC (structural policy). These norms together form the constitutional framework for the Confederation's economic policy. Special importance attaches to the relationship with → Art. 126 FC (budget management), which anchors the debt brake and thus limits the fiscal policy scope for economic cycle policy measures.
No. 5Balanced economic development (para. 1): According to prevailing doctrine, the concept encompasses the «magic square» of economic policy: price stability, full employment, external economic equilibrium, and appropriate economic growth (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Swiss Federal Constitutional Law, 10th ed. 2020, No. 1022). The wording «in particular» shows that the prevention and combating of unemployment and inflation represent priority but not exhaustive objectives.
No. 6Consideration of regional development (para. 2): This provision obliges the Confederation to pursue a spatially differentiated economic policy. Cooperation with cantons and the economy is to be understood as a cooperation requirement that respects Switzerland's federalist structure (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Gallen Commentary, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 100 No. 8).
No. 7Departure from economic freedom (para. 3): The authorisation relates to three economic sectors: monetary and credit systems, foreign trade, and public finances. The criterion of necessity («if necessary») underlines the exceptional character of such interventions. Prevailing doctrine interprets this provision restrictively and requires an immediate threat to economic stability (Müller/Schefer, Fundamental Rights in Switzerland, 4th ed. 2008, p. 982).
No. 8Anti-cyclical fiscal policy (para. 4): The provision obliges all state levels to conduct budgets appropriate to the economic cycle. During economic booms, public budgets should be conducted restrictively; during recessions, expansively. This obligation stands in tension with the debt brake according to → Art. 126 FC (Waldmann/Belser/Epiney, BSK FC, 2nd ed. 2024, Art. 100 No. 15).
No. 9Cyclical surcharges and discounts (para. 5): This provision enables temporary variations in the tax burden for stabilisation purposes. The requirement to sequester the absorbed funds is intended to prevent their pro-cyclical use. The different treatment of direct and indirect taxes in reimbursement reflects administrative practical considerations.
No. 10Job creation reserves (para. 6): The instrument of job creation reserves was concretised by the Federal Act of 20 December 1951 (JCRA, SR 823.31). The formation of such reserves is voluntary but can be promoted through tax incentives. After release by the Federal Council, companies decide autonomously on their use within the framework of the legal purpose designation (Decision 2A.247/2003 of 22 December 2003 recital 2.1).
No. 11 Art. 100 FC establishes comprehensive legislative competences of the Confederation in the field of economic cycle policy. These competences are partly designed as discretionary provisions (paras. 1, 3, 5, 6), partly as obligations (paras. 2, 4). The provision contains no directly applicable subjective rights but requires concretisation through legislation.
No. 12 The most important implementing statutes are the Job Creation Reserves Act (JCRA), the National Bank Act (NBA, SR 951.11) for monetary policy measures, and the Financial Budget Act (FBA, SR 611.0) for anti-cyclical fiscal policy. The practical importance of classical economic cycle control has diminished since the 1990s, as monetary policy has been delegated to the independent National Bank and the debt brake restricts fiscal policy scope.
No. 13Relationship to the debt brake: It is disputed in doctrine to what extent the debt brake according to → Art. 126 FC restricts the economic cycle policy possibilities under Art. 100 FC. Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller (General Administrative Law, 4th ed. 2014, § 3 No. 18) take the view that Art. 126 FC as the more recent special provision takes precedence. In contrast, Vallender (St. Gallen Commentary, Art. 100 No. 12) argues that both norms can be reconciled through an economic cycle-appropriate interpretation of the debt brake.
No. 14Scope of the departure authority: The scope of para. 3 is controversially discussed. While Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (No. 3425) advocate a narrow interpretation and consider only temporary, proportionate interventions permissible, part of the doctrine argues for a broader understanding that also encompasses structural measures (Biaggini, FC Commentary, 2nd ed. 2017, Art. 100 No. 8). Previous state practice tends towards restrictive interpretation.
