1The President of the Confederation chairs the Federal Council.
2The President and the Vice-President of the Federal Council are elected by the Federal Assembly from the members of the Federal Council for a term of office of one year.
3Re-election for the following year is not permitted. The President may not be elected Vice-President for the following year.
Art. 176 BV governs the election and position of the Federal President. The Federal President chairs the Federal Council and represents Switzerland at official events. However, he or she is not head of state or head of government, but merely «first among equals» (primus inter pares).
The Federal Assembly (National Council and Council of States together) elects a new Federal President and a Vice-President from among the seven Federal Councillors each year. The term of office lasts exactly one year. Immediate re-election is prohibited. The outgoing Federal President also cannot immediately become Vice-President.
Traditionally, the Federal Councillor who has been in office the longest and has never been Federal President is elected President (principle of seniority). However, this is only custom, not binding law.
The Federal President has no special powers. All important decisions are made by the Federal Council as a collegial body (group). The President chairs the meetings, helps determine the agenda and signs laws on behalf of the Federal Council. In Federal Council votes, he or she has no additional vote.
An example: Federal President Viola Amherd chaired Federal Council meetings in 2023 and received foreign heads of state. At the same time, she remained head of the Department of Defence. In 2024, another Federal Councillor was automatically elected President.
The system prevents the concentration of power in one person and strengthens Switzerland's collective leadership. Each Federal Councillor normally gets a turn as Federal President once during their term of office.
N. 1 The current regulation of the Federal Presidency in Art. 176 BV largely corresponds to the order under the old Federal Constitution of 1874. The first Federal Constitution of 1848 already knew the annually rotating presidential system. The Federal Council message on the total revision of the Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 states that the rotation principle and the one-year term of office «belong to the characteristic features of Swiss collegiate government» (BBl 1997 I 1, 355). The constitutional legislator of 1999 adopted the proven regulation without material changes.
N. 2 The non-re-electability anchored in paragraph 3 goes back to the Federal Constitution of 1848. It was introduced to prevent a concentration of power in the Federal Presidency and to ensure the equality of all Federal Councillors. The prohibition that the outgoing Federal President may become Vice-President the following year was only inserted with the constitutional revision of 1981 (AS 1981 1244).
N. 3 Art. 176 BV is located in the 2nd section of the 5th chapter on federal authorities and, together with Art. 174–179 BV, regulates the organisation and functioning of the Federal Council. The provision concretises the principle of collegiality anchored in Art. 177 para. 1 BV by assigning the Federal President exclusively a presiding function («primus inter pares»). → Art. 174 BV (Federal Council as supreme governing and executive authority); ↔ Art. 177 BV (principle of collegiality).
N. 4 The Swiss system differs fundamentally from presidential government systems, in which the head of state has independent executive powers. The Federal President is neither head of state nor head of government in the proper sense. The collective exercise of the state leadership function by the entire Federal Council is institutionally secured through Art. 176 BV.
N. 5Presiding function (para. 1): The Federal President chairs the Federal Council meetings. This function encompasses meeting leadership, setting the agenda (in consultation with the collegium) and performing protocol tasks. Material special powers are not connected with the chairmanship. In case of a tie, the Federal President has no casting vote (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N. 1571).
N. 6Election procedure (para. 2): The Federal Assembly elects the Federal President and the Vice-President from among the seven Federal Councillors. The election takes place according to Art. 175 para. 2 BV by the United Federal Assembly. The passive right to vote is exclusively available to serving Federal Councillors; an outsider cannot be directly elected as Federal President (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Galler Kommentar BV, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 176 N. 4).
N. 7Term of office: The one-year term of office begins on 1 January and ends on 31 December of the election year. An extension or shortening is constitutionally excluded. The election traditionally takes place in the winter session of the Federal Assembly (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N. 2896).
N. 8Non-re-electability (para. 3): The absolute prohibition on immediate re-election applies both to the office of Federal President and to the transition from the Federal Presidency to the Vice-Presidency. A Federal Councillor can be elected Federal President again at the earliest after a one-year break. This cooling-off period is mandatory and knows no exceptions.
