1100 000 Stimmberechtigte können innert 18 Monaten seit der amtlichen Veröffentlichung ihrer Initiative eine Teilrevision der Bundesverfassung verlangen.
2Die Volksinitiative auf Teilrevision der Bundesverfassung kann die Form der allgemeinen Anregung oder des ausgearbeiteten Entwurfs haben.
3Verletzt die Initiative die Einheit der Form, die Einheit der Materie oder zwingende Bestimmungen des Völkerrechts, so erklärt die Bundesversammlung sie für ganz oder teilweise ungültig.
4Ist die Bundesversammlung mit einer Initiative in der Form der allgemeinen Anregung einverstanden, so arbeitet sie die Teilrevision im Sinn der Initiative aus und unterbreitet sie Volk und Ständen zur Abstimmung. Lehnt sie die Initiative ab, so unterbreitet sie diese dem Volk zur Abstimmung; das Volk entscheidet, ob der Initiative Folge zu geben ist. Stimmt es zu, so arbeitet die Bundesversammlung eine entsprechende Vorlage aus.
5Eine Initiative in der Form des ausgearbeiteten Entwurfs wird Volk und Ständen zur Abstimmung unterbreitet. Die Bundesversammlung empfiehlt die Initiative zur Annahme oder zur Ablehnung. Sie kann der Initiative einen Gegenentwurf gegenüberstellen.
Art. 139 BV — Overview
Article 139 BV regulates the popular initiative for partial revision of the Federal Constitution. This instrument enables citizens to demand changes to the Constitution and to decide directly.
Who is entitled? 100,000 eligible voters can submit an initiative. This corresponds to approximately 1.9% of all eligible voters in Switzerland (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 8). The signatures must be collected within 18 months after publication in the Federal Gazette.
What forms exist? There are two possibilities: The general proposal formulates a concern broadly and leaves the elaboration to the Federal Assembly (Parliament). The elaborated draft already contains the finished constitutional text.
When are initiatives invalid? The Federal Assembly declares initiatives wholly or partially invalid if they violate the unity of form (mixing both forms), the unity of subject matter (unconnected subject matters in one text) or peremptory international law (Tschannen, Die Formen der Volksinitiative, ZBl 2002, 2). Peremptory international law includes the prohibition of torture, genocide and other fundamental prohibitions (BBl 2010 2263, 2291).
How does the procedure work? General proposals lead to a two-stage procedure: First the Federal Assembly recommends acceptance or rejection. In case of rejection, the people decide on the proposal. Elaborated drafts go directly to popular vote. Parliament can draft a counter-proposal.
Example: The Minaret Initiative (2009) demanded a construction ban for minarets. It was submitted as an elaborated draft and accepted with 57.5% Yes votes (Biaggini, ZÖR 2010, 325). The new Article 72 para. 3 BV became part of the Constitution, although it conflicts with freedom of religion.
Legal effect: Accepted initiatives become constitutional law and bind all authorities (Art. 5 para. 1 BV, Art. 195 BV). The Federal Supreme Court cannot overturn them. In conflicts with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), however, the Federal Supreme Court applied its «PKK jurisprudence»: The ECHR takes precedence (BGE 139 I 16 E. 5). From 1891 to 2023, 216 initiatives went to vote. 24 were accepted (success rate: 11%).
N. 1 The current configuration of the right of initiative at the federal level dates back to the total revision of the Federal Constitution of 1874, which introduced the popular initiative for partial revision (FG 1872 I 777, 821–823). The obligatory referendum for constitutional amendments had already existed since 1848. The initiative in the form of a general suggestion was introduced by popular vote in 1891 (FG 1890 I 1, 15–18), while the specific draft had already been possible since 1874.
N. 2 The limitation of mandatory international law was only explicitly enshrined in Art. 139 para. 3 FC with the new Federal Constitution of 1999 (FG 1997 I 1, 380–382). Previously, according to the practice of the Federal Assembly, there was no possibility to declare popular initiatives invalid for violation of the ECHR, as the controversy over the popular initiative "for a reasonable asylum policy" in 1994–1996 showed (FG 1994 III 1486; FG 1996 I 1355). The constitutional legislator reacted with the 1999 revision to this unsatisfactory legal situation.
N. 3 The most recent development concerns the discussion since 2008 on expanding the grounds for invalidity. The Federal Council presented a comprehensive report in 2010 that examined various reform options (FG 2010 2263). The parliamentary initiative 10.440 "Declaration of invalidity of popular initiatives. Also in case of violation of the core content of fundamental rights" was suspended in 2015 (AB 2015 N 1096). The debate over the material limits of the right of initiative remains a perennial theme in Swiss constitutional politics.
N. 4 Art. 139 FC is located in Title 4 "People and Cantons" and forms, together with Art. 138 FC (popular initiative for total revision) and Art. 139a FC (popular initiative with counter-proposal), the heart of direct democratic participation rights at the federal level. The provision concretizes the fundamental right to political rights guaranteed in Art. 34 FC for the specific case of constitutional initiative (Tschannen, Die Formen der Volksinitiative und die Einheit der Form, ZBl 2002, 2–29, 4).
N. 5 The connection to Art. 136 FC (Political Rights) and Art. 173 para. 1 lit. f FC (Powers of the Federal Assembly regarding popular initiatives) is systematically central. Art. 190 FC plays an important role in the question of the justiciability of accepted popular initiatives, while Art. 192–195 FC establish the limits of constitutional revision (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 7).
