1Freedom of religion and conscience is guaranteed.
2Every person has the right to choose freely their religion or their philosophical convictions, and to profess them alone or in community with others.
3Every person has the right to join or to belong to a religious community, and to follow religious teachings.
4No person may be forced to join or belong to a religious community, to participate in a religious act, or to follow religious teachings.
#Overview
Article 15 of the Federal Constitution protects freedom of belief and conscience. This fundamental right guarantees all people in Switzerland the right to freely choose, practice or reject their religion or worldview.
The fundamental right has two sides: Positive religious freedom grants the right to have and practice a faith. Negative religious freedom protects against being forced into religious acts. Both aspects are equally important.
Who is protected? All persons in Switzerland may invoke freedom of belief and conscience. This applies to Swiss citizens and foreigners, to adults and children. Religious communities (churches, mosques, temples) also have certain rights.
What is permitted? People may practice their religion privately and publicly. They may pray, wear religious clothing, attend religious services and communicate their convictions to others. No one may force them to join a particular religion or perform religious acts.
Practical examples: A Muslim female student may wear a headscarf at school. Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be forced to participate in patriotic celebrations. An employee may request leave on their religious holiday if the company permits it.
Where are the limits? Religious freedom is not unlimited. The state may impose restrictions when other important interests are affected. Example: Church bells may be rung more quietly at night so that neighbours can sleep.
Special situations: In school, the state must be neutral. It may not favour or disadvantage any religion. In naturalisation proceedings, it is prohibited to reject someone solely because of their religion. In prison or in the military, religious practices may be restricted, but must remain fundamentally possible.
Legal consequences: Those who violate the fundamental right may be prosecuted in court. The Federal Court has clarified in many judgments that religious discrimination is inadmissible. At the same time, religious practices must sometimes take a back seat when they would severely impair others.
Art. 15 FC — Freedom of Religion and Conscience
#Doctrine
#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 15 FC replaces Arts. 49 and 50 of the Federal Constitution of 1874. In terms of substance, the constituent legislator shifted the emphasis from collective-institutional provisions (dioceses, relationship between church and state) towards the individual fundamental right: the institutional aspects of the relationship between state and church were transferred to Art. 72 FC (new), and the provision on dioceses to Art. 84 para. 3 of the 1996 Draft Constitution. In its dispatch, the Federal Council noted that the existing rules of Arts. 49 para. 3, 49 paras. 4–6 and 50 para. 1 of the former FC were deliberately not carried over; instead, Art. 15 FC should «place the emphasis on the individual-rights aspects of freedom of religion» (BBl 1997 I 155 f.).
N. 2 The Federal Council chose a four-paragraph structure: para. 1 contains the general fundamental rights guarantee; para. 2 codifies freedom of choice as regards religious and ideological convictions and their profession; para. 3 formulates positive freedom of religion (joining, belonging to, and receiving instruction from a religious community); para. 4 anchors negative freedom of religion as an express prohibition of coercion. This division adopts and clarifies the doctrine of positive and negative dimensions of freedom that had existed under the former law (BBl 1997 I 591).
N. 3 The dispatch makes clear that the concept of religion is to be understood very broadly, encompassing not only the traditional world religions but also atheistic and agnostic world views (BBl 1997 I 155). The Federal Council further expressly emphasised that the provision protects «the negative right not to belong to any religion» and includes «the confessional neutrality of the state» (BBl 1997 I 155). In the Council of States, rapporteur Inderkum (C, UR) pointed out that Art. 15 FC is a purely individual fundamental right and relates «only to natural persons» — a position that was subsequently nuanced by the case law on corporate freedom of religion (→ N. 11).
