#1. Genesis

N. 1 Art. 184 BV codifies the foreign policy competences of the Federal Council as the executive authority. The provision dates back to the total revision of the Federal Constitution of 1999 (BBl 1997 I 1, 469 ff.). The constitutional legislator wanted to constitutionally anchor the Federal Council's traditional leadership role in foreign affairs, while simultaneously explicitly guaranteeing the Federal Assembly's participation rights.

N. 2 The emergency ordinance competence in para. 3 builds on the historical general police clause but restricts it to situations where «safeguarding the interests of the country so requires». The time limit requirement for emergency ordinances was deliberately inserted to prevent unlimited law-making by the executive (BBl 1997 I 470).

#2. Systematic classification

N. 3 Art. 184 BV stands in the systematic context of the distribution of competences between federal authorities (Title 5, Chapter 2, Section 3 BV). The norm must be read in connection with the following provisions:

• → Art. 166 BV (participation rights of the Federal Assembly in foreign policy)
• → Art. 173 para. 1 lit. a BV (supervision by the Federal Assembly)
• → Art. 185 BV (external and internal security)
• → Art. 54 BV (principles of foreign affairs)

N. 4 The relationship to Art. 185 para. 3 BV (emergency ordinances for internal and external security) must be determined according to the principle of speciality: Art. 185 para. 3 BV takes precedence as the more specific norm when security issues are concerned. Art. 184 para. 3 BV covers other foreign policy emergencies (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Galler Kommentar BV, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 184 N. 15).

#3. Elements of the offence / normative content

N. 5 Paragraph 1: «Conducting foreign affairs» encompasses the operational conduct of foreign policy. This includes maintaining diplomatic relations, representation in international organisations and the performance of consular duties. The «participation rights of the Federal Assembly» refer in particular to the approval of international treaties (Art. 166 para. 2 BV) and taking note of foreign policy reports.

N. 6 Paragraph 2: The treaty-making competence is divided into three phases:

• Signature: international signature by the Federal Council
• Ratification: international declaration of commitment by the Federal Council
• Approval: constitutional authorisation by the Federal Assembly

N. 7 According to prevailing doctrine, only treaties of limited scope within the meaning of Art. 7a RVOG are not subject to approval (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N. 3486).

N. 8 Paragraph 3: The emergency ordinance competence requires:

• Safeguarding the interests of the country (qualified urgency)
• Time limitation of the ordinance
• Subsidiarity vis-à-vis the ordinary legislative procedure

N. 9 The term «interests of the country» must be interpreted broadly and encompasses foreign policy, economic and humanitarian concerns. BGE 132 I 229 E. 5.3.2 specified that there must be an immediate threat to essential national interests.

#4. Legal consequences

N. 10 From para. 1 follows the Federal Council's comprehensive business management competence in foreign policy matters. It can independently exchange diplomatic notes, appoint envoys and issue political declarations.

N. 11 Ordinances under para. 3 have immediate force of law and may restrict fundamental rights, provided the requirements of Art. 36 BV are met (BGE 132 I 229 E. 5.3.1). The time limit must be set upon enactment; subsequent extension requires a new Federal Council decision with renewed examination of the requirements.

N. 12 Rulings based on emergency ordinances under para. 3 are generally contestable (BGE 132 I 229). This also applies to concretising administrative acts such as asset freezes (BGE 131 III 652).

#5. Points of contention

N. 13 Scope of emergency ordinance competence: While Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr (Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N. 1867) advocate a restrictive interpretation, other commentators argue for a wide margin of discretion for the Federal Council in assessing national interests.

N. 14 Justiciability: Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller (Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 4th ed. 2014, § 31 N. 42) take the view that Federal Council decisions under Art. 184 para. 3 BV are only subject to limited judicial review. This is contradicted by more recent case law, which demands full judicial review at least in cases of fundamental rights interference (BGE 141 I 20).

N. 15 Relationship to Art. 185 para. 3 BV: Ehrenzeller (St. Galler Kommentar BV, Art. 184 N. 16) sees Art. 184 para. 3 BV as lex generalis, while Biaggini (BV-Kommentar, 2nd ed. 2017, Art. 184 N. 11) considers both norms as equal in rank and makes a distinction according to subject areas.

#6. Practical guidance

N. 16 When applying Art. 184 para. 3 BV, the following must always be examined:

1. Is there a foreign policy emergency?
2. Are essential national interests directly threatened?
3. Is the ordinary legislative procedure too slow?
4. Has the ordinance been appropriately time-limited?

N. 17 Asset freezes based on Art. 184 para. 3 BV are subject to the analogous application of Art. 44 SchKG (BGE 131 III 652, BGE 151 III 553). Enforcement offices must observe such freezes.

N. 18 When implementing UN sanctions, a distinction must be made between the international legal obligation and the domestic competence basis. Art. 184 para. 3 BV can serve as a constitutional basis when the Embargo Act is not applicable (BGE 133 II 450).

#Emergency Powers of the Federal Council under Art. 184 para. 3 BV

#Foundations and Prerequisites

BGE 132 I 229 of 27 April 2006 The decision of an administrative body that gives concrete form to an asset freeze ordered by the Federal Council based on Art. 184 para. 3 BV constitutes an appealable administrative decision. Art. 184 para. 3 BV forms a sufficient legal basis for fundamental rights restrictions, provided the requirements of the provision are met and the measures are in the public interest and proportionate.

