1Restrictions on fundamental rights must have a legal basis. Significant restrictions must have their basis in a federal act. The foregoing does not apply in cases of serious and immediate danger where no other course of action is possible.
2Restrictions on fundamental rights must be justified in the public interest or for the protection of the fundamental rights of others.
3Any restrictions on fundamental rights must be proportionate.
4The essence of fundamental rights is sacrosanct.
Overview
Art. 36 FC regulates when and under what conditions the state may interfere with the fundamental rights of citizens. The provision functions like a kind of «emergency brake» for state power. It protects against arbitrary interference with fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, the right to private life, or the guarantee of property.
Who is affected? All state authorities — from municipalities to the Confederation — must follow these rules. Also affected are all persons whose fundamental rights are to be restricted, whether through laws, ordinances, or individual decisions.
What does the provision require? Four strict conditions must be cumulatively (all together) fulfilled:
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Legal basis: Serious interference requires a formal law from Parliament. For a house search, an ordinance is not sufficient. Only in cases of acute danger may the state act without a law.
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Justification: A public interest (security, health, order) or the protection of other fundamental rights must justify the interference. Mere administrative convenience is not sufficient.
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Proportionality: The means must be suitable, necessary, and reasonable. A total ban on demonstrations would be disproportionate if conditions would suffice.
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Protection of the essential content: The absolute core of a fundamental right may never be touched. The prohibition of torture or the subsistence minimum are inviolable.
Practical example: If the police want to search an apartment, they need a legal basis (Criminal Procedure Code), a justified reason (suspicion of a criminal offense), proportionate means (not tear apart the entire apartment for a minor offense), and may not destroy the essential content of privacy.
The provision applies to all fundamental rights interferences — from traffic controls to tax laws. It is the most important instrument for protecting individual freedom in a constitutional state.
Art. 36 FC — Restriction of Fundamental Rights
#Doctrine
#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 36 FC is an innovation of the total revision of 1999. The previous Federal Constitution of 1874 contained no general rule on the conditions for restricting fundamental rights; these had partly been formulated in connection with individual fundamental rights and partly developed through unwritten constitutional law and case law. The Federal Council's dispatch of 20 November 1996 described the objective as a codification and systematic consolidation of «unwritten principles of constitutional law» in a general provision (BBl 1997 I 195). The Federal Council deliberately chose not to regulate the conditions for restriction at each individual fundamental right in the manner of the ECHR, and instead opted for a comprehensive general clause (BBl 1997 I 195 f.).
N. 2 In the preliminary draft of 1996, the provision appeared as Art. 32 PD 96. The dispatch emphasised that the provision codifies four cumulative conditions for every restriction of a fundamental right: legal basis, public interest or protection of the fundamental rights of third parties, proportionality, and preservation of the core content (BBl 1997 I 563). The three-tier structure — para. 1 on the normative level, para. 2 on substantive justification, para. 3 on proportionality — and the absolute guarantee of core content in para. 4 were adopted by the parliamentary deliberations without substantive amendment.
N. 3 In the Council of States, Schmid Carlo (C, AI) moved for an exhaustive enumeration of permissible grounds for restriction in the Constitution, so as to remove political discretion from the Federal Supreme Court: «Engaging in politics is our business, not dispensing justice; dispensing justice is the business of the Federal Supreme Court, not engaging in politics.» Rapporteur Rhinow René (R, BL) objected, arguing that an enumerated catalogue would exclude legitimate grounds for restriction such as energy policy and spatial planning, and would curtail cantonal autonomy: «Your motion, Mr Schmid, falls into the category of 'well-intentioned is often the opposite of good'.» Federal Councillor Leuenberger supported the committee version; he emphasised that a catalogue could generate uncertainty, for example regarding «morality» as a public interest. The Schmid motion was rejected; the provision remained in its open form. The final votes took place on 18 December 1998 (both chambers) and 8/8 October 1999 (definitive adoption).
N. 4 The following were expressly rejected during the legislative process: the inclusion of environmental protection or sustainability as a general limitation on fundamental rights, a definition of core content in the constitutional provision itself, and a restriction of the public interest to constitutionally defined State tasks (BBl 1997 I 196 f.). These decisions deliberately left the provision open for judicial concretisation.