N. 4 The parliamentary deliberations on Art. 15 FC were largely uncontroversial in terms of substance. The Conference of Conciliation confirmed the Federal Council's version in the final vote of 18 December 1998. The new Federal Constitution entered into force on 1 January 2000. Freedom of worship, which had still been expressly enshrined in Art. 50 para. 1 of the former FC, is no longer separately mentioned in Art. 15 FC; however, the Federal Supreme Court has made clear that its constitutional protection was not thereby reduced in substance (BGE 129 I 74 E. 4.1).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 5 Art. 15 FC appears in the second chapter (Fundamental Rights, Arts. 7–36 FC) and belongs to the cluster of personal freedoms. It is systematically closely related to freedom of expression (→ Art. 16 FC), freedom of information, and freedom of association (→ Art. 23 FC). Freedom of religion constitutes a lex specialis in relation to general freedom of expression insofar as religious and ideological convictions are concerned; both guarantees may, however, also apply in parallel. There is a subsidiary catch-all relationship with general personal freedom (→ Art. 10 para. 2 FC).
N. 6 The prohibition of discrimination under → Art. 8 para. 2 FC, which identifies religious conviction as a prohibited ground of distinction, is in close interaction with Art. 15 FC (↔ Art. 8 para. 2 FC). The Federal Supreme Court has held that in cases of religion-based discrimination, Art. 8 para. 2 FC offers the more extensive protection, and Art. 15 FC adds no independent content (BGE 132 I 167 E. 3). The conditions for restricting the right are governed exclusively by → Art. 36 FC; the essential core under Art. 36 para. 4 FC is inviolable.
N. 7 Art. 15 FC contains a directly applicable, subjective guarantee of a defensive right. It is directed primarily against state interference (defensive dimension), but according to the prevailing view also encompasses a state duty to protect religious peace (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.2). In the educational sphere, it also establishes a right to religiously neutral instruction (→ Art. 62 FC). The relationship between church and state is a matter for the cantons (→ Art. 72 FC).
#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content
3.1 Scope of Protection
N. 8 Art. 15 FC protects inner freedom (forum internum), i.e. the right to believe, not to believe, or to change one's religious conviction, as well as outer freedom (forum externum) to express, practise, and propagate convictions — or not to share them (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.4; BGE 135 I 79 E. 5.1). The forum internum constitutes the inviolable essential core (Art. 36 para. 4 FC); the forum externum may be restricted subject to the conditions of Art. 36 FC.
N. 9 The concept of religion and ideology is to be understood broadly. All religious creeds are protected regardless of how widely they are represented in Switzerland, including atheistic world views (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.4; BGE 134 I 49 E. 2.3). State authorities are not entitled to examine the theological correctness of religious beliefs; they must proceed from the subjective significance that the religious norm holds for the persons concerned (BGE 135 I 79 E. 4.4; BGE 142 I 49 E. 5.2).
N. 10 The freedom of worship guaranteed by Art. 15 paras. 2 and 3 FC encompasses acts of worship, the observance of religious customs and commandments, and dress requirements that are an expression of religious conviction — in particular the Islamic headscarf (hijab), the Jewish kippah, the habit of Christian monks and nuns, and visibly worn crosses (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.6; BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.5). Freedom of worship is regarded as a component and consequence of Art. 15 FC and was not restricted in substance by the entry into force of the new FC (BGE 129 I 74 E. 4.1).
N. 11 The holders of this fundamental right are primarily natural persons. Legal entities pursuing religious or ecclesiastical objectives may, according to the consistent case law of the Federal Supreme Court, also invoke freedom of religion (corporate freedom of religion; BGE 145 I 121 E. 23; BGE 142 I 195 E. 5.2). Legal entities without a religious purpose do not, however, fall within the personal scope of protection of Art. 15 FC; special principles apply to church taxes levied on legal entities (BGE 126 I 122 E. 3).
3.2 Positive and Negative Freedom of Religion
N. 12 Para. 3 guarantees positive freedom of religion: the right to join or belong to a religious community and to receive religious instruction. Para. 4 establishes negative freedom of religion as an express prohibition of coercion: no one may be compelled to join a religious community, to perform a religious act, or to receive religious instruction. This two-part structure has implications in particular for withdrawal from a church and church taxes (→ N. 20).