No. 15Justiciability: It is disputed whether and to what extent justiciable obligations can be derived from Art. 100 FC. The prevailing opinion denies this with reference to the wide discretionary scope of political authorities in economic cycle control (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, Art. 100 No. 15). A minority opinion considers judicial review possible at least in cases of obvious inaction despite severe economic crisis.
No. 16 The practical importance of Art. 100 FC has changed since the entry into force of the new Federal Constitution. The classical instruments of economic cycle control (paras. 5 and 6) have not been activated for decades. Instead, economic cycle policy occurs primarily through the National Bank's monetary policy, automatic stabilisers in the tax and social insurance system, and targeted measures in crisis situations.
No. 17 The COVID-19 pandemic has newly illustrated the relevance of Art. 100 FC. The Confederation's extensive stabilisation measures (short-time work compensation, hardship aid, guarantees) were implicitly based on this constitutional foundation, even though the concrete legal bases were mostly found in the Epidemics Act and emergency ordinances. This shows that Art. 100 FC retains its importance as a general economic policy competence basis.
No. 18 For legal application, it should be noted that economic cycle policy measures are always subject to the principle of proportionality according to → Art. 5 para. 2 FC. Interventions in economic freedom require a sufficient legal basis even when invoking Art. 100 para. 3 FC. The mere existence of a recession is insufficient; a qualified disruption of overall economic equilibrium is required.
Judgment 2A.247/2003 of 22 December 2003 consid. 2.1
Confirmation of the constitutional basis and division of competence between SECO and the tax authorities in the creation of job creation reserves.
The decision concretizes the implementation of Art. 100 para. 6 BV through the Job Creation Reserves Act.
«To promote a balanced economy and to prevent and combat unemployment, private sector enterprises may form tax-privileged job creation reserves through annual contributions (Art. 1 ABRG; see also Art. 100 para. 6 BV or Art. 31quinquies old BV).»
Federal Administrative Court Judgment B-3984/2009 of 4 March 2010 consid. 3.3
Constitutional anchoring of the release requirements for job creation reserves.
The judgment confirms that the release of reserves constitutes a mandatory prerequisite for their use.
«Art. 100 para. 6 BV (SR 101), which underlies the ABRG, already shows that enterprises can only decide on the deployment of reserves within the statutory purposes of use after their release.»
Federal Administrative Court Judgment B-4599/2012 of 22 October 2013
Confirmation of strict temporal requirements for the use of job creation reserves.
The judgment demonstrates the consistent application of economic policy instruments.
Federal Administrative Court Judgment B-2616/2013 of 11 September 2014
Further specification of the conditions for use of job creation reserves in the context of constitutional requirements.
The judgment emphasizes the importance of timely economic impact.
«The Federal Act on the Formation of Tax-Privileged Job Creation Reserves provides that private sector enterprises may form job creation reserves to promote a balanced economy and to prevent and combat unemployment [...] (Art. 100 para. 6 of the Federal Constitution).»
Regarding derogation from the principle of economic freedom under Art. 100 para. 3 BV, there is no supreme court case law yet. The constitutional provision has not been used as a basis for restrictions on economic freedom that have become contentious before the Federal Court.
Regarding the concrete application of Art. 100 para. 4 and 5 BV concerning economic considerations in fiscal policy and economic surcharges or discounts, there is no published supreme court case law. These instruments have not been activated since the Federal Constitution came into force in 1999.
#Cooperation Between the Confederation and the Cantons
BGE 96 II 305 of 18 June 1970
Fundamental considerations on the influence of economic factors in property law matters.
The decision shows the distinction between economy-related and other economic factors.
«An increase or decrease in value of an object belonging to the contributed property of the husband or wife that is solely attributable to economic conditions does not affect this calculation, but benefits or burdens the spouse who contributed the object in question.»
Recent case law on COVID-19 stabilization measures (2020-2024) refers primarily to special statutory bases and not directly to Art. 100 BV. The courts have regarded hardship aid and other stabilization measures as implementation of the Confederation's general economic policy competence, without explicitly referring to Art. 100 BV.