Art. 12 BGFA — Professional Rules

#Doctrine

#1. Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 12 BGFA codifies the substantive professional duties of lawyers at the federal level. Prior to the entry into force of the BGFA on 1 June 2002, professional rules were governed exclusively by cantonal law; a uniform national standard did not exist. The Federal Council's dispatch of 28 April 1999 (BBl 1999 6013, 6039) described the harmonisation of professional rules as a flanking measure to facilitate intercantonal freedom of movement: divergent cantonal professional duties created de facto barriers to mobility.

N. 2 As a conceptual guideline, the legislature pursued two objectives: first, the harmonisation of the «common denominator» of the cantonal professional legislation then in force (Fellmann, in: Fellmann/Zindel [eds.], Basler Kommentar zum Anwaltsgesetz [BSK BGFA], 2nd ed. 2011, N. 3 on Art. 12 BGFA), and second, a clear separation between generally binding statutory professional rules and the private rules of conduct of bar associations (BBl 1999 6040). Action was required because certain cantons did not exhaustively regulate professional duties by statute, but instead referred to association guidelines — which was problematic from the standpoint of the principle of legality.

N. 3 Letters a–d of the Federal Council's draft covered the four core duties (diligence, independence, avoidance of conflicts of interest, advertising). Parliament supplemented the catalogue during deliberations with letters e–j (prohibition of contingency fees, reference to company law liability rules, anti-money laundering, duty to inform clients). The dispatch described letters e–j as «rather technical points, which largely corresponded to the cantonal rules then in force» (BBl 1999 6057 no. 233.25). The current French text of letter e was amended by the drafting committee prior to the final vote, without any substantive change being intended; the German and Italian texts are therefore authoritative (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.7.2).

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#2. Systematic Classification

N. 4 Art. 12 BGFA belongs to Chapter 3 of the Act («Professional Rules and Supervision», Art. 12–20 BGFA). It is closely connected with:

• → Art. 8 para. 1 let. d BGFA (independence as a condition for registration): independence under let. b is simultaneously an ongoing professional duty and a static condition for registration; cf. ↔ Art. 8 BGFA.
• → Art. 13 BGFA (professional secrecy): professional secrecy is the most intensive expression of the duty of confidentiality and constitutes an autonomous professional duty that radiates throughout the entire law of procedure.
• → Art. 17 BGFA (disciplinary measures): any breach of Art. 12 BGFA may give rise to disciplinary measures; the prohibition on representation in the event of a conflict of interest is not a disciplinary sanction under Art. 17, but a procedural consequence of the lack of capacity to appear before the courts (BGE 138 II 162 E. 2.5.1).

N. 5 Art. 12 BGFA is exhaustive (numerus clausus). Cantonal professional rules that go beyond the federal catalogue lack a legal basis (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.1.1; BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.1; BBl 1999 6039). Since the entry into force of the BGFA, cantonal rules of conduct of private bar associations may only be used as an aid to interpretation insofar as they express a view prevailing in virtually all cantons throughout Switzerland (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.1.1). This applies equally to the guidelines of the Swiss Bar Association (SAV).

N. 6 The professional rules bind lawyers in all areas of their professional activity, not only in the representation of parties before courts. Extrajudicial mandates, advisory work, and other professional conduct are also covered. The professional duties do not apply to private life (cf. Kantonsgericht Uri, 06/07 40, E. 1).

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#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content

3.1 Diligence and Conscientiousness (let. a)

N. 7 Let. a establishes the general clause of lawyers' professional duties. The lawyer must practise his or her profession «with diligence and conscientiousness». According to the intent of the legislature, this obligation applies to all professional acts and extends to relations with authorities, the opposing party, and clients (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.2). The Federal Supreme Court has clarified that let. a does not contain a requirement always to adopt the «least intrusive possible approach»; however, «unnecessarily aggressive and inappropriately harsh conduct» is prohibited (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.2.2).