N. 13 Negative freedom of religion protects against state coercion in matters of religious practice, but does not confer a right to be entirely shielded from the religious convictions of others. The mere wearing of religious symbols by fellow pupils, for example, does not violate the negative freedom of religion of third parties (BGE 142 I 49 E. 9.4.2; BGE 135 I 79 E. 7.2).
3.3 State Duty of Neutrality
N. 14 Art. 15 FC obliges the state to maintain religious and ideological neutrality. This neutrality is achieved either through a strict separation of state and religion (laicist model) or through an attitude of equal openness towards all creeds (confessionally neutral model). Cantonal constitutional law recognises both variants (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.3; BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.4). The duty of neutrality applies to authorities and their representatives, but not to pupils as legal subjects (BGE 142 I 49 E. 9.2). The Federal Supreme Court recognises that cantons have considerable latitude within the framework of federalism (→ Art. 72 FC) (BGE 148 I 160 E. 5).
3.4 Functions of the Fundamental Right
N. 15 According to the Federal Supreme Court, freedom of religion and conscience fulfils three functions: (1) duty of tolerance — securing religious peace; (2) protection of liberty — ensuring that all persons may preserve, express, and live by their deepest convictions in everyday life; (3) integration function — preventing the exclusion of religious minorities and facilitating their social integration (BGE 142 I 49 E. 3.2; BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.3; Kiener/Kälin, Grundrechte, 2nd ed. 2013, p. 313).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 16 As a defensive right against state interference, Art. 15 FC affords direct protection. Interferences with the forum externum are permissible only if they satisfy the conditions of Art. 36 FC: a legal basis (para. 1), a public interest or the protection of the fundamental rights of others (para. 2), and proportionality (para. 3). Serious interferences require a basis in formal legislation (BGE 139 I 280 E. 5.1; BGE 142 I 49 E. 6).
N. 17 The state's duty of neutrality and confessional equal treatment are enforceable as individual rights. However, freedom of religion and conscience does not confer a right to prevent the state from performing, promoting, or supporting acts that are incompatible with one's own world view, provided the state does not thereby unlawfully take sides in favour of a particular religion (BGE 145 I 121 E. 5.2).
N. 18 The assessment of the seriousness of an interference is governed by objective criteria; state authorities must assess the religious significance of a norm from the perspective of the persons concerned, without making their own theological evaluation (BGE 135 I 79 E. 4.4; BGE 142 I 49 E. 7.1). The Federal Supreme Court qualifies a general prohibition on a female pupil wearing a headscarf in a public school as a serious interference (BGE 142 I 49 E. 7.2; BGE 139 I 280 E. 5.2).
N. 19 Art. 15 FC continues to apply in principle in the context of the execution of sentences. Restrictions on freedom of worship are, however, easier to justify in view of the special-status relationship; they must nevertheless be limited to maintaining the orderly operation of the institution and may not go beyond what is necessary (BGE 129 I 74 E. 4.2). Exclusion from communal religious services for security reasons is constitutionally compliant provided the prisoner is guaranteed access to pastoral care.
N. 20 Withdrawal from a church must also be enforceable as a partial withdrawal from the national church: it is sufficient to declare withdrawal from the national church constituted as a body governed by public law; renunciation of the universal church cannot be required (judgment 2P.16/2002 of 18.12.2002). Church taxes levied on legal entities are in principle compatible with Art. 15 FC (BGE 126 I 122 E. 3; BGE 128 I 317 E. 4).
#5. Contested Issues
5.1 Headscarf in the School Context
N. 21 The most contested constellation concerns the wearing of religious clothing in public schools. The Federal Supreme Court draws a sharp distinction between pupils and teachers: while it recognised a headscarf ban for the latter (notably in the Canton of Geneva with its laicist tradition) as constitutionally compliant (BGE 123 I 296 E. 4), it declared a general headscarf ban for female pupils lacking a basis in formal legislation to be unconstitutional (BGE 139 I 280 E. 5). Even where a basis in formal legislation exists, such a ban is disproportionate if there is no concrete threat to school peace (BGE 142 I 49 E. 10.2).