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 5 Art. 36 FC appears in the second chapter of the Federal Constitution on fundamental rights (Art. 7–36 FC) and forms its conclusion. The provision has a dual function: it protects fundamental rights by establishing binding limits on State intervention, while simultaneously authorising the State to restrict fundamental rights under certain conditions. → Art. 5 para. 2 FC (general principle of proportionality) is closely related, but must be distinguished from Art. 36 para. 3 FC: Art. 5 para. 2 applies to all State action, whereas Art. 36 para. 3 applies specifically to restrictions of fundamental rights.
N. 6 Art. 36 FC applies to all fundamental rights under Art. 7–34 FC, that is, to defensive rights, institutional guarantees, and positive obligations arising from fundamental rights. The provision does not apply to the non-justiciable social goals of Art. 41 FC (→ Art. 41 FC). For certain fundamental rights, specific conditions for restriction supplement Art. 36 FC: Art. 31 FC for deprivation of liberty, Art. 15 para. 4 FC for the forum internum of freedom of religion, Art. 10 para. 3 FC for the prohibition of torture. These special reservations take precedence as leges speciales (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 306).
N. 7 In relation to the ECHR, Art. 36 FC has no corresponding provision; the ECHR regulates the conditions for restriction in connection with each individual guarantee (e.g. Art. 8 para. 2, Art. 9 para. 2, Art. 10 para. 2, Art. 11 para. 2 ECHR). The Swiss approach of a general clause allows for a uniform dogmatics, whereas the ECHR system distinguishes between rights that may be restricted and absolute rights (Art. 3, 4 para. 1, 7 ECHR). Art. 36 para. 4 FC corresponds to the absolute core of the non-derogable ECHR rights (→ Art. 15 ECHR). → Art. 190 FC must be observed: federal statutes are binding on the Federal Supreme Court even if they violate Art. 36 FC.
#3. Elements of the Provision / Normative Content
3.1 Legal Basis (Para. 1)
N. 8 Para. 1 sentence 1 establishes the requirement of a legal basis: every restriction of a fundamental right must be based on a legal foundation. «Restriction» is to be understood broadly: it covers all State action that affects the protected scope of a fundamental right, irrespective of whether it takes the form of a condition, a prohibition, an obligation, or a sanction. The Federal Supreme Court has consistently described the principle of legality in its fundamental-rights dimension as follows: «The principle of legality requires a sufficient and appropriate degree of determinacy of the legal rules to be applied, in the service of the requirement of a legal basis, legal certainty (calculability and foreseeability), and equal application of the law» (BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1).
N. 9 Para. 1 sentence 2 tightens the requirement for serious restrictions: these must be «provided for in the law itself», i.e. in an act of parliament. An act of parliament is characterised by democratic legitimacy: it is enacted by the parliament with the possibility of a referendum. The purpose of this heightened requirement is the democratic accountability of intensive restrictions of fundamental rights (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.1). For minor interferences, a basis in subordinate legislation enacted within the proper competence suffices; the severity of the specific interference in question is determinative. The act of parliament must itself contain the essential elements of the permissible interferences; a complete regulation in subordinate legislation is impermissible for serious interferences (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.1; Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 67 ff.).
N. 10 The required degree of normative density cannot be determined in the abstract. It depends on: the variety of factual situations to be regulated, the severity of the interference, the addressees of the norm, and the foreseeability of decisions in individual cases (BGE 128 I 327 E. 4.2; BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1). In police law, reduced requirements of determinacy apply owing to the particular nature of the regulatory field — unforeseeable threat situations, situational adaptation; imprecision is compensated for by heightened requirements of proportionality (BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1; BGE 128 I 327 E. 4.2). Parliamentary ordinances based directly on a cantonal constitution have the status of acts of parliament and are sufficient as a legal basis (BGE 128 I 327 E. 4.1).