N. 8 The duty of diligence is given concrete expression in, among others, the following duties:

• Duty to advise: The lawyer must inform clients of the prospects and risks of proceedings (BGE 127 III 357 E. 1d).
• Confidentiality in settlement negotiations: Disclosure of settlement negotiations with the opposing party constitutes a breach of let. a (BGE 144 II 473 E. 2.1).
• Duty to communicate in criminal proceedings: Art. 12 let. a guarantees that the defence counsel may inform his or her client of the contents of procedurally relevant documents; a contrary prohibition issued by the investigating authority breaches let. a and b (BGE 146 IV 218 E. 3.2.2).
• Representation of the legal profession: A lawyer shares responsibility for the proper functioning of the rule of law and must refrain from excessive attacks on the opposing party (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.2.2, with reference to Wolffers, Der Rechtsanwalt in der Schweiz, 1986, p. 32).

N. 9 Let. a corresponds in its essence to the professional duty provision of Art. 32 SCC, which justifies defamatory statements by lawyers in proceedings insofar as they are relevant to the matter, do not exceed what is necessary, and are not needlessly offensive (BGE 131 IV 154 E. 3.4).

3.2 Independence (let. b)

N. 10 Let. b requires that the lawyer practise his or her profession «independently, in his or her own name and on his or her own responsibility». Independence encompasses an institutional and a personal dimension. Institutional independence is directed against extraneous influence from employers, law firm partners, or third parties; personal independence guards against the lawyer's own conflicts of interest.

N. 11 In the case of employed lawyers, the employer's organisation must offer the same guarantees as employment with a registered lawyer (BGE 138 II 440 E. 17). In the case of international law firms organised as a «limited liability partnership» (LLP) under foreign law, equivalent guarantees are lacking where the foreign partners are not subject to Swiss disciplinary supervision (BGE 140 II 102 E. 5.2.2). The assessment of independence under let. b must be conducted substantively and not formally; the decisive question is whether the employer is able to exercise extraneous influence over the conduct of the mandate (BGE 130 II 87 E. 4.3.3).

N. 12 Let. b is the professional-law counterpart to Art. 8 para. 1 let. d BGFA. The dual nature — as a condition for registration and as an ongoing professional duty — means that a permanent loss of independence arising after registration may give rise both to a disciplinary measure under Art. 17 BGFA and to removal from the register under Art. 9 BGFA (↔ Art. 8, 9 BGFA).

3.3 Conflicts of Interest (let. c)

N. 13 Let. c requires lawyers to avoid «any conflict» between the interests of their clients and the interests of third parties. The wording is strict: not only the actual conflict of interest is prohibited, but already the risk thereof. Let. c gives rise in particular to the prohibition on dual representation — the simultaneous representation of parties with opposing interests (BGE 135 II 145 E. 9.1; Fellmann, BSK BGFA, N. 96 ff. on Art. 12).

N. 14 The Federal Supreme Court has clarified that a purely abstract conflict of interest does not suffice to justify a prohibition on representation; what is required is a concrete conflict of interest, which must be established by the supervisory authority on the basis of the actual facts (BGE 135 II 145 E. 9.1, with reference to BGE 134 II 108 E. 4.2). A conflict of interest affecting a lawyer also extends to his or her law firm partners and associates (judgment 2P.297/2005 of 19 April 2006 E. 4.1).

N. 15 The duty to terminate: If a conflict of interest arises during an ongoing mandate, the lawyer must withdraw from the mandate. The prohibition on representation — whether pronounced by a disciplinary authority or a court — is not itself a disciplinary measure under Art. 17 BGFA, but a procedural consequence of the lack of capacity to appear before the courts (BGE 138 II 162 E. 2.5.1). It does not preclude a subsequent disciplinary decision.

N. 16 The procedural standing of the client: A person who is directly affected by a prohibition on representation (i.e., who loses his or her lawyer) has a protectable interest within the meaning of Art. 89 para. 1 let. c BGG and has standing to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court — a departure from the case law established in BGE 135 II 145 (BGE 138 II 162 E. 2.4–2.5). The right to be granted standing to appeal before cantonal instances may not be construed more restrictively than standing under Art. 89 BGG (BGE 135 II 145 E. 5).