N. 9 Election as Federal President does not establish additional powers compared to other Federal Councillors. The Federal President remains fully integrated into the collegium and is subject to the principle of collegiality like all Federal Councillors. His departmental responsibility remains unaffected by the election (Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 4th ed. 2014, § 17 N. 12).
N. 10 In practice, the Federal President performs the following tasks: representation of Switzerland on state visits, chairing Federal Council meetings, signing decrees on behalf of the Federal Council, New Year's address to the nation. These functions arise partly from unwritten constitutional customs, partly from simple legislative regulations (in particular the Government and Administration Organisation Act, RVOG).
N. 11Reform discussion: The doctrine has been discussing a strengthening of the Federal Presidency for decades. Biaggini advocates for a multi-year term of office to improve continuity in foreign policy (Biaggini, BV Kommentar, 2nd ed. 2017, Art. 176 N. 3). In contrast, Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr defend the existing system as a guarantor of the balance of power in the Federal Council (Bundesstaatsrecht, N. 1572). Parliamentary initiatives to extend the term of office regularly failed due to resistance from the Federal Assembly.
N. 12Seniority principle: The constitutional bindingness of the seniority principle in the election of the Federal President is disputed. The prevailing doctrine qualifies it as a mere constitutional custom without legal bindingness (Ehrenzeller et al., St. Galler Kommentar, Art. 176 N. 6). A minority sees it as a constitutional convention consolidated through long-standing practice (Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte, 4th ed. 2008, p. 892). The Federal Assembly is legally free to deviate from the seniority principle.
N. 13Substitution: The question of substitution when the Federal President is prevented from acting is controversially discussed. While Art. 176 para. 2 BV mentions the Vice-President, the constitution does not explicitly regulate his powers. Practice assumes automatic substitution in all presidential functions. Critical voices call for explicit constitutional regulation (Aubert/Mahon, Petit commentaire, Art. 176 N. 8).
N. 14 The election of the Federal President takes place on Wednesday of the third session week of the winter session. The Federal Assembly uses the absolute majority. If no candidate reaches the required number of votes in the first ballot, further ballots take place. The non-election of a Federal Councillor «designated» according to seniority is rare but constitutionally permissible.
N. 15 In international negotiations, the Federal President can only act within the framework of a Federal Council resolution. Independent foreign policy initiatives are denied to him. In practice, he coordinates closely with the head of the FDFA. The representative tasks must be reconciled with the duties as head of department, which means a considerable additional burden.
N. 16 There are certain creative possibilities for the concrete design of the presidential year. Thus, the Federal President can set thematic priorities and shape the public communication of the Federal Council. However, this «soft power» may not be used to circumvent the principle of collegiality. In case of disagreements in the Federal Council, the Federal President has no special enforcement possibilities.
Art. 176 BV is a purely organizational provision that regulates the presidential system of the Federal Council. Since it is an internal procedural rule that does not establish subjective rights and has no direct legal consequences for third parties, this provision is practically non-justiciable. This explains the complete absence of BGE decisions on this constitutional provision.
Constitutional practice regarding the Federal Council is mainly shaped by political conventions and parliamentary control, not by court decisions. The Federal Supreme Court has had no occasion to assess the election of the Federal President or Vice-President, as these decisions lie within the exclusive competence of the Federal Assembly and do not affect fundamental rights.
In Federal Supreme Court case law, Art. 176 BV is occasionally mentioned in connection with general questions of Federal Council organization, without the norm itself being the subject of assessment. The courts respect the constitutional division of competences and only exceptionally assess internal organizational questions of the Federal Council.
The practical significance of Art. 176 BV lies exclusively in the political and constitutional sphere. Legal disputes do not arise from the application of this norm, but at most from its interpretation by the Federal Assembly in the annual election of the presidency. However, such questions of interpretation are not justiciable and are clarified through parliamentary practice.
The complete absence of specific court decisions on Art. 176 BV is systemic and corresponds to the nature of this organizational legal provision. The norm unfolds its effect exclusively within the institutional framework of the separation of powers and is therefore not subject to judicial review.