N. 11 Para. 1 sentence 3 contains the emergency clause (police general clause): in the event of a serious, imminent, and otherwise unavoidable danger, restrictions of fundamental rights are exceptionally permissible even without a legal basis. The three conditions are cumulative: (1) Seriousness: ordinary disruptions do not suffice; (2) Imminence: the danger must have concretised in the present; (3) Unavoidability by other means: there must be a genuine emergency for which no statutory means are available. The clause is to be interpreted restrictively and may not be invoked where typical and foreseeable threat situations have not been regulated despite being known (BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1; BGE 100 Ia 144 on the subsidiary nature of the general clause; Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 1862).
3.2 Public Interest or Protection of the Fundamental Rights of Third Parties (Para. 2)
N. 12 Para. 2 requires a substantive justification of the interference by a public interest or by the protection of the fundamental rights of third parties. The listing of both grounds for justification side by side was a deliberate decision of the constitutional legislature as against earlier drafts (BBl 1997 I 196). The public interest is an unwritten concept, concretised through case law and legal scholarship. It encompasses the classical police interests (public safety, order, health, and morals) as well as broader public welfare interests such as spatial planning, environmental protection, the economic order, and procedural guarantees under the rule of law (BGE 129 I 232 E. 3). The constitutional legislature expressly rejected limiting the public interest to constitutionally defined State tasks (BBl 1997 I 196).
N. 13 The protection of the fundamental rights of third parties as an independent ground for justification is the most important difference from earlier versions and from the ECHR. It enables direct horizontal effect of fundamental rights through State intervention: the State interferes with the fundamental right of one person in order to protect the fundamental right of another. Where the fundamental rights of different holders come into conflict, a balancing exercise must be conducted (BGE 134 I 140 E. 6.2: protection of the respondent from domestic violence as grounds for justifying an exclusion order; BGE 128 I 327 E. 4.3.2: fundamental rights of event participants as justification for exclusion measures).
3.3 Proportionality (Para. 3)
N. 14 Para. 3 codifies the principle of proportionality as a limitation on interferences. The Federal Supreme Court applies a three-stage test:
- Suitability: The measure must be suitable to achieve the desired objective, i.e. causally contribute to it.
- Necessity: Among several equally suitable measures, the one least burdensome to those affected must be chosen. «A measure is disproportionate if the objective can be achieved by means of a less severe restriction of fundamental rights» (BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.2).
- Reasonableness (proportionality stricto sensu): The measure must be in reasonable proportion to the severity of the interference; the means and the end must bear a reasonable relationship to each other (BGE 145 IV 263 E. 3.4; BGE 140 I 2 E. 6.3).
N. 15 The more severe the restriction of a fundamental right, the stricter the proportionality review. The Federal Supreme Court reviews proportionality in cases of restrictions of fundamental rights in principle freely, but exercises a degree of restraint where pronounced questions of discretion are to be assessed or where cantonal authorities are better acquainted with particular local conditions (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.5). In the case of indeterminate norms, the principle of proportionality performs a compensatory function: where statutory determinacy decreases, the requirements of proportionate application in individual cases increase (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.3; BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1).
N. 16 In the context of pandemic law, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed that the principle of proportionality requires measures to be kept in reasonable proportion to the risks; this assessment must be based not only on worst-case scenarios but also on the probability of the risk materialising (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.4). As knowledge advances, measures must be adapted; a measure cannot be deemed unlawful because it appears, with the benefit of hindsight and greater knowledge, to have been suboptimal (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.7).
3.4 Guarantee of Core Content (Para. 4)
N. 17 Para. 4 declares the core content of fundamental rights inviolable. The guarantee of core content is absolute: it admits of no balancing and is not at the disposal of the legislature. The Federal Supreme Court defines the core content as «that inviolable domain of the fundamental right without which the fundamental right would lose its character and become devoid of purpose» (BGE 147 I 372 E. 2.3); further as «the indispensable minimum of fundamental-rights substance required to guarantee human dignity» (BGE 129 I 173 E. 4). → Art. 7 FC (human dignity) forms the dogmatic foundation of the guarantee of core content.