3.4 Advertising (let. d)

N. 17 Let. d permits lawyers' advertising that «remains objective» and «corresponds to the information needs of the public». The starting point is admissibility: it is not advertising, but its restriction that requires justification (BGE 139 II 173 E. 6.1; BBl 1999 6056 no. 233.24). The dispatch expressly opposed a «general prohibition on advertising».

N. 18 Permissible advertising must be «restrained and factually accurate». The required restraint relates to the content, form, and methods of advertising (BGE 139 II 173 E. 6.2.2). Sensationalist, intrusive, and loudly promotional methods are impermissible. Factually accurate external advertising (firm signs) is in principle permitted; a large-format inscription on a building façade (length 9.4 m, illuminated, at a busy intersection) violates the required restraint in terms of presentation (BGE 139 II 173 E. 7). Cantonal supervisory authorities have a margin of appreciation in interpreting the indeterminate legal concepts (BGE 139 II 173 E. 6.3.2).

N. 19 Let. d must be interpreted in conjunction with Art. 27 FC (economic freedom) and Art. 95 FC (professional rules). There is a public interest in the proper and high-quality practice of the legal profession, which justifies restrictions on advertising (BGE 139 II 173 E. 5.1).

3.5 Prohibition of Contingency Fees (let. e)

N. 20 Let. e prohibits two forms of contingency arrangements: (1) the pactum de quota litis — an agreement to share in the proceeds of the proceedings in lieu of a fee; and (2) the prior waiver of a fee in the event of an unfavourable outcome. According to the authoritative German and Italian texts, the prohibition relates to an agreement «in lieu of a fee» (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.7.1).

N. 21 The pactum de palmario — a success premium in addition to the fee owed in any event — is in principle permissible, but must comply with three conditions (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.7.5):

1. The success-independent fee must not only cover costs but also enable the lawyer to earn a reasonable profit.
2. The success-dependent component may not exceed the success-independent component.
3. The pactum de palmario must be concluded at the outset of the mandate (or after conclusion of the dispute) — not during the ongoing mandate.

A pactum de palmario concluded in breach of these conditions violates Art. 12 let. e in conjunction with let. i BGFA and is void under Art. 20 CO (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.8.1).

3.6 Further Professional Duties (let. f–j)

N. 22 Let. f requires lawyers to hold client funds separately from their own assets (duty to manage assets separately). Let. g obliges lawyers to verify the identity of the counterparty in transactions constituting a mandate-establishing act within the meaning of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (↔ Art. 9 AMLA). Let. h prohibits professional activities that are incompatible with the legal profession or that jeopardise the reputation of the profession. Let. i obliges lawyers to inform clients, upon accepting a mandate, of the principles governing billing and to provide periodic or on-request information on the amount of fees; this duty is directly connected with the prohibition on the pactum de palmario (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.7.4). Let. j (inserted in 2004) requires lawyers acting as mediators to inform the parties concerned of the rules applicable to the proceedings and of the significance of their role as mediator.

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#4. Legal Consequences

N. 23 Breaches of Art. 12 BGFA may give rise to the following legal consequences:

(a) Under disciplinary law: The cantonal supervisory authority may order the following measures under Art. 17 BGFA: a caution, a reprimand, a fine of up to CHF 20,000, a temporary prohibition on practising (up to 2 years), or a permanent prohibition on practising. Multiple measures may be combined (Art. 17 para. 2 BGFA). A provisional withdrawal of the licence to practise is possible under Art. 17 para. 3 BGFA.

(b) Under civil law: Breaches of let. e (contingency fees) result in the nullity of the agreement under Art. 20 CO (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.8.1). Breaches of the duty of diligence under let. a may give rise to lawyer's liability under Art. 398 para. 2 CO.

(c) Under procedural law: In the event of a conflict of interest under let. c, the lawyer loses the capacity to appear before the courts and must be excluded from the proceedings. The prohibition on representation may be pronounced both by the supervisory authority and by the court conducting the proceedings (BGE 138 II 162 E. 2.5.1).

