Art. 13 BGFA — Professional Secrecy

#Doctrine

#1. Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 13 BGFA codifies the lawyer's professional secrecy for the first time at the exhaustive federal level. Before the BGFA entered into force on 1 June 2002, the cantons regulated professional secrecy in their respective cantonal lawyers' acts; the federal anchor in Art. 321 SCC supplemented this cantonal framework in criminal law terms, without establishing a uniform professional duty of confidentiality. The Federal Council's Dispatch of 28 April 1999 justifies the codification of professional secrecy as a professional rule on the grounds that the lawyer's privilege is a central element of the legal order and of access to justice (BBl 1999 6039 para. 172.2). The Federal Council emphasised that para. 2 — the duty to ensure that auxiliary persons maintain secrecy — corresponds to the concept of the auxiliary person under Art. 101 CO (BBl 1999 6039 para. 172.2).

N. 2 The separate regulation of the release from secrecy in Art. 13 para. 1 sentence 2 BGFA was controversial during the legislative process. The Federal Council's draft provided that the release would not oblige the lawyer to disclose what had been confided. The parliamentary deliberation process was unusually intensive: the National Council and the Council of States diverged on multiple occasions; the Council of States referred the bill back to its committee on 16 March 2000. The current text of the provision was not reached until the conciliation procedure of the 2000 Spring Session and the final vote of 23 June 2000. Whether and to what extent the release from secrecy could be regulated under cantonal law was expressly left open in the parliamentary proceedings and was only settled by the Federal Supreme Court in BGE 142 II 307 (→ N. 18–19).

N. 3 The subject of the authorities' duty to report violations of the professional rules, also addressed in the Dispatch (BBl 1999 6047), was codified in Art. 15 BGFA and must be systematically distinguished from Art. 13 BGFA.

#2. Systematic Classification

N. 4 Art. 13 BGFA belongs to the second section of the Act (Art. 12–20), which governs the professional rules and supervision. Professional secrecy stands in a close relationship with the other professional rules: it gives concrete expression to the general duty of diligence under Art. 12 lit. a BGFA and interacts with the duty of independence under Art. 12 lit. b BGFA (↔ Art. 12 BGFA). A violation of professional secrecy is sanctioned under disciplinary law pursuant to Art. 17 BGFA and under criminal law pursuant to Art. 321 SCC (→ Art. 17 BGFA).

N. 5 Professional secrecy under Art. 13 BGFA has a radiating effect on procedural law as a whole: Art. 171 para. 1 CrimPC, Art. 160 para. 1 lit. b CPC, and Art. 42 para. 1 lit. b APA grant the lawyer a right to refuse to testify; Art. 264 para. 1 lit. d CrimPC protects the lawyer against seizure. The constitutional foundation lies in Art. 13 FC (protection of private life) and Art. 29 FC (right to a fair hearing). The Federal Supreme Court has underscored the institutional character of professional secrecy: it protects not only the individual interests of clients, but also serves the public interest in a functioning administration of justice (BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.1).

N. 6 Since its entry into force, the BGFA regulates lawyers' professional duties, including professional secrecy, exhaustively under federal law (BGE 131 I 223 E. 3.4; BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.1). Cantonal legal bases that sought to regulate professional secrecy differently or additionally — such as the requirement in the Canton of Vaud to obtain prior authorisation from the Bâtonnier — are incompatible with federal law (BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.2). Deontological rules of cantonal bar associations retain relevance insofar as they may be drawn upon to interpret and specify the federal professional rules (BBl 1999 6039 para. 172.2; BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.1).

#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content

3.1 Material Scope of Protection (para. 1 sentence 1)

N. 7 Protected is everything that «has been confided to the lawyer by his or her clients in the course of his or her professional activity». The Federal Supreme Court interprets this scope of protection broadly: it covers not only the content of mandate communications, but also the mere fact that a mandate relationship exists, the amount of fee claims, and all documents and communications that have a connection — even a loose one — with the conduct of the mandate (BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.2).