N. 18 The core content is to be determined specifically for each fundamental right. A statutory definition of the core content in the constitutional provision itself was expressly rejected by the constitutional legislature (BBl 1997 I 197): concretisation is to be carried out by the courts. The Federal Supreme Court affirms a violation of core content only rarely; in practice, it examines proportionality as the primary issue. The core content is not violated where the protected scope in question is substantially restricted but not entirely hollowed out (BGE 134 I 140 E. 6.3: an exclusion order does not violate the core content of personal liberty).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 19 Restrictions of fundamental rights that violate one of the four conditions of Art. 36 FC are unconstitutional. The legal consequence is the annulment of the contested act within the framework of the applicable appeal proceedings. In abstract norm review proceedings, the Federal Supreme Court annuls a cantonal provision if it cannot be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution; where a legal basis for surveillance of public space is lacking, the provision must be annulled (BGE 136 I 87 E. 8.3: annulment of § 32 PolG/ZH due to an insufficient legal basis).
N. 20 Art. 36 FC is directly applicable constitutional law. In appeal proceedings, those affected may invoke a violation of any of the four conditions. Pursuant to Art. 95 BGG, the Federal Supreme Court may examine a violation of Art. 36 FC in public law appeals. The requirements regarding grounds and grounds of appeal are governed by Art. 106 para. 2 BGG; violations of fundamental rights must be substantiated in detail.
N. 21 Where Art. 36 FC is violated by federal statutes, the special feature of → Art. 190 FC applies: the Federal Supreme Court applies federal statutes even if they are unconstitutional. A formal declaration of the unconstitutionality of a federal statute therefore has no quashing effect (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 1974 ff.).
#5. Disputed Issues
N. 22 Dispute regarding the delimitation of «serious» restriction (para. 1 sentence 2): The distinction between minor and serious restrictions of fundamental rights is contested in legal scholarship. Müller/Schefer (Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 67 ff.) focus primarily on the intensity and duration of the interference and its proximity to the core content. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 1835 ff.) additionally emphasise the significance of the protected interest at stake: interferences with particularly deserving protected interests such as physical integrity or private life are typically serious. The Federal Supreme Court has not developed a general definition but assesses severity on a case-by-case basis (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.1: general ban on events = serious restriction of freedom of assembly; BGE 134 I 140 E. 3.3: exclusion and contact prohibition = no deprivation of liberty). Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr (op. cit., N 306) criticise the case law as too focused on individual circumstances and advocate for abstract criteria based on the type of fundamental right and duration of interference.
N. 23 Dispute regarding the nature of the guarantee of core content (para. 4): There is disagreement as to whether the core content is to be determined in an absolute or relative manner. The absolute theory (Müller/Schefer, op. cit., p. 729; in case law: BGE 147 I 372 E. 2.3) posits a hard, non-balanceable core content that is always protected irrespective of competing interests. The relative theory determines the core content in dependence on the severity and circumstances of the individual case; what forms part of the core content under low interference pressure might fall outside the core where there are overriding countervailing interests. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (op. cit., N 1887 ff.) take a differentiating position: the core content remains absolute, but is to be determined specifically for each fundamental right, with human dignity and the elementary substance of freedom serving as guiding benchmarks. The practice of the Federal Supreme Court is broadly consistent with the absolute theory, since violations of core content are almost never found.
N. 24 Dispute regarding the application of Art. 36 FC to third-party effect and positive obligations: It is disputed whether Art. 36 FC also applies where the State fails to fulfil a positive obligation or where the fundamental-rights interests of private persons collide. Müller/Schefer (op. cit., p. 79 ff.) and Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (op. cit., N 1800 ff.) affirm the analogous application of Art. 36 FC in these constellations: even State omissions within the protected scope must be measured against the four conditions. By contrast, part of the scholarship emphasises that Art. 36 FC is primarily designed for negative State interferences; in the case of positive obligations, the proportionality standard must be adapted, since the legislature enjoys considerable latitude for discretion in this area.
N. 25 Dispute regarding the openness of the catalogue of public interests: The parliamentary debate over an exhaustive catalogue (→ N. 3) continues in the doctrine. The prevailing view (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, op. cit., N 1855; Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, op. cit., N 314 ff.) welcomes the open concept of public interest as being consistent with the system and in accordance with democratic pluralism. A minority view (Tschannen, in various scholarly contributions) urges caution: an overly broad judicial latitude regarding the public interest undermines the requirement of a legal basis and creates uncontrollable room for balancing.