(d) Under criminal law: Breaches of let. a may in certain circumstances fulfil the elements of Art. 321 SCC (violation of professional secrecy), where professional secrecy is implicated (↔ Art. 13 BGFA, Art. 321 SCC).

N. 24 The cantonal supervisory authority of the canton of registration is competent for disciplinary supervision (Art. 14 para. 1 BGFA), not that of the canton in which the professional act was performed. Authorities competent for disciplinary supervision in the canton where the act occurred may additionally notify the registration authority (Art. 14 para. 2 BGFA).

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#5. Contested Issues

5.1 Scope of the Exhaustive Character (let. a)

N. 25 Whether the general clause in let. a transforms internal customs and usages of the legal profession into binding professional rules is disputed. The Federal Supreme Court rejects a wholesale incorporation and cautions against the unreflective adoption of local rules of conduct (BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.1.3). Fellmann/Zindel (BSK BGFA, N. 3 on Art. 12) favour allowing the SAV rules of conduct to be used as an aid to interpretation insofar as they are accepted throughout Switzerland. Bohnet/Martenet (Droit de la profession d'avocat, 2009, N. 294 ff.) consider the exhaustive character to be a mandatory requirement of the principle of legality and reject any normative effect of association guidelines. Practice follows the Federal Supreme Court: rules of conduct serve only as an aid to interpretation, not as an independent legal basis (BGE 136 III 296 E. 2.1).

5.2 Pactum de palmario (let. e)

N. 26 Prior to BGE 143 III 600, it was disputed whether the pactum de palmario violated Art. 12 let. e BGFA. The prevailing doctrine affirmed its admissibility in principle: Fellmann (BSK BGFA, N. 120, 122 on Art. 12), Bohnet/Martenet (Droit de la profession d'avocat, N. 1597), Schiller (Das Erfolgshonorar nach BGFA, SJZ 100/2004, p. 355 f.) and numerous other authors argued that let. e prohibited only the pure pactum de quota litis. A minority (Schwander, Erfolgshonorar ohne Zustimmung des Klienten?, ZBJV 145/2009, p. 590 ff.) considered any success-dependent element to constitute a breach of let. e, relying on the divergent French text — which resulted from the drafting committee's intervention. The Federal Supreme Court followed the majority view in BGE 143 III 600, but specified three cumulative conditions for admissibility (→ N. 21).

5.3 Independence of Employed Lawyers (let. b)

N. 27 The conditions under which employed lawyers at non-disclosure-obligated employers remain eligible for registration were developed by the Federal Supreme Court in a line of cases (BGE 130 II 87 → BGE 138 II 440 → BGE 140 II 102). Schiller (Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 2009, N. 1133) criticises the fact that the solution may lead to reverse discrimination against domestic lawyers compared with EU/EFTA lawyers, for whom the registration condition in Art. 8 para. 1 let. d BGFA cannot be invoked in the same way (cf. Art. 25 BGFA). The Federal Supreme Court considers such discrimination to be justified by the public interest in the independence of the legal profession (BGE 140 II 102 E. 5.2.3).

5.4 Concrete vs. Abstract Conflicts of Interest (let. c)

N. 28 Bohnet (Conflits d'intérêts: seuls les risques concrets comptent, Revue de l'avocat 8/2008, p. 364) and the Federal Supreme Court (BGE 135 II 145 E. 9.1) require a concrete conflict of interest in order to justify disciplinary intervention. In practice, supervisory authorities tended to regard abstract risks as sufficient. Nater (Interessenkollisionen: Herausforderung für Anwältinnen und Anwälte, SJZ 104/2008, p. 466) supports the requirement of a concrete conflict but cautions against setting the threshold too high and ignoring the preventive character of let. c. The Federal Supreme Court requires precise factual findings by the cantonal instance, without which a review of the conflict of interest is not possible (BGE 135 II 145 E. 9.2).

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#6. Practical Notes

N. 29 Distinction between professional law and rules of conduct: Lawyers must distinguish between SAV rules of conduct and cantonal association guidelines on the one hand, and federal professional rules on the other. The latter are exhaustive and solely determinative for disciplinary purposes. Association guidelines may assist in interpretation, but cannot give rise to independent duties.

