All individuals shall take responsibility for themselves and shall, according to their abilities, contribute to achieving the tasks of the state and society.
Art. 6 FC – Personal responsibility and social responsibility
#Overview
Art. 6 FC governs the personal responsibility of every person and their obligation to participate in the state and society. The provision contains two main duties: every person must take responsibility for themselves and contribute to the common good according to their abilities.
Who is affected? All persons in Switzerland – Swiss citizens as well as foreigners. The provision applies to natural persons, i.e. to human beings, not to companies.
What does personal responsibility mean? Personal responsibility means that every person must bear the consequences of their decisions themselves. They should secure their livelihood through their own efforts. State assistance such as social assistance only comes into play when the person really can no longer provide for themselves. This assistance is subsidiary (secondary).
What does social responsibility mean? Every person should contribute «according to their abilities» to managing social tasks. These may be physical, financial or intellectual abilities. Concretely, this means for example: paying taxes, performing military service, sending children to school or engaging in voluntary work.
Practical example: An unemployed father must actively search for a new job and cannot simply receive social assistance without making an effort. At the same time, he must pay his taxes and ensure that his children attend school.
Legal effect: Art. 6 FC is a principle without direct enforceability before the courts. However, the courts use it to interpret other laws, particularly in social assistance and social insurance law. The provision supports the principle of subsidiarity: private initiative and personal responsibility come before state assistance.
#Doctrine
#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 6 Cst. was created during the total revision of the Federal Constitution in the parliamentary deliberations of 1996–1999. The Federal Constitution of 1874 contained no comparable article on personal responsibility. The 1985 proposal for a model constitution by the FDJP still envisaged a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental duties, which the Federal Council deliberately omitted from its draft constitution of 1996 (BBl 1997 I 1, 140 f.).
N. 2 The Federal Council's dispatch justified the omission of fundamental duties with two main arguments: the difficulty of deciding which duties deserve constitutional rank, and the problems of sanctioning breaches of duty (BBl 1997 I 141). At the same time, the Federal Council emphasized that the absence of a catalogue of fundamental duties "does not, however, mean that the inhabitants of this country have no duties towards the community".
N. 3 The parliamentary debates show a shift from the idea of fundamental duties towards the concept of individual and social responsibility. Federal Councillor Arnold Koller argued that the understanding of human nature underlying the Constitution already contained the idea of responsibility: if human beings are capable of autonomy, they also bear the responsibility that comes with it (Rochel, Commentary on Art. 6 Cst., N 11).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 4 Art. 6 Cst. stands at the end of the first title on general provisions, immediately before the second title on fundamental rights, civil rights and social objectives. This placement underlines the programmatic character of the norm as a general constitutional provision with radiating effect on the entire constitutional text (Biaggini, Cst.-Commentary, Art. 6 N 1).
N. 5 The systematic position before the fundamental rights is deliberately chosen: Art. 6 Cst. functions as a counterweight to the positive obligations of the state and symbolically emphasizes the subsidiarity principle (→ Art. 5a Cst.). This is particularly evident in Art. 41 para. 1 Cst., where the Confederation and cantons commit themselves to the social objectives "in addition to personal responsibility and private initiative" (Gächter/Renold-Burch, BSK Cst., Art. 6 N 3).
N. 6 The norm is closely connected with other constitutional provisions: ↔ Art. 2 para. 3 Cst. (equal opportunities), ↔ Art. 5a Cst. (subsidiarity), → Art. 8 Cst. (equality before the law and prohibition of discrimination), → Art. 12 Cst. (right to assistance in emergency situations), → Art. 41 Cst. (social objectives), → Art. 59 Cst. (military service), → Art. 62 Cst. (compulsory education).
#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content
N. 7 Art. 6 Cst. contains two components: individual responsibility ("Every person takes responsibility for themselves") and social responsibility ("contributes according to their ability to the accomplishment of the tasks of state and society").
N. 8 Addressees: The expression "every person" includes all natural persons regardless of their nationality. According to Chatton (CR Cst., Art. 6 N 20), legal persons should also be included by analogy based on the language versions and preparatory work, as they can have considerable positive and negative effects on their environment.
N. 9 Individual responsibility: This encompasses more than mere attribution of one's own decisions. In relational interpretation, personal responsibility means the duty to recognize the consequences of one's own decisions and to control negative effects on others (Rochel, Commentary on Art. 6 Cst., N 33-34). This presupposes certain competencies, in particular basic education (→ Art. 19, 62 Cst.).
