Art. 2 FC — Purpose

#Doctrine

#1. Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 2 FC builds on the purpose articles of the Federal Constitutions of 1848 and 1874, but fundamentally revises their substance. The explanatory report on the 1995 preliminary draft explicitly describes the function of the purpose article as an aid to the interpretation of the Constitution as a whole, without establishing any competences (Explanatory Report VE 1995, p. 30 f.). Art. 2 VE 1995 consolidated the two classical federal purposes — external independence and internal peace and order — into the concept of «independence and security of the country», and added environmental protection and commitment to a peaceful international order as new elements.

N. 2 The Federal Council's dispatch of 20 November 1996 describes Art. 2 as a provision that gives the constituted state «a substantive purpose as the basis of its existence» and fulfils an «orientation function for the future» (BBl 1997 I 127). The Federal Council was guided by the classical fourfold structure of state purposes: freedom, security, community, and welfare. A formulaic commitment to the welfare state, modelled on more recent cantonal constitutions or the German Basic Law, was deliberately rejected (BBl 1997 I 176). The principle of sustainability was integrated into the purpose article in general terms at the suggestion of the consultation procedure, rather than being repeated in individual substantive articles (BBl 1997 I 411). The Federal Council expressly noted that the provision «does not establish competences» (BBl 1997 I 127).

N. 3 The parliamentary deliberations of 1998 were marked by controversy over two points: the inclusion of the term «sustainable development» and the anchoring of equal opportunity as a state purpose. In the National Council, Walter Steinemann (F, SG) warned against a «total submission to an ecological system of compulsion», and Hans Fehr (V, ZH) described «sustainable development» as a meaningless buzzword. Vreni Hubmann (S, ZH), by contrast, reported that the committee had decided to include sustainable development and equal opportunity in the article. In the Council of States, rapporteur Bruno Frick (C, SZ) explained the differences: the majority of the committee preferred «sustainable» as an adverb in the sense of «promotes sustainably», while Pierre Aeby (S, FR) argued in favour of the National Council's version. Federal Councillor Arnold Koller expressed personal scepticism: «On the other hand, the term 'sustainable' is probably [...] also a buzzword.» Carlo Schmid (C, AI) criticised the inclusion as superfluous, since para. 4 already contained the lasting preservation of the natural foundations of life. Frick finally emphasised that «this purpose article is not directly applicable, which facilitates its adoption by the Council of States.» The conciliation conference agreed on the present fourfold structure (paras. 1–4) with «sustainable development» as a standalone term in para. 2 and equal opportunity as para. 3. Both chambers adopted the text in the final vote of 18 December 1998; the FC entered into force on 1 January 2000.

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#2. Systematic Classification

N. 4 Art. 2 FC is situated in the first chapter («General Provisions», Art. 1–6 FC) and constitutes the normative foundation of the entire constitutional order. The provision belongs to the category of programmatic norms: it formulates state objectives but establishes neither subjective rights nor federal competences. It must therefore be strictly distinguished from fundamental rights (Art. 7–36 FC), social goals (→ Art. 41 FC), and the actual competence norms (Art. 42 ff. FC). As a purpose article, Art. 2 FC serves primarily a teleological interpretive function: it is a guiding principle for the concretisation of other constitutional provisions (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 91 ff.).

N. 5 The four paragraphs of Art. 2 FC are closely connected to numerous individual provisions of the FC: para. 1 (protection of freedom, independence, security) corresponds to ↔ Art. 7–36 FC (fundamental rights), → Art. 54 ff. FC (foreign affairs), and → Art. 58 ff. FC (army). Para. 2 (welfare, sustainability, cohesion, cultural diversity) is reflected in → Art. 73 FC (sustainability), → Art. 104 FC (agriculture), and → Art. 70 FC (languages). Para. 3 (equal opportunity) is linked to ↔ Art. 8 FC (equality before the law) and → Art. 41 FC (social goals). Para. 4 (natural foundations of life, international order) corresponds to → Art. 73 f. FC (environment) and → Art. 54 FC (foreign affairs). The relationship with → Art. 5 FC (rule of law principle) is constitutive: Art. 2 sets out the objectives, Art. 5 the means.

