#1. Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 179 BV stems from the total revision of the Federal Constitution of 1999. The provision essentially adopted the regulation of the former Art. 105 old BV of 1874, but for the first time explicitly introduced the Federal Chancellery at the constitutional level as a "general staff unit" of the Federal Council (BBl 1997 I 463). The message emphasized the dual function of the Federal Chancellery as an administrative hub and political coordination office of the federal government.

N. 2 The constitutional legislator deliberately refrained from a detailed description of tasks at the constitutional level. The concrete design of the staff function should be able to be carried out flexibly through law and ordinance (BBl 1997 I 464). This restraint enables an adaptation of the Federal Chancellery to changing political and administrative needs.

#2. Systematic Classification

N. 3 Art. 179 BV stands in the 5th section of the 5th chapter on the federal authorities, immediately after the provisions on the Federal Council (Art. 174–178 BV) and before the regulations on the federal administration (Art. 180 BV). This placement underscores the special position of the Federal Chancellery between government and administration.

N. 4 The norm is closely related to Art. 30–34 of the Government and Administration Organisation Act (GAOA) as well as the Organisation Ordinance for the Federal Chancellery (OO-FC). Art. 179 BV forms the constitutional basis for these ordinary legislative regulations (→ Art. 174 BV for the organisation of the Federal Council; → Art. 180 BV for the federal administration).

#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content

#General Staff Unit

N. 5 The term "general staff unit" characterises the Federal Chancellery as a central support body without its own decision-making powers in substantive matters. According to Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender (St. Gallen Commentary, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 179 N. 4), the staff function comprises three core elements: preparation, coordination and implementation support of Federal Council resolutions.

N. 6 The general clause "general" staff unit distinguishes the Federal Chancellery from the departmental secretaries general, which function as special staff units of their departments. The Federal Chancellery performs cross-departmental horizontal tasks.

#Management by Federal Chancellor

N. 7 The Federal Chancellor is elected by the Federal Assembly for four years according to Art. 145 BV. The Constitution thus constitutes an independent federal body that belongs neither to the Federal Council nor to the administration in the narrower sense (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Swiss Federal Constitutional Law, 10th ed. 2020, N 1568).

N. 8 The dual role as chief of staff and elected federal body gives the Federal Chancellor a special position. According to Art. 32 GAOA, he participates in Federal Council meetings with an advisory vote and has the right to make motions within his area of competence.

#4. Legal Consequences

N. 9 Art. 179 BV results in the constitutional anchoring of the Federal Chancellery as a necessary body of the federal state organisation. The legislator is obliged to provide a functional staff unit for the Federal Council. An abolition of the Federal Chancellery would only be possible through constitutional amendment.

N. 10 The staff function does not establish any independent sovereign powers vis-à-vis third parties. Rulings by the Federal Chancellery always require a specific legal basis, such as in the area of political rights (Art. 69 ff. FPA) or the principle of transparency (Art. 10 FTA).

N. 11 The constitutional position gives the Federal Chancellery legitimacy for coordinating and supporting activities in all areas of government activity, including informing the public (cf. BGE 145 I 1 E. 5.2.2).

#5. Controversies

N. 12 The scope of the Federal Chancellery's political communication powers is controversially discussed. While Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Swiss Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 2016, N 3485) advocate a restrictive interpretation of the staff function, Tschannen (in: Diggelmann/Hertig Randall/Schindler, Constitutional Law of Switzerland, Vol. III, 2020, § 65 N. 28) argues for a broad understanding of information tasks as an implicit part of modern governance.

N. 13 The scope of the delegation authority for appeal legitimations is also disputed. Müller/Schefer (Fundamental Rights in Switzerland, 4th ed. 2008, p. 892) advocate a narrow interpretation, while the practice of the Federal Court generally allows delegations within the central federal administration (cf. BGE 140 II 539 E. 4.2).

N. 14 The legal qualification of statements by the Federal Chancellor is also controversial. Biaggini (BV Commentary, 2nd ed. 2017, Art. 179 N. 3) emphasizes the binding nature of collegial decisions of the Federal Council, while other authors acknowledge a certain independent communication scope (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Gallen Commentary, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 179 N. 12).

#6. Practice Guidelines

N. 15 For rulings by the Federal Chancellery, the specific legal basis must always be examined. The general staff function according to Art. 179 BV is not sufficient for sovereign action. Particularly in the area of political rights, the detailed procedural provisions of the FPA must be observed.

N. 16 Different legal remedy paths apply for challenging rulings by the Federal Chancellery. While for rulings on the success of referendums since 2008 only the non-success can be challenged (BGE 146 I 126 E. 1), other rulings in the area of political rights are generally subject to appeal.

N. 17 In the context of transparency requests, the Federal Chancellery functions both as the requested authority for its own documents and as a coordination office for cross-departmental requests (Art. 10 para. 3 FTA). When processing, the dual role must be considered: own competence versus coordination function.

#General Position and Tasks of the Federal Chancellery

#Staff Function for the Federal Council

BGE 145 I 1 of 29.10.2018 E. 5.2.2

The Federal Chancellery acts as a general staff unit of the Federal Council in informing voters. The Federal Court held that the Federal Chancellery, as a staff unit of the Federal Council, is competent and entitled to support the Federal Council in informing voters about federal referendum proposals.