N. 10 Social responsibility: The contribution "according to their ability" introduces a principle of justice. The concept of "ability" is to be understood as synonymous with capabilities – of a physical, psychological, intellectual and financial nature (Häberle, SGK Cst., Art. 6 N 21). The distinction between "state" and "society" is deliberately chosen and gives civil society constitutional existence (Rochel, N 55-57).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 11 Art. 6 Cst. is understood by prevailing doctrine as a programmatic norm with limited direct legal effect (Mahon, Petit Commentaire, Art. 6 N 3; Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Swiss Constitutional Law, N 3616). The Federal Supreme Court qualified the norm as having no "particular normative significance, but essentially declaratory and signalling effect" (BGE 131 V 339 C. 3.4.1).
N. 12 Despite its limited justiciability, Art. 6 Cst. has important legal effects:
- As an aid to interpretation for other constitutional norms, particularly in determining the understanding of human nature in the Constitution
- As concretization of the subsidiarity principle in social assistance law (BGE 142 V 178 C. 5.1)
- In determining the reasonableness of personal contributions (judgment 8C_708/2018 C. 5.2)
- As justification for mandatory insurance to protect the solidarity community
N. 13 The norm does not establish independent fundamental duties, but can be used to concretize existing legal duties. However, it may not be used to create conditions that are not provided for in a law or other constitutional provisions (Chatton, CR Cst., Art. 6 N 23).
#5. Controversial Issues
N. 14 Legal nature of the norm: While the majority doctrine sees Art. 6 Cst. as a purely programmatic provision without direct legal effect (Biaggini, Cst.-Commentary, Art. 6 N 8), other authors recognize considerable normative potential. Häberle (SGK Cst., Art. 6 N 22) sees development possibilities through legislative concretization and doctrine. Chatton (CR Cst., Art. 6 N 22-23) criticizes the overly restrictive view and emphasizes the minimal legal significance as an aid to interpretation.
N. 15 Relationship between personal responsibility and subsidiarity: It is disputed whether Art. 6 Cst. constitutionally anchors the subsidiarity principle. Gächter (Personal responsibility as a constitutional basic assumption, ZSSV 2018, 693 ff.) affirms this emphatically. Pärli (The problem with personal responsibility, ZSSV 2018, 707 ff.) warns against overemphasizing personal responsibility, which could endanger welfare state achievements.
N. 16 Scope of social responsibility: The extent of the duty to participate in social tasks is controversially discussed. Kley (Fundamental duties of private persons, 135 ff.) advocates for a restrictive interpretation limited to legally concretized duties. Winistörfer (in: Schmid, Fundamental right and principle, 2021, 89) sees room for broader moral appeals, for example in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility.
N. 17 Application to legal persons: While Chatton supports the analogous application to legal persons (CR Cst., Art. 6 N 20), the majority doctrine rejects this. Bertschi/Gächter (New accents in the "updated" Federal Constitution, 2000, 3 ff.) argue that Art. 6 Cst. is primarily directed at natural persons as bearers of moral responsibility.
#6. Practical Guidance
N. 18 In social assistance, Art. 6 Cst. is regularly relevant for assessing the duty of personal contribution and cooperation duties. However, the authorities must assess individual capabilities contextually – personal responsibility is not an absolute quantity (Studer, Social assistance employment relationships, 2021, 156 ff.).
N. 19 In social insurance law, Art. 6 Cst. serves to justify information duties of the insured and to justify benefit reductions in case of self-inflicted damage. However, the requirements must be proportionate and take into account actual capabilities (Riemer-Kafka, The duty to personal responsibility, 1999, 234 ff.).
N. 20 For legislation, Art. 6 Cst. offers orientation in designing mandatory insurance and the balance between individual provision and collective security. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the limits of personal responsibility must be rediscussed (Müller, On freedom, excessive demands and boomerangs, ZBl 2022, 1 f.).
N. 21 In judicial proceedings, Art. 6 Cst. should only be used cautiously as an independent argument. The norm is primarily suitable for strengthening other constitutional or legal foundations, but not for justifying new duties without a legal basis.