«Lorsqu'elle satisfait aux conditions de l'art. 184 al. 3 Cst., une mesure fondée sur cette disposition constitue une base légale suffisante pour la restriction des libertés fondamentales, autant que ces restrictions soient par ailleurs justifiées par un intérêt public et proportionnées au but visé.»

BGE 141 I 20 of 13 December 2014 The requirements of Art. 184 para. 3 BV and Art. 36 BV are not identical and must be examined separately. The Federal Council may only issue emergency ordinances when the protection of the country's interests so requires — a broad but not unlimited provision.

«L'appartenance du recourant aux personnes exposées énumérées dans la liste annexée à l'O-Egypte, initialement contestée, a été tranchée par décision du 27 avril 2011 qui est entrée en force.»

#Asset Freezes and Sanctions Measures

BGE 131 III 652 of 14 September 2005 Art. 44 SchKG applies by analogy to Federal Council decisions to freeze assets based on Art. 184 para. 3 BV. Debt enforcement and bankruptcy offices may not oppose such a "seizure" with their own contradictory administrative decisions.

«Auf einen Beschluss des Bundesrats, Guthaben gestützt auf Art. 184 Abs. 3 BV zu sperren, ist Art. 44 SchKG sinngemäss anwendbar.»

BGE 151 III 553 of 28 August 2025 Art. 44 SchKG applies by analogy to sanctions-related asset freezes under the Ukraine Ordinance, which are based on Art. 184 para. 3 BV. Direct constitutional foundation on Art. 184 para. 3 BV gives corresponding measures sufficient legal force vis-à-vis ordinary federal law.

«Auf sanktionsrechtliche Vermögenssperren, die sich auf die Ukraine-Verordnung stützen, ist Art. 44 SchKG analog anwendbar.»

#Entry Bans and Political Measures

BGE 129 II 193 of 21 February 2003 Federal Council decisions concerning entry bans and political expulsions that are directly based on Art. 184 para. 3 BV are in principle not subject to administrative court appeal. The protection of national interests justifies entry bans against persons whose activities are liable to endanger Switzerland's relations with third states.

«Das aus Gründen der Wahrung der Landesinteressen (Art. 184 Abs. 3 BV) verhängte Einreiseverbot gegen den in der Schweiz niedergelassenen Ausländer, der in oder für Organisationen tätig gewesen ist, deren Aktivitäten geeignet sind, die Lage im Kosovo und den angrenzenden Gebieten zusätzlich zu destabilisieren und damit die Beziehungen der Schweiz zu Drittstaaten zu gefährden, hält vor Art. 8 EMRK stand.»

#Implementation of UN Sanctions

BGE 133 II 450 of 14 November 2007 Switzerland is bound by UN Security Council sanctions decisions, provided they do not violate peremptory international law (ius cogens). The Federal Council cannot independently remove persons from UN sanctions lists; the delisting procedure by the sanctions committee is provided for this purpose.

«Der Schweiz ist es deshalb verwehrt, den Beschwerdeführer selbständig aus Anhang 2 TalibanV zu streichen; hierfür ist ein besonderes Delisting-Verfahren durch den Sanktionsausschuss des UNO-Sicherheitsrats vorgesehen.»

#Police General Clause in the Financial Market Sector

BGE 137 II 431 of 15 July 2011 In exceptional situations, FINMA may disclose bank customer data based on the police general clause when economic stability and the protection of the financial market so require. The systemic relevance of a bank may justify the protection of overriding public interests.

«Mit der damit verbundenen Beeinträchtigung des weltweiten bzw. des schweizerischen Wirtschaftssystems wären unabsehbare Konsequenzen verbunden gewesen, welche wesentliche und existenzielle Interessen des Landes tangiert hätten.»

#Proportionality Review

BGE 132 I 229 (continued) Asset freezes violate the principle of proportionality when they relate to assets adjudicated with legal force and exhibit excessive duration.

«En l'espèce, le blocage contesté, en tant qu'il s'applique à des avoirs revendiqués sur la base d'un jugement entré en force, ne serait-ce que par sa durée excessive, viole le principe de la proportionnalité.»

#Procedural Guarantees and Legal Protection

BGE 129 II 193 (continued) Art. 13 ECHR applies to entry bans against resident aliens whose family life (Art. 8 ECHR) could be affected. The fundamental inadmissibility of administrative court appeals against Federal Council decisions under Art. 184 para. 3 BV raises questions regarding effective legal protection.

«Anwendbarkeit von Art. 13 EMRK bejaht bei Verhängung eines Einreiseverbots gegen einen niedergelassenen Ausländer, dessen Ehefrau und Kinder in der Schweiz leben, da sich in vertretbarer Weise ein Eingriff ins Familienleben (Art. 8 EMRK) behaupten lässt.»

#Delimitation from Other Areas of Law

In the area of criminal procedural law, it should be noted that Art. 184 StPO (expert opinion) constitutes an independent regulation and must not be confused with Art. 184 BV. The corresponding decisions (e.g. BGE 148 IV 22, BGE 144 IV 69) concern exclusively criminal procedural questions without reference to the Federal Council's foreign policy competence.