#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 182 Const. largely corresponds to former Art. 104 oConst. The provision was systematically relocated and linguistically modernised during the total revision of 1999, without any material change being intended (BBl 1997 I 1, 363 f.). The anchoring of ordinance-making power in the Constitution dates back to the Federal Constitution of 1874 and has its roots in the Swiss principle of separation of powers.
N. 2 The Federal Council's message on the new Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 emphasises that the Federal Council's ordinance-making competence encompasses both the authority to issue legal ordinances (based on a delegation) and implementing ordinances (to concretise laws) (BBl 1997 I 363). This dual function reflects the central role of the Federal Council in the Swiss legislative system.
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 3 Art. 182 Const. is located in the 3rd section on the Federal Council and the Federal Administration. The provision must be read in connection with the constitutional principle of legality (Art. 5 Const.), the principle of separation of powers (→ Art. 164 Const.) and the delegation principles (Art. 164 para. 2 Const.).
N. 4 The Federal Council's ordinance-making power is part of the executive function but stands in tension with the primacy of the legislature. While Art. 163 Const. establishes the Federal Assembly's legislative competence, Art. 182 Const. enables the Federal Council to act as a legislator within the delegated framework. This systematic connection is also evident in case law on the distinction between law and ordinance (BGE 139 II 460 consid. 3.2).
#3. Elements / Normative Content
#a) Legal ordinances (para. 1)
N. 5 Legal ordinances are general-abstract norms that the Federal Council issues based on a constitutional or statutory authorisation. The authorisation must be sufficiently specific (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 1834). The Federal Court distinguishes between:
- Independent legal ordinances: based directly on the Constitution (rare)
- Dependent legal ordinances: based on statutory delegation (standard case)
N. 6 The requirements for specificity of the delegation norm depend on the severity of the fundamental rights interference. In cases of severe interference, the delegation must be so precise that the essential features of the regulation already emerge from the law (BGE 143 I 253 consid. 3.5; Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 2848).
#b) Implementing ordinances (para. 2)
N. 7 The implementing competence encompasses three areas:
- Implementation of legislation: Issuance of administrative ordinances and implementing provisions
- Implementation of Federal Assembly resolutions: Implementation of parliamentary mandates
- Implementation of judicial judgments: Ensuring judgment implementation
N. 8 Implementing ordinances do not require special statutory authorisation; they result from the Federal Council's constitutional implementing competence (Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller, Verwaltungsrecht, 4th ed. 2014, § 23 N 15). However, they may not create new legal obligations or extend existing ones (BGE 139 II 460 consid. 3.3).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 9 The legal consequences differ according to the type of ordinance:
Legal ordinances establish direct rights and obligations for private parties. They are binding on authorities and courts (→ Art. 190 Const.). However, if they exceed the delegation limits, the Federal Court may leave them unapplied in the specific case (BGE 139 II 460 consid. 4).
N. 10 Implementing ordinances are primarily directed at implementing authorities. Insofar as they merely concretise the law without creating new obligations, they are permissible. If they exceed this framework, they violate the principle of separation of powers (BGE 126 III 36 consid. 3b).
#5. Controversies
N. 11 Disputed distinction between legal and implementing ordinances: While Müller/Schefer (Grundrechte, 4th ed. 2008, p. 78) argue for a restrictive interpretation of implementing competence, Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr (Bundesstaatsrecht, N 1840) advocate a more generous view for technical detailed regulations. The Federal Court follows a pragmatic approach and examines whether the ordinance materially creates new law (BGE 139 II 460).
N. 12 Limits of subdelegation: It is controversial to what extent the Federal Council may further delegate its ordinance-making competence to departments or offices. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Verfassungsrecht, N 2852) favour subdelegation for technical implementing provisions. Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller (Verwaltungsrecht, § 23 N 18) warn against excessive shifting of legislation to the administrative level.
N. 13 Emergency ordinance power: It is disputed whether Art. 182 Const. implicitly contains an emergency ordinance power of the Federal Council. The prevailing doctrine (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Galler Kommentar, Art. 182 N 15) denies this and refers to Art. 185 para. 3 Const. for security policy measures. The COVID-19 pandemic has reignited this debate (cf. BGE 148 V 162).
#6. Practical Guidelines
N. 14 When reviewing an ordinance, a three-step approach should be taken:
- Authorisation basis: Is there a constitutional or statutory delegation?
- Delegation limits: Does the ordinance remain within the framework of authorisation?
- Proportionality: Are the regulations necessary and appropriate?
N. 15 For practice, the distinction between law-substituting and law-supplementing ordinance power is relevant. The former is only permissible with express and precise delegation, the latter is possible within the framework of general implementing competence (St. Galler Kommentar, Art. 182 N 12).
N. 16 For judicial review of ordinances: The Federal Court only reviews Federal Council ordinances as a preliminary question regarding their legality (BGE 141 II 169 consid. 2.1). Cantonal courts are not competent for abstract judicial review but may refuse to apply unlawful ordinance provisions in individual cases.