N. 8 The key criterion for determining whether something falls within the scope of protection is the functional delimitation: professional secrecy protects exclusively specifically legal activities; activities that could equally be performed by asset managers, fiduciaries, or bankers — notably asset management and investment — are not covered (BGE 112 Ib 606: right to refuse testimony denied for facts learned in connection with an activity confined to a purely commercial asset management mandate; BGE 135 III 597 E. 3.3). This distinction is of practical significance for internal investigations and compliance mandates in the financial market sector.

N. 9 Information falls within the protection of secrecy as soon as it is apparent to the lawyer that the client wishes confidentiality — regardless of whether that wish is expressed explicitly or inferred from the circumstances (BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.2; Fellmann, Anwaltsrecht, 2nd ed. 2017, N 530). Not protected, by contrast, are letters sent to the lawyer merely by way of copy, correspondence with lawyers representing third parties, and acts performed by the lawyer in a non-legal capacity (e.g. as a member of the board of directors) (BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.3).

3.2 Temporal and Personal Scope (para. 1 sentence 1)

N. 10 Professional secrecy applies «without time limit and towards all persons». It lapses neither upon termination of the mandate nor upon the death of the client. It must be observed equally towards third parties, authorities, courts, and heirs (BGE 135 III 597 E. 3.3 f.). The duty of confidentiality also exists towards the client's heirs; the heirs' right to information under Art. 400 para. 1 CO is restricted by the overriding professional secrecy (BGE 135 III 597 E. 3.4).

3.3 Effect of the Release from Secrecy (para. 1 sentence 2)

N. 11 A release granted by the client or the competent supervisory authority (→ N. 18–19) entitles the lawyer to disclose what has been confided, but does not obligate him or her to do so. Professional secrecy is in this sense «absolute»: the decision whether to disclose rests with the lawyer alone; neither the client nor the supervisory authority can compel the lawyer to make a disclosure (BGE 136 III 296 E. 3.3; Bohnet/Martenet, Droit de la profession d'avocat, 2009, N 1853, 1869). This distinguishes Art. 13 BGFA from other duties of confidentiality under the law of mandate (Art. 398 CO), which pass to the heirs under general rules.

3.4 Duty to Ensure Confidentiality through Auxiliary Persons (para. 2)

N. 12 Art. 13 para. 2 BGFA obliges the lawyer to ensure that his or her auxiliary persons maintain professional secrecy. The concept of «auxiliary person» is broad: it corresponds to the concept in Art. 101 CO and encompasses all persons to whom the lawyer delegates tasks in fulfilment of his or her professional duties — regardless of whether they work within the law firm or externally (employees, secretarial staff, trainee lawyers, external service providers such as cleaning companies, translation services, cloud providers) (BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.3; Bohnet/Martenet, Droit de la profession d'avocat, 2009, N 1861; Schiller, Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 2009, N 540 f.). Nater/Zindel take the view that the concept of auxiliary person departs from Art. 101 CO and must be interpreted more broadly (Nater/Zindel, Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz, 2nd ed. 2011, N 51 on Art. 13 BGFA).

N. 13 The duty under Art. 13 para. 2 BGFA is non-transferable: the lawyer cannot discharge himself or herself by contractually transferring responsibility for maintaining secrecy to the auxiliary person. Delegation is, however, permissible where the lawyer carefully selects the auxiliary person, instructs him or her on the duty of confidentiality, and monitors compliance therewith (Fellmann, Anwaltsrecht, 2nd ed. 2017, N 649). Sub-delegation — where the auxiliary person in turn transfers the confidentiality-sensitive tasks to a further third party — is impermissible, because the lawyer can no longer exercise adequate control (BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.4).

