#1. Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 154 BV was anchored at the constitutional level for the first time with the total revision of the Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999. The Dispatch on a new Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 (BBl 1997 I 1) explains that the provision constitutionally secures the existing parliamentary group system of the Federal Assembly and codifies the previous practice. Previously, the right to form parliamentary groups was based exclusively on the parliamentary rules of procedure and the practice of the councils.

N. 2 The constitutional drafters recognised the central importance of parliamentary groups for the functioning of parliament. The Dispatch notes that parliamentary groups «structure parliamentary work and channel political will formation» (BBl 1997 I 440). The explicit constitutional anchoring was intended to strengthen the organisational autonomy of the Federal Assembly and provide parliamentary groups with a clear constitutional basis.

#2. Systematic Classification

N. 3 Art. 154 BV is located in Chapter 2 of Title 5 on the Federal Assembly and is systematically placed between the provisions on procedural autonomy (Art. 153 BV) and parliamentary services (Art. 155 BV). This position emphasises that the formation of parliamentary groups is part of the internal organisation of parliament.

N. 4 The norm is closely related to:

• → Art. 148 BV (composition and election of the Federal Assembly)
• → Art. 149 BV (incompatibilities)
• → Art. 153 BV (procedural autonomy)
• ↔ Art. 8 BV (equality before the law, including for unaffiliated parliamentarians)
• → Art. 161 BV (prohibition of instructions and free mandate)

#3. Normative Content

N. 5 Art. 154 BV grants members of the Federal Assembly the right to form parliamentary groups. The norm contains three central elements: the subject («members of the Federal Assembly»), the legal consequence («may») and the object («form parliamentary groups»).

N. 6 The term «may» makes clear that this is a right, not an obligation. No member of parliament can be forced to belong to a parliamentary group. The constitution thus guarantees both positive and negative freedom of parliamentary group affiliation (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 3245).

N. 7 The constitutional text does not define what a «parliamentary group» is. According to parliamentary practice and Art. 5sexies GVG, at least five members from the same council are required who unite based on their political convictions. The constitution deliberately leaves the detailed regulation to the business order autonomy of the councils (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Galler Kommentar BV, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 154 N 3).

#4. Legal Consequences

N. 8 Art. 154 BV does not establish a subjective constitutional right of the individual parliamentarian, but rather an institutional guarantee. The Federal Assembly must provide the possibility to form parliamentary groups and may not prevent or disproportionately impede this.

N. 9 The concrete legal position of parliamentary groups results from the Parliament Act and the council regulations. Parliamentary groups are entitled to:

• Representation in parliamentary committees (Art. 43 para. 3 ParlA)
• Financial contributions (Art. 5sexies GVG)
• Speaking time in plenary sessions
• Submission of parliamentary group motions

N. 10 Unaffiliated parliamentarians enjoy the same basic parliamentary rights as group members due to Art. 8 BV and Art. 161 BV. However, they have no claim to parliamentary group privileges such as increased financial contributions or guaranteed committee seats (Parliamentary Initiative Ruf 90.253).

#5. Disputed Issues

N. 11 In legal doctrine, it is disputed whether Art. 154 BV also establishes a right to adequate financial resources for parliamentary groups. Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr (Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 1623) affirm a constitutional minimum claim, since without financial means the work of parliamentary groups would be factually impossible. Müller/Schefer (Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 892) see financing, on the other hand, as a pure matter of business order regulation.

N. 12 The question of minimum size is also controversially discussed. While Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (ibid., N 3246) consider the threshold of five as appropriate, Waldmann advocates for more flexible handling that is oriented to the size ratios of the councils.

#6. Practical Guidelines

N. 13 When forming parliamentary groups, the following should be noted:

• Parliamentary group formation takes place anew at the beginning of each legislative period
• Changing parliamentary groups during the legislative period is permissible
• Parliamentary group membership has no influence on the free mandate according to Art. 161 BV
• In case of parliamentary group withdrawals or exclusions, the regulatory deadlines must be observed

N. 14 For parliamentary practice, it is crucial that parliamentary groups are not legal entities. They can neither sue nor be sued. Legally relevant actions must be undertaken by individual group members or by the organs designated by the parliamentary group.

N. 15 The rules of procedure of the councils provide detailed regulations for parliamentary group motions, speaking times and committee representations. These are to be consulted in the respective council regulations and are subject to autonomous regulation by the councils.

#Preliminary Remarks

Art. 154 BV, which governs the right of members of the Federal Assembly to form parliamentary groups, is an organizational provision without direct subjective rights. Accordingly, the highest court case law on this norm is sparse. The organization of parliamentary group formation is primarily governed by the Parliamentary Administration Act and the procedural rules of the chambers.

#I. No Highest Court Case Law on Art. 154 BV

The Federal Supreme Court has not yet directly interpreted or applied Art. 154 BV. This is explained by the fact that parliamentary group formation represents an internal organizational matter of the Federal Assembly that is not justiciable. The concrete organization is governed by parliamentary rules of procedure, particularly Art. 5sexies of the Parliamentary Administration Act (GVG).

#II. Parliamentary Practice on Parliamentary Group Formation

The practical implementation of Art. 154 BV occurred through various parliamentary initiatives and debates:

Parliamentary Initiative (Committee of the National Council) of 8 February 1990

• Date: 8 February 1990
• Increase in contributions to parliamentary groups of the Federal Assembly
• Confirmation of the constitutional basis for parliamentary group contributions
• Case law relevance for the financial equipment of parliamentary groups

«It is rightly argued, in our view, that the activities of the parties are to a large extent oriented towards the parliamentary decision-making process. The parties take up the social views and interests present in the people, bundle and articulate them in order to set the public opinion-forming and decision-making process in motion.»

Parliamentary Initiative (Ruf) of 21 June 1991

• Date: 21 June 1991
• Contributions to the non-party delegations of the Federal Assembly
• Discussion on the constitutional equal treatment of parliamentarians
• Fundamental question on the interpretation of Art. 154 BV

«The Federal Constitution nowhere distinguishes between parliamentarians with and without parliamentary group membership and consequently with more or fewer rights. All members of a chamber of the Federal Assembly are equal under the Federal Constitution.»

#III. Constitutional Classification

The organizational nature of Art. 154 BV leads to its application being shaped primarily by parliamentary practice and not by judicial decisions. The norm guarantees the organizational autonomy of the Federal Assembly in parliamentary group formation without establishing justiciable individual rights.

#IV. Relation to Other Constitutional Provisions

Art. 154 BV stands in systematic connection with:

• → Art. 148 BV (Composition of the Federal Assembly)
• → Art. 149 BV (Procedural autonomy of the chambers)
• ↔ Art. 8 BV (Legal equality of parliamentarians)