Case law
#Fundamental significance and subsidiarity principle
BGE 141 I 153 (17 September 2015) — Crediting of cohabitation contribution in social assistance budget The subsidiarity principle is an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community enshrined in Art. 6 Cst. Crediting a cohabitation contribution in a stable cohabitation violates neither the prohibition of arbitrariness nor legal equality.
«Social assistance is governed by the subsidiarity principle. As a fundamental principle in social assistance law, subsidiarity means that social assistance is in principle only granted to the extent that the individual has no access to other reasonable sources of assistance. It is thus an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community, as enshrined in Art. 6 Cst.»
BGE 150 V 161 (1 February 2024) — Subsidiarity principle and occupational benefit protection Art. 6 Cst. establishes the subsidiarity principle in social assistance law, which must however be balanced against federal occupational benefit protection and the principle of proportionality when it comes to the obligation to draw early vested benefits.
«The subsidiarity principle is an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community, as enshrined in Art. 6 Cst. (BGE 150 I 6 consid. 10.1.2 with references; BGE 141 I 153 consid. 4.2 with references; judgments 8C_17/2023 of 5 October 2023 consid. 4; cf. also Art. 41 para. 1 Cst.).»
#Current application in social assistance law
Judgment 8C_138/2024 (8 July 2025) — Cohabitation contribution and supplementary benefits Even with cohabiting partners who receive supplementary benefits, a cohabitation contribution can be credited. The subsidiarity principle as an expression of Art. 6 Cst. justifies the consideration of all income of the partner, including supplementary benefits.
«Social assistance is governed by the subsidiarity principle (BGE 141 I 153 consid. 4.2). As a fundamental principle in social assistance law, subsidiarity means that social assistance is in principle only granted to the extent that the individual has no access to other reasonable sources of assistance. It is thus an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community, as enshrined in Art. 6 Cst.»
Judgment 8C_708/2018 (26 March 2019) — Crediting of helplessness allowance The crediting of income in social assistance budgets follows the subsidiarity principle. When parents care for a disabled child, the helplessness allowance can in principle be credited as income, taking into account the special circumstances.
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that the subsidiarity principle serves as a constitutional basis for crediting various types of income in social assistance assessment.
#Administrative court case law
Administrative Court of Bern, judgment 200 2016 679 (17 February 2017) — Subsidiarity in social assistance The subsidiarity principle is, with regard to Art. 6 Cst., an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community. Other reasonable sources of assistance must be used as a priority.
«As a fundamental principle in social assistance law, subsidiarity means that social assistance is in principle only granted to the extent that the individual has no access to other reasonable sources of assistance. It is thus an expression of the duty of joint responsibility and solidarity towards the community, as enshrined in Art. 6 Cst.»
Administrative Court of Zurich, decision VB.2018.00357 (7 November 2019) — Cohabitation contribution and personal responsibility Crediting a cohabitation contribution corresponds to the principle of personal responsibility under Art. 6 Cst. and the subsidiarity principle in social assistance law.
The court held that the economic approach for cohabiting couples corresponds to the constitutional obligation of joint responsibility.
#Historical development
BGE 121 I 138 (19 April 1995) — Landsgemeinde assemblies and civic duties Art. 6 Cst. was mentioned in the context of civic duties and democratic participation. The court recognised the constitutional anchoring of joint responsibility, without however elaborating on this in detail.
BGE 91 I 110 (1965) — Parish councils and civic duties Early mention of civic duties in the context of the organisation of parish councils. The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that certain forms of organisation can presuppose civic joint responsibility.
#Further areas of application
BGE 96 I 636 (1970) — Concordats and civic duties Art. 6 Cst. was mentioned in connection with obligations under concordats, whereby the Federal Supreme Court emphasised the significance of the civic duty to participate in state and social affairs.
BGE 89 I 80 (1963) — Municipal organisation Early case law on the significance of civic duties in municipal self-administration. The court recognised the constitutional basis for participation obligations at municipal level.
#Relationship to other constitutional provisions
BGE 94 I 525 (1968) — Basel reunification Art. 6 Cst. was mentioned in the context of federalist reorganisation. The court referred to the significance of civic duty for democratic decision-making in complex state organisation procedures.
The case law shows that Art. 6 Cst. has gained practical significance particularly in social assistance law, where the subsidiarity principle is understood as a direct expression of constitutional personal responsibility and solidarity. More recent decisions confirm this case law and apply it to new factual situations, particularly in the consideration of different types of income in social assistance budgets.