#4. Legal Consequences

N. 14 A violation of professional secrecy under Art. 13 BGFA entails three independent sanctions: disciplinary measures under Art. 17 BGFA (ranging from a reprimand to a permanent prohibition on practising), criminal prosecution under Art. 321 para. 1 SCC (custodial sentence of up to three years or a monetary penalty), and civil liability under Art. 97 CO in conjunction with the law of mandate (→ Art. 17 BGFA; ↔ Art. 321 SCC). The disciplinary sanction and the criminal sanction are independent of each other; a violation of Art. 13 BGFA always also satisfies the elements of the offence under Art. 321 SCC, insofar as the facts concerned were confided to the lawyer in the exercise of his or her profession (BGE 142 II 307 E. 4.1).

N. 15 Seizure and search of lawyers' files are permissible only under qualified conditions. The unsealing procedure under Art. 248 para. 1 CrimPC in conjunction with Art. 264 para. 1 lit. d CrimPC serves as a procedural safeguard: in the unsealing procedure, the competent authority separates out files that are demonstrably subject to professional secrecy (BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.1). In the case of lawyers' files, the requesting authority must demonstrate to what extent the law firm may be implicated in the criminal conduct under investigation (BGE 130 II 193 E. 4.3).

#5. Contested Issues

5.1 Exhaustive Federal Law and Relationship to Cantonal Law

N. 16 The BGFA regulates professional duties, including professional secrecy, exhaustively (→ N. 6). It follows from BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.1 that cantonal professional rules may only be invoked to interpret and specify the federal norm. Bohnet/Martenet affirm a certain gap-filling function for deontological rules (Bohnet/Martenet, Droit de la profession d'avocat, 2009, N 245, 294 ff.), whereas Schiller emphasises the exhaustive effect of the BGFA more sharply (Schiller, Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 2009, N 547). The Federal Supreme Court ultimately follows a restrictive line: cantonal «authorisation requirements» vis-à-vis the Bâtonnier are incompatible with federal law (BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.2).

5.2 Conditions for the Release from Secrecy

N. 17 Until BGE 142 II 307, the question of which criteria apply when the supervisory authority grants a release from secrecy was disputed. Art. 321 no. 2 SCC and Art. 13 para. 1 sentence 2 BGFA do not specify such criteria. Fellmann took the view that professional law could impose stricter requirements than criminal law and could refuse a release even where a criminal law ground of justification would exist (Fellmann, Anwaltsrecht, 2nd ed. 2017, N 547 ff.). Schiller, Nater/Zindel, and Corboz, by contrast, advocated a balancing of interests based on the criminal law grounds of justification as a minimum standard (Nater/Zindel, Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz, 2nd ed. 2011, N 153 on Art. 13 BGFA; Schiller, Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 2009, p. 152).

N. 18 BGE 142 II 307 E. 4.3 has resolved this dispute: since the unification brought about by the BGFA, the criteria for a release from secrecy must be derived exclusively from federal law; cantonal law may not establish diverging standards. As a minimum requirement, the conditions for a criminal law ground of justification under Art. 321 no. 2 SCC must be met. This entails a balancing of interests in which only a clearly preponderant public or private interest can justify a release. Under professional law, the elements of a violation of professional secrecy cannot be defined more narrowly than under criminal law — contrary to Fellmann's position.

N. 19 The question of the right to refuse testimony following a release from secrecy has not been conclusively resolved. BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.2 holds — in the context of the unsealing procedure — that the procedural professional secrecy continues to subsist independently of a release under professional law. This confirms the substantive absoluteness of professional secrecy under Art. 13 para. 1 sentence 2 BGFA: a release by the client gives the lawyer merely a permission; it creates no obligation whatsoever to disclose — the decision remains with the lawyer.