#6. Practical Notes
N. 26 In practice, the Federal Supreme Court reviews restrictions of fundamental rights by means of a four-part test: (1) Does an interference with the protected scope of a fundamental right exist? (2) Is there a sufficient legal basis? (3) Is the public interest established? (4) Is the interference proportionate and is the core content preserved? The sequence must be followed; if the legal basis is already lacking, the further steps of the review are unnecessary. Authorities that restrict fundamental rights must set out these four conditions in the reasoning of their decisions (→ Art. 29 para. 2 FC, duty to give reasons).
N. 27 When drafting legislative foundations, the following points must be observed: serious interferences must be provided for in the act of parliament itself — not merely through a delegation to subordinate legislation — and the act of parliament must regulate the essential elements of the interference. Ordinances may only regulate minor interferences independently, or concretise serious interferences within the framework of a sufficiently determinate statutory authorisation. In police law, general-clause formulations are permissible provided that the principle of proportionality is expressly set out and applied (BGE 128 I 327 E. 4.3.3; BGE 136 I 87 E. 8.3).
N. 28 The emergency clause of para. 1 sentence 3 is limited to genuine and unforeseeable emergency situations. It may not be used to close structural regulatory gaps or to address typical and known threat situations without a legal basis. The Federal Supreme Court reviews strictly whether a danger that could not be averted by other means existed. Authorities invoking the general clause bear the burden of proof that all three elements are present.
N. 29 In administrative proceedings, the proportionality review should always explicitly address all three stages (suitability, necessity, reasonableness). In particular, necessity — the exhaustion of less restrictive means — is subject to especially critical scrutiny by appellate bodies. For measures with temporal effect, ongoing review of proportionality is required; as the knowledge base advances, the requirements for justification increase (BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2.7).
N. 30 Art. 36 para. 4 FC is rarely applied directly in practice. Appellants raising a core-content ground of appeal should set out in detail why the remaining substance of the fundamental right is so minimal that the fundamental right loses its purpose. A violation of core content is qualitatively different from a serious violation of proportionality: it requires the complete hollowing out of the fundamental-rights protected scope, not merely an intensive restriction.
#Case Law
#Fundamental Application of Restrictions on Fundamental Rights
BGE 130 I 26 E. 4 of 27 November 2003 Legal basis and public interest in admission restrictions. The Federal Supreme Court examines the permissibility of interferences with economic freedom using the three-part test of Art. 36 BV.
«Restrictions on fundamental rights are only permissible if they are based on a sufficient legal basis, are justified by a public interest or by the protection of fundamental rights of third parties, and are proportionate.»
BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1 of 30 September 2009
Principle of legality and definiteness of the legal basis in police law.
Police law encounters particular difficulties regarding the requirement of definiteness due to the special nature of the regulatory area.
«The principle of legality requires sufficient and appropriate definiteness of the legal provisions to be applied in service of the legal reservation, legal certainty (calculability and predictability) and equal application of the law.»
BGE 147 I 450 E. 3.2 of 8 July 2021 COVID-19 measures: Legal basis and proportionality review. The event ban for pandemic control meets the requirements of Art. 36 BV.
«Serious restrictions must be provided for in the law itself (i.e. in formal law). Exceptions are cases of serious, immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger.»
#Proportionality Review
BGE 145 IV 263 E. 3.4 of 24 April 2019 DNA profiles: Three-stage proportionality review for minor fundamental rights interferences. Identification service measures must be suitable, necessary and reasonable.
«The principle of proportionality requires that an official measure is suitable and necessary for achieving the goal lying in the public or private interest and proves reasonable and proportionate for those affected in view of the severity of the fundamental rights restriction.»
BGE 142 I 121 E. 6 of 20 April 2016 Police detention: Proportionality in time-limited freedom interferences. Six-hour detention of a demonstration participant was disproportionate.
«A measure is disproportionate if the goal can be achieved with a less severe fundamental rights interference.»
BGE 140 I 2 E. 6.3 of 7 January 2014 Concordat against violence at sporting events: Preventive measures and proportionality. Area bans must be oriented towards the principle of proportionality.