«The Federal Chancellery is the staff unit of the Federal Council (Art. 1 para. 1 of the Organisation Ordinance of 29 October 2008 for the Federal Chancellery [OV-BK; SR 172.210.10] in conjunction with Art. 30 para. 1 RVOG). As such, it supports the Federal Council in carrying out its tasks (Art. 1 para. 3 lit. a OV-BK in conjunction with Art. 30 para. 2 lit. a RVOG). It participates in the preparation and conduct of federal referendums (Art. 3 para. 1 VPR as well as Art. 1 para. 4 lit. a OV-BK).»

#Standing to Appeal of the Federal Chancellery

BGE 140 II 539 of 26.06.2014 E. 4.2

The Federal Chancellery has, according to Art. 89 para. 2 lit. a BGG, a statutory right to appeal, which it can delegate to subordinate administrative units by means of ordinance. The Federal Court clarified the limits of this delegation possibility.

«The right to appeal accorded by law to the Federal Chancellery and departments of the Confederation can be delegated by means of ordinance to an administrative unit of the central federal administration (E. 4.2). In the specific case, no norm of federal law transfers the power to appeal to the Federal Court to the Specialist Unit for Personnel Security Checks (E. 4.4).»

#Political Rights and the Federal Chancellery

#Popular Initiatives and Referendums

BGE 131 II 449 of 31.05.2005 E. 3.4

For popular initiatives, the Federal Chancellery is not authorised to subsequently correct defective voting rights certificates. The Federal Court established the clear limits of the Federal Chancellery in reviewing popular initiatives.

«A subsequent certification or correction of defective certificates by the Federal Chancellery is not possible (E. 3.4).»

BGE 129 II 305 of 06.06.2003 E. 1.1

Against negative rulings of the Federal Chancellery concerning registration in the federal party register, administrative court appeal is admissible. The Federal Court clarified the legal remedy against rulings of the Federal Chancellery.

«Against a ruling of the Federal Chancellery rejecting registration, administrative court appeal is available (E. 1.1).»

BGE 146 I 126 of 14.02.2020 E. 1

The Federal Court confirmed the limited contestability of rulings by the Federal Chancellery on the validity of referendums. According to the regulation in force since 2008, only rulings on non-validity are contestable.

«According to the version of Art. 80 para. 2 BPR in force since 1 January 2008, appeals to the Federal Court are admissible against rulings of the Federal Chancellery on the non-validity of a referendum. It follows that appeals directed against a ruling on the validity of a referendum are inadmissible (E. 1).»

#Right to Be Heard in Declarations of Invalidity

BGE 100 Ib 1 of 22.01.1974 E. 2

In declarations of invalidity of popular initiatives, the Federal Chancellery must give the initiators an opportunity to comment beforehand. The Federal Court established important procedural guarantees for the initiative process.

«In a declaration of invalidity, the Swiss Federal Chancellery must give the initiators an opportunity to comment on the alleged grounds of invalidity prior to the ruling (Cons. 2).»

#Information Tasks and Communication

#Referendum Videos and Information Duties

BGE 145 I 1 of 29.10.2018 E. 5.1.3 and E. 5.2.2

The Federal Chancellery may publish referendum videos to fulfil the Federal Council's information mandate, but is subject to the principles of objectivity, transparency and proportionality. The Federal Court defined the limits of the Federal Chancellery in referendum information.

«With the appeal in voting rights matters, it can thus be claimed to this extent that a referendum video published by the Federal Chancellery - possibly in cooperation with a department - in advance of a federal referendum to inform voters violates the right of voters to free opinion formation and unimpaired voting according to Art. 34 para. 2 BV.»

#Coordination of Government Communication

BGE 145 I 1 of 29.10.2018 E. 5.2.2

The Federal Chancellery ensures coordinated information and communication policy at government level and ensures rapid information about Federal Council decisions. The Federal Court recognised the central role of the Federal Chancellery in government communication.

«In general, it ensures long-term and coordinated information and communication policy at government level and ensures the most rapid possible information about the decisions of the Federal Council (Art. 1 para. 3 lit. c OV-BK in conjunction with Art. 34 para. 1 RVOG). The departments inform about their activities in consultation and cooperation with the Federal Chancellery.»

#Historical Development of Jurisprudence

#Early Jurisprudence on the Federal Chancellery

BGE 100 Ib 1 of 22.01.1974 E. 1

The Federal Court established early on that the Federal Chancellery issues rulings concerning popular petitions instead of the Federal Council. This marked the transition from political to administrative treatment of such procedures.

«Since the revision of the OG in 1968, the Federal Chancellery is now competent for issuing such rulings instead of the Federal Council.»

BGE 147 I 206 of 07.10.2020 E. 2

The Federal Court confirmed the contestability of rulings by the Federal Chancellery on the withdrawal of popular initiatives. This extended judicial protection in the area of political rights.

«Against the withdrawal of a federal popular initiative, appeal to the Federal Court is possible (E. 2). The withdrawal of a federal popular initiative is also possible under the conditions of Art. 73 BPR after the cancellation of a referendum by the Federal Court (E. 3).»