N. 22 Müller/Schefer (Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 277) emphasise that the state's duty of neutrality creates a duty to protect all creeds rather than a duty to defend against religious symbolism by private individuals. Kiener/Kälin (Grundrechte, 2nd ed. 2013, pp. 270 f.) share this analysis: allowing a female pupil to wear a headscarf does not constitute state identification with a particular faith. The Federal Supreme Court adopted this academic position in BGE 142 I 49 E. 9.2.
5.2 Exemptions from School Classes
N. 23 The extent of the entitlement to exemption from compulsory classes on religious grounds is contested. The Federal Supreme Court granted Muslim female pupils an exemption from swimming lessons in 1993 (BGE 119 Ia 178), but refused in 2008 to grant an exemption to Muslim boys, citing the increased interest in integration (BGE 135 I 79 E. 7.3). It justified the change of practice by reference to changed social circumstances (the numerical growth of the Muslim population and the statutory entrenchment of the mandate of integration). Karlen (Das Grundrecht der Religionsfreiheit in der Schweiz, 1982, pp. 294 f.) and Kälin (Grundrechte im Kulturkonflikt, 2000, p. 39) emphasise that the subjective significance of the religious norm for the persons concerned — not its intersubjective binding force within the religious community — must be decisive in establishing the scope of protection; this position was confirmed in BGE 135 I 79 E. 4.4.
5.3 State Laicity and Neutrality
N. 24 It is controversial how far the cantonal tradition of laicity can justify state interferences with the religious practice of public employees. The Federal Supreme Court acknowledges that cantons such as Geneva, with a marked laicist constitutional tradition, may impose more far-reaching duties of neutrality on public employees, but emphasises that an excessively strict application would in individual cases be incompatible with Art. 15 FC (BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.10.3.3). Häfner (Religionsverfassung, in: Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Vol. III, 2020, pp. 2338 f.) calls for greater judicial restraint on the part of the Federal Supreme Court in the abstract review of cantonal laicity legislation. Hertig Randall (in: Études en l'honneur de Tristan Zimmermann, 2017, p. 150) and Mahon (ibid., pp. 203 f.) distinguish «inclusive» from «exclusive» laicity: only the former is compatible with the pluralism of a democratic society.
5.4 Corporate Freedom of Religion
N. 25 Whether, and to what extent, legal entities with a religious purpose are holders of freedom of religion and conscience was disputed under the former constitutional law. The dispatch (BBl 1997 I 155) and the Council of States (Inderkum) proceeded from an individual-rights character of the provision. The Federal Supreme Court has, however, consistently recognised religious bodies as holders of fundamental rights (BGE 145 I 121 E. 23; BGE 142 I 195 E. 5.2 ff.), thereby overcoming the narrow parliamentary reading. Pahud de Mortanges (BSK BV, Art. 15 N. 1) sees this as a systemically consistent development towards comprehensive protection of collective religious practice.
#6. Practical Notes
N. 26 ECHR parallel law: Art. 9 ECHR protects freedom of religion and conscience in essentially the same way as Art. 15 FC (BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.1). Art. 18 of the UN Covenant II (SR 0.103.2) has no independent scope in relation to Art. 9 ECHR (BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.1). The ECtHR grants Contracting States a broad margin of appreciation in matters of freedom of religion, which the Federal Supreme Court takes into account in the context of cantonal review of norms (BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.13).
N. 27 Proportionality: In the case of interferences with the forum externum, the three-part proportionality test under Art. 36 para. 3 FC must be applied in full: suitability, necessity, and reasonableness. Integration and equality interests may constitute public interests without, however, automatically outweighing the fundamental right (BGE 135 I 79 E. 7.1 f.; BGE 142 I 49 E. 8–10). For serious interferences, a basis in formal legislation is in all cases a prerequisite (BGE 139 I 280 E. 5.1).