«A reasonable purpose-means relationship is required. The measures may not lead to a disadvantage that stands in recognizable disproportion to the pursued purpose.»
#Public Interest and Protection of Third Parties
BGE 143 I 21 E. 5.3 of 17 November 2016 Family reunification: Balancing between public interest and private protection interests. The public interest in immigration control must be weighed against the child's welfare.
«Restrictions on fundamental rights must be justified by a public interest or by the protection of fundamental rights of third parties.»
BGE 129 I 232 E. 3 of 3 February 2003 Naturalisation proceedings: Rule of law procedural guarantees as public interest. The duty to provide reasons for rejecting naturalisation decisions serves the public interest.
«The public interest can also lie in ensuring that rule of law procedural guarantees are observed and that a proper decision can be made.»
#Core Content Protection
BGE 129 I 173 E. 4 of 12 February 2003 Place of burial: Inviolability of the core content of fundamental rights. The core content of fundamental rights must be observed even when weighing different fundamental rights interests.
«The core content of fundamental rights is inviolable. It encompasses the minimum of fundamental rights substance that is indispensable for guaranteeing human dignity.»
BGE 147 I 372 E. 2.3 of 22 April 2021 DNA profiles for demonstration participation: Criticism of the interference qualification. The Federal Supreme Court expresses criticism of the previous case law on interference intensity.
«The core content encompasses that inviolable area of the fundamental right without which the fundamental right would lose its character and become meaningless.»
#Emergency Clause (Art. 36 para. 1 sentence 3 BV)
BGE 130 I 65 E. 3.1 of 27 January 2004 Security control in prisons: Exception in case of serious, immediate danger. Fundamental rights restrictions without formal legal basis are only permissible in emergencies.
«Exceptions are cases of serious, immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger. This emergency clause is to be interpreted restrictively and concerns genuine emergencies.»
#Procedural Guarantees for Serious Interferences
BGE 142 I 135 E. 3 of 2 May 2016 Administrative detention: Right to judicial review in case of deprivation of liberty. Art. 31 para. 4 BV grants procedural guarantees going beyond Art. 36 BV.
«If the person concerned requests judicial review of the detention order for the first time, this must take place as quickly as possible.»
BGE 143 I 310 E. 3.3 of 21 March 2017 Covert investigation: Deletion of image recordings as disproportionate measure. For serious interferences, particularly high requirements must be placed on proportionality.
«The immediate and irretrievable deletion of image recordings was disproportionate, since the public prosecutor's office could have at least secured copies of the recordings.»
#Police Law and Restrictions on Fundamental Rights
BGE 137 I 327 E. 5 of 11 November 2011 Observation by private detectives: Legal basis for preventive surveillance. Art. 59 para. 5 IVG forms a sufficient legal basis for observations in the private sphere.
«The observation must be objectively necessary. Video recordings of the insured person must be proportionate and necessary for task fulfilment.»
BGE 144 I 170 E. 3 of 27 June 2018 Access to files: Information access and personality protection. Access to administrative documents must be weighed against personality rights of third parties.
«The refusal of files can be based on the protection of fundamental rights of third parties if disclosure would violate overriding private interests.»
#Technical Surveillance
BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.2 of 29 May 2002 DNA profiles in criminal proceedings: Constitutional design for new technologies. The creation of DNA profiles interferes with bodily integrity and data protection.
«The processing of DNA profiles affects both the right to bodily integrity and the claim to protection against misuse of personal data.»
#Economic Freedom and Restrictions on Fundamental Rights
BGE 130 II 281 E. 6 of 1 June 2004 Family reunification: Multi-dimensional fundamental rights review. Different fundamental rights can be simultaneously affected and must be assessed overall.
«When reviewing fundamental rights interferences, it must be considered that different fundamental rights can be simultaneously affected and an overall assessment of all relevant interests must be undertaken.»
#International References
BGE 139 I 16 E. 3 of 26 January 2012 Deportation initiative: Relationship between national constitutional law and international law. New constitutional requirements can conflict with existing international law.
«When applying Art. 36 BV, international legal obligations must also be observed insofar as these contain more extensive guarantees.»