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#3. Elements / Normative Content

N. 6 Para. 1 — Purpose of freedom and security: The Confederation «protects the freedom and rights of the People» — a reference to the subjective freedoms as established by the fundamental rights (Art. 7–36 FC) — and «safeguards the independence and security of the country». The term «security» encompasses both internal (police) and external (military) security (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 298). «Independence» refers to state sovereignty in relation to other states, not primarily a requirement of neutrality — the latter is not enshrined in the FC but has the character of customary law. Para. 1 is not a competence basis for federal legislation; it describes the telos that is realised through the respective substantive competences.

N. 7 Para. 2 — Welfare, sustainability, and cohesion purposes: The four objectives of this paragraph — common welfare, sustainable development, internal cohesion, cultural diversity — are of equal rank and mutually complementary (BBl 1997 I 126; Explanatory Report VE 1995, p. 30). «Sustainable development» (développement durable / sviluppo sostenibile) is structured as a cross-cutting responsibility: → Art. 73 FC concretises the principle for the domain of nature and landscape. In BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4, the Federal Supreme Court derived from Art. 2 para. 2 FC the concept of the welfare state and the social responsibility of the community, which it found to be inherent in the concept of economic capacity in Art. 127 para. 2 FC. «Cultural diversity» plays an interpretive role notably in matters of language, cantonal autonomy, and the protection of cultural minorities (→ Art. 70 FC).

N. 8 Para. 3 — Equal opportunity: The formulation «the greatest possible equality of opportunity» makes clear that the constituent assembly intended not an absolute requirement but an objective provision. Federal Councillor Koller warned against abusive interpretations: «If, however, the concept of equal opportunity were interpreted to mean that the state would have to compensate throughout for these unequal starting conditions, the state would clearly be overreaching itself.» The Federal Supreme Court relied on Art. 2 para. 3 FC in BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4 to conclude from equal opportunity as a state objective that the state must not «through its actions create unequal opportunities [...] or exacerbate inequalities that already exist». Para. 3 does not establish a directly enforceable right; it serves as an aid to interpretation for equality guarantees (↔ Art. 8 FC) and social goals (→ Art. 41 FC).

N. 9 Para. 4 — Environmental and international law purpose: «Lasting preservation of the natural foundations of life» reflects the sustainability principle in its ecological dimension. The dispatch emphasises that the inclusion is «recognised today as indispensable» (BBl 1997 I 127). The commitment to «a just and peaceful international order» goes beyond the requirement of neutrality and encompasses active efforts for peace, human rights, and international law — it is an expression of «growing interdependence and shared responsibility» (BBl 1997 I 127). Both objectives of para. 4 are concretised by → Art. 54 FC (foreign affairs), → Art. 73 FC (sustainability), and → Art. 74 ff. FC (environment).

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#4. Legal Consequences

N. 10 Art. 2 FC is not directly applicable and establishes no subjective rights for individuals. Individuals cannot invoke Art. 2 FC directly to claim state benefits or to resist state interference; for those purposes, the specific fundamental rights (Art. 7–36 FC) and procedural guarantees (Art. 29 ff. FC) are authoritative. Already in BGE 31 I 297 (1905, concerning the former FC), the Federal Supreme Court held that Art. 2 contained «no guarantee of an individual right». This understanding is undisputed under the current FC.

N. 11 Art. 2 FC does not establish federal competences. Even under the former Art. 2 of the 1874 FC, the Federal Supreme Court held in BGE 115 Ia 277 E. 4b (3 May 1989, concerning Art. 2 of the 1874 FC): «The statement of purpose in Art. 2 FC does not, however, establish a federal competence. The Federal Constitution also does not recognise any subject matter of overall national defence. The Confederation therefore has legislative competence in the area of overall national defence only to the extent that such competence has been conferred upon it by the Constitution in the individual sub-areas.» The Court expressly relied on Aubert and Häfelin/Haller in this regard. This fundamental understanding — Art. 2 as a purely teleological, non-competence-establishing norm — remains unchanged under the current FC and is shared by the entire body of doctrine (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 296 f.; Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 91).

N. 12 The interpretive function of Art. 2 FC produces concrete normative effect when courts and authorities interpret other constitutional and statutory provisions teleologically. The guiding principle is that, where interpretations are otherwise of equal merit, the variant that better serves one of the state purposes is to be preferred. This function is particularly relevant in the interpretation of fundamental rights (→ Art. 36 FC: proportionality) and of social goals (→ Art. 41 FC).