N. 30 Conflict of interest management: Law firms should maintain a systematic conflicts-check procedure. If a conflict of interest already exists at the time of accepting a mandate, the mandate must be declined; if it arises during the mandate, the lawyer must withdraw immediately (→ Art. 17 BGFA). The prohibition on representation in the event of a conflict of interest may be pronounced ex officio by any court; it is advisable to disclose conflicts of interest proactively.

N. 31 Fee arrangements: Where success-related elements are to be agreed, care must be taken to ensure that (1) the fee owed in any event covers costs and provides a reasonable profit, (2) the success premium does not exceed the base fee, and (3) the agreement is concluded at the time of accepting the mandate — not subsequently. The duty to inform under let. i is mandatory (BGE 143 III 600 E. 2.7.5). Pure quota arrangements (pactum de quota litis) are void.

N. 32 Communication in criminal proceedings: Lawyers have the right and the duty to explain procedurally relevant documents to their clients. An instruction from the court conducting the proceedings prohibiting the lawyer from informing the client of the contents of a document violates let. a and b BGFA and is contrary to federal law (BGE 146 IV 218 E. 3.2.2–3.2.3). Art. 73 para. 2 CPC concerns communication with the outside world, not the internal lawyer-client communication.

N. 33 Advertising: Factually accurate, restrained advertising is permissible (website, letterhead, simple firm signs, search engine optimisation). Intrusive or loudly promotional methods are impermissible, as is advertising that — including in terms of presentation — lacks the required restraint. Cantonal supervisory authorities have a margin of appreciation; decisions on admissibility are subject to limited review by the Federal Supreme Court (BGE 139 II 173 E. 6.3.2).

N. 34 Professional duties and procedural law: Art. 12 BGFA radiates throughout the entire law of procedure. Its scope of application covers not only disciplinary law, but also the capacity to appear before the courts (Art. 68 CPC, Art. 127 CPC), fee claims (Art. 398 CO), and the law of evidence (admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence, cf. BGE 140 III 6 E. 3.1 on confidential lawyer correspondence).

#Rechtsprechung

#Sorgfaltspflicht (lit. a)

BGE 130 II 270 18. Juni 2004 Die Sorgfaltspflicht nach Art. 12 lit. a BGFA umfasst sämtliche beruflichen Handlungen und erstreckt sich auf die Beziehungen zu Behörden, Gegenpartei und Klientschaft. Kantonale Standesregeln dienen seit Inkrafttreten des BGFA nur noch als Auslegungshilfe, soweit sie eine landesweit geltende Auffassung widerspiegeln. Leitentscheid zum abschliessenden Charakter der bundesrechtlichen Berufsregeln und zur Reichweite der Generalklausel von lit. a.

«Auf kantonale Standesregeln kann seit Inkrafttreten des eidgenössischen Anwaltsgesetzes nur noch abgestellt werden, soweit die betreffende Standesregel eine landesweit in nahezu allen Kantonen geltende Auffassung zum Ausdruck bringt.»

BGE 131 IV 154 2005 Ehrverletzende Äusserungen von Anwälten im Prozess sind durch die Berufspflicht nach Art. 32 StGB gerechtfertigt, sofern sie sachbezogen sind, nicht über das Notwendige hinausgehen, nicht unnötig verletzend sind und nicht wider besseres Wissen erfolgen. Die Sorgfaltspflicht nach Art. 12 lit. a BGFA stimmt im Kern mit der strafrechtlichen Berufspflicht überein. Der Entscheid klärt das Verhältnis zwischen anwaltsrechtlicher Sorgfaltspflicht und strafrechtlichem Rechtfertigungsgrund.

«Diese Rechtsprechung zur Anwendung von Art. 32 StGB bei Äusserungen von Anwälten im Prozess stimmt im Kern mit Lehre und Praxis zur Berufsregel überein, wonach die Anwältinnen und Anwälte zur sorgfältigen und gewissenhaften Ausübung ihres Berufes verpflichtet sind.»