N. 28 Scope of protection and credibility: In proceedings, it is sufficient to credibly demonstrate that the conduct invoked is a direct expression of religious conviction. Authorities may not examine the internal consistency or prevalence of the religious commandment (BGE 135 I 79 E. 4.4; BGE 142 I 49 E. 5.2). Whether the relevant commandment is observed by all members of the faith is irrelevant (BGE 119 Ia 178 E. 7e).
N. 29 Church taxes: Legal entities may be subject to church taxes; this is in principle compatible with Art. 15 FC (BGE 126 I 122; BGE 128 I 317). Special principles derived from freedom of religion and conscience apply in the case of religiously mixed marriages (BGE 128 I 317 E. 4).
N. 30 Cantonal laicity law: The Federal Supreme Court reviews cantonal laicity legislation on an abstract basis with heightened judicial restraint. A general prohibition on religious worship events in public spaces is disproportionate (BGE 148 I 160 E. 11.5). Neutrality obligations for public employees may be constitutionally compliant but must be applied in a concrete and proportionate manner (BGE 148 I 160 E. 7.10.3.3).
Cross-references: ↔ Art. 8 para. 2 FC (prohibition of discrimination, religious conviction as a prohibited ground of distinction); → Art. 36 FC (conditions for restricting all fundamental rights); → Art. 72 FC (church–state relationship, cantonal competences); → Art. 62 FC (education law, confessional neutrality of public schools); → Art. 9 ECHR (parallel Convention guarantee); → Art. 18 UN Covenant II (international guarantee, with no independent scope in relation to ECHR).
#Case Law
#Fundamental Principles of Freedom of Religion
BGE 142 I 49 E. 3 of 11 December 2015
Headscarf ban for female pupils violates Art. 15 Const.
The fundamental right protects both inner and outer freedom of religion.
«Freedom of belief and conscience belongs to the oldest fundamental rights; evidence of the idea of tolerance can already be found in the fourth century. The freedom of belief and conscience anchored in the cited ideas is guaranteed by Art. 15 Const. It grants every person the right to freely choose their religion and their ideological conviction and to profess it alone or in community with others.»
#Freedom of Religion in the School Context
BGE 135 I 79 E. 4.4 of 24 October 2008
Swimming lesson exemption for Muslim pupils — Determination of the meaning of religious rules.
The fundamental right also protects convictions of religious minorities regardless of their prevalence.
«The religiously neutral state cannot examine religious rules for their theological correctness. Likewise, it is prohibited from determining the meaning of a religious prescription and thus its weight in the balancing of interests itself. Religious content that justifies religiously motivated behaviour or suggests certain modes of dress is fundamentally not to be examined.»
BGE 139 I 280 E. 5 of 11 July 2013
Headscarf ban for female pupils requires a formal legislative basis.
Serious interference with Art. 15 Const. requires a sufficient legal basis.
«The prohibition of wearing a headscarf at school is a serious interference with the fundamental right of freedom of belief and conscience, which requires a formal legislative basis; the general public school legislation of the Canton of Thurgau does not constitute such a basis.»
#Protection Against Discrimination and Naturalisation
BGE 134 I 49 E. 3.2 of 27 February 2008
Non-naturalisation due to wearing a headscarf is discriminatory.
Art. 15 Const. operates via Art. 8 para. 2 Const. in naturalisation proceedings.
«Basing a negative naturalisation decision on wearing a headscarf as a religious symbol is likely to impermissibly disadvantage the applicant. A qualified justification is lacking for this: The mere wearing of a headscarf does not in itself express an attitude that violates rule of law and democratic values.»
BGE 134 I 56 E. 5 of 27 February 2008
Discrimination review in religiously motivated refusal of naturalisation.