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#5. Contested Issues

N. 13 Hierarchy of state purposes: The question of whether a normative hierarchy exists among the four state purposes is disputed in the doctrine. The Federal Council's dispatch expressly rejected a general hierarchy: «The provision does not contain a general order of precedence among the state purposes» (BBl 1997 I 126). The explanatory report likewise states that «[a]ll federal purposes are in principle of equal weight» (Explanatory Report VE 1995, p. 30). By contrast, isolated voices in the doctrine argue that para. 1 (freedom and security purpose) holds a certain priority because it describes the state's minimum of self-preservation (see Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 300 f.). The prevailing view follows the Federal Council: the purposes are of equal rank and must be weighed against one another in the specific context (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 95).

N. 14 Legal quality of the sustainability principle: The meaning of the term «sustainable development» was highly contested in the parliamentary debates. Frick explained that «sustainability, as understood in political terms, goes far beyond mere conservation of the environment and natural resources, because it additionally encompasses economic and cultural life and the entire state.» Steinemann and Fehr in the National Council opposed a broad conception, criticising the term as vague and devoid of meaning. In the doctrine, there is consensus that the sustainability principle in Art. 2 para. 2 FC is anchored as a general state objective and establishes no immediate subjective claims; what is disputed is how far the integrative — economic, social, and ecological — dimension of the concept extends (Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 729 ff.). In the area of climate protection, the Federal Supreme Court has increasingly incorporated the sustainability dimension; BGE 147 V 95 (Klimaseniorinnen, 2021) touched on the question of state protective obligations arising from the environmental state objective, even though the decision was primarily based on Art. 10 para. 1 FC.

N. 15 Direct applicability of equal opportunity: Whether Art. 2 para. 3 FC — beyond its interpretive function — establishes at least a right against a deterioration of equal opportunity is not conclusively settled in the doctrine. The Federal Supreme Court left this question open in BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4, yet nonetheless derived a negative obligation from the provision: the state must not through its actions «exacerbate inequalities that already exist». Whether this constitutes a justiciable minimum content remains open. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 303) answer in the negative and stress the purely programmatic character; Müller/Schefer (Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 731 f.) consider a subsidiary protective effect against measures that manifestly promote inequality to be defensible.

N. 16 Relationship of para. 4 to other constitutional articles: It is disputed whether the commitment to «a just and peaceful international order» goes beyond a programmatic norm and establishes a justiciable state protective obligation that may be invoked against state inaction in individual cases. The prevailing doctrine answers in the negative (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 97). Para. 4 is understood as a political commitment that is operationalised through → Art. 54 FC and treaty law.

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#6. Practical Notes

N. 17 Interpretive function in practice: In the application of law, Art. 2 FC regularly serves as a teleological argument in the interpretation of federal legislation and constitutional articles. The Federal Supreme Court has invoked Art. 2 para. 2 FC to anchor the concept of the welfare state in tax law (BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4): «The promotion of the common welfare pursuant to Art. 2 para. 2 FC expresses the concept of the welfare state and the social responsibility of the community.» This approach can be productively employed in proceedings concerning tax, social security, and environmental law when other rules of interpretation do not provide a clear solution.

N. 18 Democratic principle and Art. 2 para. 1 FC: The Federal Supreme Court referred to Art. 2 para. 1 FC as an expression of the fundamental principles of democracy in BGE 147 I 194 E. 3.3 (Konzernverantwortungsinitiative, 2021) and judgment 1C_713/2020 of 23 March 2021 E. 3.3. The appellants complained that the cantonal majority requirement violated «the fundamental principles of democracy (Preamble of the FC; Art. 2 para. 1 FC)». The Federal Supreme Court found the complaint to be time-barred and held that the limitation of voting power equality through the cantonal majority requirement was «constitutionally intended and binding upon the Federal Supreme Court» (Art. 190 FC). Art. 2 para. 1 FC may be invoked as a reference point in complaints concerning the democratic constitutional order, but is incapable of derogating from binding constitutional norms.