#Unabhängigkeit (lit. b)

BGE 140 II 102 6. Dezember 2013 Registereintrag einer bei einer internationalen Kanzlei angestellten Anwältin. Die Unabhängigkeitsanforderung von Art. 8 Abs. 1 lit. d BGFA ist materiell zu verstehen. Bei angestellten Anwälten muss die Organisation des Arbeitgebers dieselben Garantien bieten wie eine Anstellung bei registrierten Anwälten. Sind die ausländischen Partner nicht der schweizerischen Disziplinaraufsicht unterstellt, fehlt es an gleichwertigen Garantien. Grundsatzentscheid zur Unabhängigkeit in international organisierten Kanzleien und zur dualen Natur von lit. b als Berufsregel und Registrierungsvoraussetzung.

«On ne saurait dire que l'engagement de la recourante par A. LLP présente les mêmes garanties en termes d'indépendance que si elle était employée par un ou plusieurs avocat(s) inscrit(s) dans un registre cantonal.»

#Interessenkonflikte (lit. c)

BGE 135 II 145 2009 Der Mandant, dessen Anwalt wegen eines Interessenkonflikts diszipliniert wird, hat ein eigenes Beschwerderecht gegen den Disziplinarentscheid. Das Beschwerderecht vor den kantonalen Instanzen muss mindestens so weit reichen wie jenes vor Bundesgericht. Leitentscheid zur Legitimation der Klientschaft im Disziplinarverfahren bei Verstössen gegen lit. c.

«Das Beschwerderecht des Mandanten, dessen Anwalt wegen Interessenkonflikts diszipliniert worden ist, ist zu bejahen.»

BGE 138 II 162 20. Februar 2012 Unabhängig davon, ob ein Vertretungsverbot durch eine disziplinarische oder eine gerichtliche Behörde ausgesprochen wird, stellt es einen Eingriff in die Wirtschaftsfreiheit des Anwalts dar und kann angefochten werden. Die Beschwerdeberechtigung des betroffenen Mandanten wird bestätigt. Präzisierung der verfahrensrechtlichen Stellung bei Vertretungsverboten wegen Interessenkonflikten.

«Unabhängig davon, ob es durch eine disziplinarische oder eine gerichtliche Behörde ausgesprochen wurde, stellt das einem Anwalt auferlegte Vertretungsverbot einen Eingriff in die Rechtsstellung des betroffenen Mandanten dar.»

#Werbung (lit. d)

BGE 139 II 173 25. Januar 2013 Grundsatzentscheid zur Auslegung von Art. 12 lit. d BGFA. Nicht die Anwaltswerbung, sondern deren Einschränkung ist rechtfertigungsbedürftig. Zurückhaltende und sachlich zutreffende Werbung ist zulässig. Die gebotene Zurückhaltung bezieht sich auf Inhalt, Form und Methode. Im konkreten Fall wurde eine grossformatige Fassadenanschrift als unzulässig erachtet, weil die gestalterische Zurückhaltung fehlte. Wegweisender Entscheid zu den Grenzen der Anwaltswerbung unter dem BGFA mit umfassender historischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Einordnung.

«Nicht die Anwaltswerbung, sondern deren Einschränkung ist gemäss verfassungsrechtlich vorgezeichneter und gesetzlich konkretisierter Wertung rechtfertigungsbedürftig.»

#Berufsgeheimnis und Berufsregeln als numerus clausus

BGE 136 III 296 31. März 2010 Das BGFA nennt abschliessend die Berufsregeln. Kantonale Standesregeln der Anwaltsverbände, die über das Bundesrecht hinausgehen, sind nicht verbindlich. Im konkreten Fall war die kantonale Pflicht, vor einer Zeugenaussage die Bewilligung des Verbandspräsidenten einzuholen, bundesrechtswidrig. Bestätigung des abschliessenden Charakters der bundesrechtlichen Berufsregeln am Beispiel des Berufsgeheimnisses nach Art. 13 BGFA.

«Le droit fédéral énumère d'une manière exhaustive les règles professionnelles auxquelles sont soumis les avocats.»