Lack of language skills may override headscarf wearing as a ground for refusal.
«In view of lacking German language and civic knowledge, the rejection of the naturalisation application stands constitutionally, regardless of the fact that the applicant wears a headscarf.»
#Church Withdrawal and Negative Freedom of Religion
BGE 134 I 75 E. 3-9 of 16 November 2007
Partial church withdrawal from the cantonal church suffices.
Negative freedom of religion protects against coercion to belong to a religious community.
«The declaration of withdrawal from the cantonal church suffices; the person wishing to withdraw cannot be required to renounce the Roman Catholic Church as such.»
BGE 129 I 68 E. 3.1-3.4 of 18 December 2002
Legal effects of partial church withdrawal.
Art. 15 para. 4 Const. protects against coercion to practice religion.
«Legal effects of a declaration to withdraw only from the parish or cantonal church but to continue professing the Roman Catholic Church (so-called partial church withdrawal) are to be determined in light of freedom of belief and conscience.»
#Church Taxes and Freedom of Religion
BGE 126 I 122 E. 3 of 13 June 2000
Church tax liability of legal entities compatible with Art. 15 Const.
Freedom of religion primarily protects natural persons.
«Confirmation of previous case law on the fundamental compatibility of church tax liability of legal entities with Art. 49 para. 6 old Const. [now Art. 15 Const.].»
BGE 128 I 317 E. 4 of 20 February 2002
Church taxes in confessionally mixed marriage.
Freedom of belief and conscience sets limits on church taxation.
«Adherence to the principles previously derived from freedom of belief and conscience for church taxation in confessionally mixed marriages.»
#Freedom of Religion in Penal Enforcement
BGE 129 I 74 E. 4.2 of 13 January 2003
Freedom of worship in prison — restrictions are possible.
Freedom of religion also applies in special power relationships, but with restrictions.
«In penal enforcement, restrictions of freedom lying in the public interest arise from the purpose of this institution and from the requirement of maintaining orderly institutional operations. They may not exceed the measure necessary for this purpose.»
#State Neutrality and Religious Symbols
BGE 148 I 160 E. 7 of 23 December 2021
Geneva Laïcité Act and freedom of religion of state employees.
Neutral exercise of state functions may restrict religious expressions.
«Art. 3 paras. 3 and 5 LLE/GE, according to which court personnel, members of cantonal executive authorities and civil servants are to refrain from displaying their religious affiliation through proclamations or external signs, is in conformity with Art. 15 and 36 Const. and Art. 9 No. 1 ECHR. However, an excessively strict application of this provision in individual cases is to be avoided.»
BGE 145 I 121 E. 4 of 17 December 2018
Financing contribution of cantonal church to counselling centre does not violate freedom of religion.
Indirect promotion of non-religious purposes by religious communities is permissible.
«The freedom of belief of the Roman Catholic Cantonal Church or cantonal church law are not violated by the conditional contribution of the Catholic Cantonal Church of Grisons in the amount of CHF 15,000 to a counselling centre for family planning, sexuality, pregnancy and partnership.»
#Religious Minorities and Integration
BGE 126 I 133 E. 4 of 23 May 2000
Missionary activity on public ground is subject to local restrictions.
Freedom of religion is not unlimited and must be balanced against other interests.
«Anyone who wants to distribute paid services and does not clearly reveal the possibly associated missionary goal to the targeted public must accept that their advertising actions are not privileged from the perspective of freedom of religion.»
#Relationship to the ECHR
BGE 132 I 167 E. 3 of 10 May 2006
Freedom of religion and protection against discrimination in naturalisation.
Art. 15 Const. and Art. 9 ECHR have parallel protective effect.
«The invocation of Art. 15 Const. and Art. 9 ECHR has no independent significance with regard to the complaint that naturalisation was refused on discriminatory grounds due to religious affiliation, since the prohibition of discrimination in Art. 8 para. 2 Const. offers more extensive protection.»