N. 19 No direct right of action: Persons seeking legal protection and authorities should note that Art. 2 FC cannot be invoked as an independent legal basis before Swiss courts in any constellation. Where substantive claims are to be asserted, the applicable fundamental rights (Art. 7–36 FC), social goals (→ Art. 41 FC), or relevant statutory provisions must always be examined. Art. 2 FC reinforces and guides these norms, but does not replace them.

N. 20 Climate protection and the sustainability requirement: In view of the growing number of climate litigation cases and the development of case law in the area of state protective obligations, Art. 2 paras. 2 and 4 FC is gaining importance as an interpretive standard in environmental and climate matters. Courts and administrative authorities should consistently incorporate the sustainability principle as an integrating guiding concept in licensing decisions in the fields of energy, spatial planning, and environmental law, and link it with the substantive articles (→ Art. 73 FC, → Art. 74 FC). The Federal Administrative Court has already invoked Art. 2 para. 2 FC as a standard of justification in the field of nuclear energy law (judgment A-5647/2016 of 6 September 2018).

#Case Law

#State Purposes as Constitutional Principles

BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4 of 1 June 2007 (Obwalden Tax Rates) The promotion of the common welfare according to Art. 2 para. 2 Cst. expresses the idea of the social state and the social responsibility of the community. These goals are inherent in the concept of economic capacity and help shape the design of tax law.

«The promotion of the common welfare according to Art. 2 para. 2 Cst. expresses the idea of the social state and the social responsibility of the community. [...] These goals are inherent in the concept of economic capacity in Art. 127 para. 2 Cst.»

BGE 115 Ia 277 E. 4b of 3 May 1989 (Medical Personnel in the Coordinated Medical Service) The statement of purpose in Art. 2 Cst. does not establish an independent competence of the Confederation. The Constitution does not recognize a subject area of total defence, which is why the Confederation only has legislative competence insofar as it has been conferred upon it in the individual sub-areas by the Constitution.

«However, the statement of purpose in Art. 2 Cst. does not establish any competence of the Confederation. The Federal Constitution also does not recognize a subject area of total defence. The Confederation therefore only has legislative competence in the area of total defence insofar as it has been conferred upon it in the individual sub-areas by the Constitution.»

#Democratic Principle and Political Rights

BGE 147 I 194 E. 3.3 of 1 January 2021 (Corporate Responsibility Initiative) The democratic principle from Art. 2 para. 1 Cst. is concretized by the case law on the cantonal majority rule. The restriction of equal voting power is constitutionally intended and binding on the Federal Supreme Court.

«The complainants allege that the rejection of the Corporate Responsibility Initiative due to the requirement of the cantonal majority violates the fundamental principles of democracy (Preamble of the Cst.; Art. 2 para. 1 Cst.) as well as the principle that all voters have equal political rights.»

#Equal Opportunities and Social State Principle

BGE 133 I 206 E. 7.4 of 1 June 2007 (Obwalden Tax Rates) Equal opportunities as a state goal in Art. 2 para. 3 Cst. obligates the state not to create unequal opportunities through its actions and not to exacerbate existing inequalities. A basic prerequisite for personal and economic development is solidarity between different population groups.

«From equal opportunities as a state goal in Art. 2 para. 3 Cst. [...] it can at least be inferred that the state should not create unequal opportunities through its actions and must not exacerbate existing inequalities.»

#Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection

Judgment A-5647/2016 of 6 September 2018 (Nuclear Energy) The Federal Administrative Court applies Art. 2 para. 2 Cst. (sustainable development) in the context of nuclear energy and decommissioning funds. Sustainable development is used as a justification for strict regulation of the nuclear industry.

The case law shows that the principle of sustainable development is reflected in concrete enforcement measures in environmental and energy law.

#Cultural Diversity

PB.2002.00038 of 26 February 2003 (Administrative Court of Zurich) In employment law disputes, Art. 2 Cst. is considered as a constitutional basis for the protection of cultural and linguistic minorities in public service. Cultural diversity as a state goal shapes the interpretation of employment law in the public sector.

#Rule of Law

31 I 297 of 11 May 1905 (Historical BGE) Already in early Federal Supreme Court practice, it was established that Art. 2 Cst. does not contain a guarantee of an individual right, but rather represents an objective determination of state purpose. This case law continues to shape the understanding of the norm as an organizational principle to this day.

«Art. 2 Cst. does not contain a guarantee of an individual right.»