5.3 Concept of Auxiliary Person; Digital Infrastructure

N. 20 Whether cloud providers and external IT service providers qualify as «auxiliary persons» within the meaning of Art. 13 para. 2 BGFA is contested. The Federal Supreme Court, in BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.3, answered this question in the affirmative in principle: external service providers are also auxiliary persons where they are contractually linked to the lawyer and potentially have access to information protected by professional secrecy. Chappuis/Alberini and Maurer/Gross favour a broad qualification as auxiliary persons that includes cloud providers (Chappuis/Alberini, Secret professionnel de l'avocat et solutions cloud, Revue de l'Avocat 8/2017, p. 340; Maurer/Gross, CR, Loi sur les avocats, 2010, N 97–100 on Art. 13 LLCA). Nater/Zindel likewise favour a broad interpretation but doubt complete congruence with Art. 101 CO (Nater/Zindel, Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz, 2nd ed. 2011, N 52 f. on Art. 13 BGFA). The practical consequence is that the lawyer must conclude an explicit written confidentiality agreement with cloud providers and must exclude sub-delegation (BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.4–7.5).

5.4 In-House Lawyers

N. 21 In-house legal counsel employed under an employment contract cannot in principle rely on Art. 13 BGFA, since — owing to their non-registration in the cantonal register of lawyers under Art. 8 BGFA and their subordinate relationship to their employer — they are not subject to the BGFA. The Federal Supreme Court has clearly established this in respect of lawyers without BGFA registration (BGE 145 II 229 E. 6.1 ff.). This limitation also applies in the area of legal privilege: the Swiss protection is narrower than the Anglo-American concept, which is of considerable practical significance in international proceedings (competition law, international mutual legal assistance) (Fellmann, Anwaltsrecht, 2nd ed. 2017, N 520).

#6. Practical Notes

N. 22 A lawyer violates Art. 13 para. 2 BGFA if he or she engages auxiliary persons without instructing them in writing on the duty of confidentiality. In the case of external service providers (cloud, translation, detective agencies), it is recommended to conclude a confidentiality agreement containing an express prohibition on sub-delegation and a clear allocation of liability to the service provider (BGE 145 II 229 E. 7.5; Fellmann, Anwaltsrecht, 2nd ed. 2017, N 649).

N. 23 In unsealing proceedings, the lawyer should immediately request sealing (Art. 248 para. 1 CrimPC) and substantiate to the unsealing court, for each individual document, the extent to which it is attributable to the mandate relationship. A blanket invocation of professional secrecy is insufficient (BGE 143 IV 462 E. 2.3; BGE 130 II 193 E. 4.3).

N. 24 A lawyer who requests a release from professional secrecy — for example in order to enforce outstanding fee claims — must demonstrate to the supervisory authority why he or she did not, or could not, require an advance payment. Without such substantiation, the balancing of interests will regularly operate against the granting of a release (BGE 142 II 307 E. 4.3.3). An advance release for possible future fee disputes is impermissible (BGE 150 II 300).

N. 25 For the distinction between mandate content that merits protection and that which does not, the decisive question is whether the activity in question is specifically legal in nature or whether it could equally be performed by a non-lawyer (asset manager, fiduciary). In cases of doubt, the specifically legal qualification should be documented in order to enable a successful defence in unsealing proceedings (→ BGE 112 Ib 606; BGE 135 III 597 E. 3.3).

#Cross-References

• ↔ Art. 12 BGFA (Professional rules; duty of diligence and independence)
• → Art. 17 BGFA (Disciplinary measures for violations)
• ↔ Art. 321 SCC (Criminal professional secrecy)
• → Art. 171 para. 1 CrimPC (Right to refuse testimony in criminal proceedings)
• → Art. 160 para. 1 lit. b CPC (Right to refuse to cooperate in civil proceedings)
• → Art. 264 para. 1 lit. d CrimPC (Protection against seizure)
• → Art. 13 FC (Protection of private life)
• → Art. 101 CO (Concept of auxiliary person)
• → Art. 8 para. 1 lit. d BGFA (Independence as a condition for registration)

#Rechtsprechung

#Sachlicher Geltungsbereich

BGE 130 II 193 27. Mai 2004 Das anwaltliche Berufsgeheimnis nach Art. 13 BGFA ist weit auszulegen. Bereits die blosse Tatsache, dass ein Mandatsverhältnis zwischen Anwalt und Klient besteht, wird vom Berufsgeheimnis erfasst. Der sachliche Schutzbereich beschränkt sich nicht auf den Inhalt der Kommunikation. Leitentscheid zum Umfang des sachlichen Schutzbereichs und zur Frage, ob das Bestehen eines Mandatsverhältnisses selbst geschützt ist.

