The members of the National Council and of the Federal Council as well as the Federal Chancellor are elected for a term of office of four years. Judges of the Federal Supreme Court have a term of office of six years.
Art. 145 FC regulates how long important federal offices last. Members of the National Council and the Federal Council are elected for four years. This also applies to the Federal Chancellor. Federal judges have a longer term of office of six years.
This regulation affects everyone who wants to be elected to these offices or is already in office. The different terms of office have important reasons. For political offices, the four years ensure that those elected must regularly account to the people. This strengthens democracy.
The six-year term of office for federal judges has a different purpose. It is intended to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judges can make their decisions without having to fear rapid removal from office. At the same time, they must face re-election every six years.
After the expiry of the term of office, all rights and duties of the office end automatically. There is no extension. The person concerned must be newly elected if they want to remain in office. Early removal from office for political reasons is not permitted.
A practical example: A National Councillor is elected in 2023. Her term of office ends automatically in 2027, even if she would like to continue. If she wants to remain in office, she must stand for re-election in 2027. A federal judge who was elected in 2022 remains in office until 2028 and must then also stand for re-election.
The different terms of office create a balance between democratic control and independent administration of justice. They are an important component of the Swiss separation of powers.
Art. 145 Cst. was adopted in the total revision of 1999 without substantial changes from the previous constitution. The Dispatch on the new Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 (BBl 1997 I 1, 421) states that the provision brings together the previously scattered provisions on terms of office across various articles. The four-year term of office for the National Council and Federal Council had been constitutionally anchored since 1848, while the six-year term of office for federal judges was first introduced in 1874. The differentiated design of terms of office was deliberately maintained to take account of the different functional requirements of the three branches of government.
N. 2 Systematic Classification
Art. 145 Cst. is located in Title 5 on the Federal Authorities and is systematically positioned between the provisions on eligibility (Art. 143 f. Cst.) and incompatibility (Art. 144 Cst.) on the one hand, and the immunity provisions (Art. 162 Cst.) on the other. Together with → Art. 143 Cst. (eligibility) and → Art. 144 Cst. (incompatibilities), the norm forms the constitutional foundation for the personal organisation of the federal authorities. In the context of the separation of powers (→ Art. 144 para. 1 Cst.), the different terms of office for political authorities and judicial bodies is of particular importance.
N. 3 Elements of the Offence / Content of the Norm
The provision conclusively regulates the terms of office for three categories of federal offices. The concept of term of office designates the time frame for which a person is elected to an office (Schaub, BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 3). The four-year term of office for the National Council, Federal Council and Federal Chancellor corresponds to the legislative period, thereby ensuring democratic legitimacy and political coherence. The six-year term of office for federal judges deliberately deviates from this to strengthen judicial independence (Schaub, BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 7). The norm contains no provision on re-eligibility, which follows from → Art. 143 Cst. (unlimited eligibility).
N. 4 Legal Consequences
Upon expiry of the term of office, the rights and duties associated with the office expire by virtue of the Constitution. An automatic extension or tacit continuation of the office is excluded. According to doctrine (Kiener, BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 10), the fixed term of office means that democratic legitimacy of state power can only be provided for a manageable duration. During the term of office, there is in principle an entitlement to exercise the office; early dismissal for political reasons is constitutionally inadmissible (Schaub, BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 8). However, removal from office can occur for non-political reasons (incapacity for office, gross violation of official duties), with non-re-election serving as a functional equivalent for federal judges (JAAC 68.49).
N. 5 Controversies
Doctrine is divided on two central questions. First, there is disagreement about the constitutionality of the age limit for federal judges under Art. 9 para. 2 FCJA. While the Dispatch on Federal Judicial Administration affirms compatibility with Art. 143 Cst., Fischbacher, Biaggini, Gächter and Kiener take the view that the provision is not consistent with Art. 143 Cst., as it establishes a new eligibility requirement. Second, the admissibility of removal from office of federal judges by the Federal Assembly is disputed. Biaggini, Kiener, Rhinow and Schefer consider such removal from office by means of a federal decree subject to referendum to be unconstitutional, while the St. Gallen Commentary (Ehrenzeller) and a legal opinion express at least doubts about its constitutionality. A third point of contention concerns the optimal term of office for federal judges: Raselli (BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 35) calls for an extension of the term of office or alternatively appointment for life without the possibility of re-election, while Tschannen (BSK BV, Art. 145 N. 35) is critical of life tenure.
N. 6 Practical Guidance
The different terms of office have considerable practical consequences for the conduct of office. For federal judges, a general renewal election is held every six years by the United Federal Assembly (→ Art. 168 para. 1 Cst.), with staggered elections contributing to continuity in jurisprudence. The age limit of 68 years (Art. 9 para. 2 FCJA) means that federal judges must also step down during an ongoing term of office. For National Councillors, the four-year term of office means that they must regularly face the voters, which strengthens democratic accountability. For Federal Councillors, despite formal re-eligibility, a practice of de facto irremovability has developed — non-re-elections are extremely rare. The Federal Chancellor is elected simultaneously with the Federal Council for four years (→ Art. 175 para. 2 Cst.), thereby ensuring the coherence of the executive. In case of early resignations, replacement elections are held only for the remainder of the current term of office.
BGE 147 I 1 of 16 July 2020
Non-re-election of an administrative judge for reasons of age; compatibility with constitutional principles
The Federal Supreme Court confirms that fixed terms of office for judges constitute a central element of judicial independence.
«The right to an independent court is guaranteed by fixed terms of office. The practice of the cantonal parliament not to re-elect judges of the supreme cantonal courts when they have already reached the age of 65 at the beginning of the new term of office is compatible with the principle of legality, even if cantonal law does not provide for an age-related regulation.»
BGE 112 IA 233 of 15 October 1986
Election of criminal court presidents; silent election in renewal elections
The Federal Supreme Court recognises the importance of regular renewal elections for the democratic legitimacy of judicial offices.
«The right to vote of citizens is not violated when, in renewal elections of criminal court presidents, the candidates proposed for this purpose are declared elected in a silent election because their number corresponds to that of the offices to be filled. However, it is important that the official election announcement adequately refers to the possibility of silent election, the right of voters to make proposals and the other rules governing the conduct of the election.»
JAAC 68.49 of 14 August 2003
Disciplinary responsibility of federal judges; system of short terms of office
The caselaw recognises the system of short but renewable terms of office as a functional equivalent to formal disciplinary proceedings.
«The Swiss system of election for a relatively short term of office with the requirement of re-election offers the possibility of refusing re-election to a federal judge if his incapacity for office or gross breaches of official duty are proven. The institute of short terms of office partly fulfils disciplinary functions and thus makes actual disciplinary responsibility dispensable. The 'emergency valve' of non-re-election is only available every six years.»
The caselaw on parliamentary election procedures shows that the four-year term of office of the National Council and Federal Council is to be understood not only as an organisational legal provision, but as the foundation for the continuity and legitimacy of political institutions. Regular renewal ensures both democratic control and institutional stability.
The different terms of office (four years for political bodies, six years for federal judges) reflect the functional differences between the branches of government. While the shorter political term of office ensures democratic responsiveness, the longer judicial term of office serves to guarantee judicial independence while maintaining periodic accountability.