«Das Anwaltsgeheimnis schützt auch die Tatsache, dass ein Mandatsverhältnis besteht, sowie sämtliche Umstände, die im Zusammenhang mit der Mandatsbeziehung stehen.»

BGE 112 Ib 606 1986 Der Schutzbereich des Berufsgeheimnisses erfasst Informationen, die dem Anwalt von der Klientschaft anvertraut wurden. Informationen, die der Anwalt unabhängig vom Mandatsverhältnis eigenständig erarbeitet hat, unterfallen grundsätzlich nicht dem Schutzbereich. Grundsatzentscheid zur Abgrenzung zwischen klientenseitig anvertrauten und eigenständig entwickelten Informationen.

«Unter das Berufsgeheimnis fallen nur Tatsachen, die dem Anwalt infolge seines Berufes von der Klientschaft anvertraut worden sind, nicht aber Erkenntnisse, die er unabhängig davon gewonnen hat.»

#Durchsuchung und Beschlagnahme

BGE 117 Ia 341 1991 Durchsuchungen von Anwaltsräumlichkeiten sind nur unter strengen Voraussetzungen zulässig. Der Anwalt hat das Recht, die Siegelung der beschlagnahmten Unterlagen zu verlangen, damit im Entsiegelungsverfahren geprüft wird, welche Unterlagen dem Berufsgeheimnis unterfallen. Grundsatzentscheid zum Schutz des Anwaltsgeheimnisses bei Hausdurchsuchungen und zum Entsiegelungsverfahren als Schutzmechanismus.

«Wird eine Anwaltskanzlei durchsucht, so hat der betroffene Anwalt das Recht, die Siegelung der Papiere zu verlangen, damit in einem Entsiegelungsverfahren geprüft werden kann, ob die Unterlagen dem Berufsgeheimnis unterstehen.»

#Unternehmensanwälte

BGE 145 II 229 26. Juni 2019 Unternehmensinterne Rechtsberater unterstehen grundsätzlich nicht dem anwaltlichen Berufsgeheimnis nach Art. 13 BGFA, da es ihnen an der erforderlichen Unabhängigkeit im Sinne von Art. 8 Abs. 1 lit. d BGFA fehlt. Der Schutzbereich des schweizerischen Anwaltsgeheimnisses ist enger als das anglo-amerikanische legal privilege. Leitentscheid zur Abgrenzung des Anwaltsgeheimnisses bei In-house Counsel und zum Verhältnis von Unabhängigkeit und Geheimnisschutz.

«Unternehmensinterne Rechtsberater unterstehen nicht dem Anwaltsgeheimnis, weil sie in einem Subordinationsverhältnis zu ihrem Arbeitgeber stehen und ihnen die für das Anwaltsgeheimnis vorausgesetzte Unabhängigkeit fehlt.»

#Zeugnisverweigerung

BGE 143 IV 462 28. September 2017 Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Anwalts im Strafverfahren nach Art. 171 StPO konkretisiert das Berufsgeheimnis von Art. 13 BGFA auf prozessualer Ebene. Die Anwältin oder der Anwalt kann die Aussage auch dann verweigern, wenn die Klientschaft sie oder ihn vom Berufsgeheimnis entbunden hat. Präzisierung des Verhältnisses zwischen berufsrechtlicher Geheimhaltungspflicht und strafprozessualem Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht.

«Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Anwalts besteht unabhängig davon, ob der Mandant den Anwalt vom Berufsgeheimnis entbunden hat.»