N. 6 In the international context, Art. 139 FC must be read together with Art. 5 para. 4 FC (observance of international law). Practice shows tensions between popular sovereignty and international law obligations, as exemplarily visible in the minaret initiative (accepted 2009) and the deportation initiative (accepted 2010) (Biaggini, Die schweizerische direkte Demokratie und das Völkerrecht, ZÖR 2010, 325–343, 330–335).
#3.1 Number of Signatures and Collection Period (Para. 1)
N. 7 The number of 100,000 signatures of eligible voters corresponds to about 1.9% of those entitled to vote (as of 2024: approx. 5.5 million). This threshold has remained unchanged since 1977, although the number of eligible voters has more than doubled since then (Hangartner, Unklarheiten bei Volksinitiativen, AJP 2011, 471–478, 472). The relative lowering of the threshold is partially compensated by the professionalization of signature collection.
N. 8 The 18-month period begins with the official publication of the initiative text in the Federal Gazette (Art. 69 para. 1 BPR). BGE 131 II 449 E. 3.2 established a strict practice: voting right certificates must be obtained from the competent authority within the collection period. Subsequent remedies are excluded (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 10).
N. 9 The general suggestion formulates a concern in general terms and leaves the elaboration to the Federal Assembly. This form now makes up less than 5% of all initiatives (Auer, Contre-projet indirect, procédure à une phase et clause référendaire conditionnelle, ZBJV 1986, 209–248, 215). The last initiative submitted as a general suggestion was the fat cat initiative (2008), which was however converted into a specific draft before the vote.
N. 10 The specific draft must be formulated as a fully drafted constitutional text. It is subject to strict formal requirements: clarity, consistency and ability to be integrated into the system of the Federal Constitution (Tschannen, ZBl 2002, 8–12). Practice shows increasing professionalization of text drafting, often with the involvement of specialized law firms.
N. 11 Unity of form requires that an initiative be submitted either as a general suggestion or as a specific draft, but not as a mixed form (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 22–24). BGE 129 I 381 E. 2 confirmed that mixed initiatives must be declared invalid in their entirety. A division is not provided for under federal law, even though some cantons recognize this in their law.
N. 12 Unity of subject matter requires a factual connection between all parts of an initiative. BGE 129 I 366 E. 2 clarified: voters must not be put in a predicament where they must accept parts they wish to reject. The test is objective: Could a reasonable voter want to judge different parts differently for factual reasons (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 25–32)?
N. 13 Mandatory international law (ius cogens) comprises, according to the practice of the Federal Council, at least: the prohibition of torture, genocide, slavery, the prohibition of violence, the non-refoulement principle as well as the non-derogable guarantees of the ECHR (FG 2010 2263, 2291). This enumeration is not exhaustive; the concept develops with international law (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 35).
N. 14 Factual impossibility of implementation is recognized by the Federal Council and Federal Assembly as an implicit ground for invalidity, but finds no express basis in Art. 139 para. 3 FC. Practice is extremely restrained: only in cases of evident impossibility of implementation is an initiative declared invalid (FG 2008 2891, 2907–2908 regarding the gold initiative).
N. 15 Initiatives declared valid in the form of a general suggestion lead to a two-stage procedure according to para. 4: If the Federal Assembly approves, it drafts a proposal. If rejected, the people first decide on the suggestion. Only with the people's approval must the Federal Assembly act (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 51–52).
N. 16 Specific drafts go directly to popular vote (para. 5). The Federal Assembly gives a voting recommendation and can draft a direct or indirect counter-proposal (Art. 139a and 139b FC). The historical success rate is about 11% (24 out of 216 initiatives put to vote since 1891, as of end 2023).
N. 17 Accepted popular initiatives become part of the Federal Constitution and enjoy the protection of Art. 190 FC. The Federal Court cannot review them for their constitutionality. In conflicts with the ECHR, however, the Federal Court applies its "PKK practice": the ECHR takes precedence even over subsequent constitutional law (BGE 139 I 16 E. 5).
N. 18 The scope of mandatory international law is fiercely disputed. Part of the doctrine advocates for an autonomously constitutional, expanded interpretation that also encompasses fundamental treaties such as the ECHR or the UN Covenants (Keller/Lanter/Fischer, Volksinitiativen und Völkerrecht, ZBl 2008, 121–154, 140–145). The prevailing doctrine and practice follow the international law definition (Epiney/Diezig, BSK BV, Art. 139 N. 37; Reich, Direkte Demokratie und völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen, ZaöRV 2008, 979–1025, 1005).
N. 19 Also controversial is the question of additional grounds for invalidity. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax (Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N. 2810–2815) argue for recognizing violations of the core content of fundamental rights as grounds for invalidity. The opposing view emphasizes the exhaustive character of Art. 139 para. 3 FC (Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 4th ed. 2014, § 51 N. 28).
N. 20 The justiciability of the validity examination by the Federal Assembly is also disputed. While the Federal Court limits its cognition to arbitrariness (BGE 129 I 185 E. 3.2), voices in the doctrine demand full judicial review to protect political rights (Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, 685–687).
N. 21 Initiative committees should submit the text to the Federal Chancellery early for informal preliminary examination. This examines title, form and translation-technical questions, but not material validity (Art. 69 para. 2 BPR). Consultation avoids later complications.
N. 22 Signature collection requires precise planning. Empirical values show: professional collectors achieve 10–15 valid signatures per hour, volunteers 3–5. For 100,000 valid signatures, about 110,000–115,000 signatures must be collected due to rejection. Certification by the municipalities additionally requires 2–4 weeks.
N. 23 In text drafting, attention must be paid to later implementability. Transitional provisions are often decisive for success. The minaret initiative (Art. 72 para. 3 FC) shows exemplarily how a precise text without transitional law can lead to implementation problems (Biaggini, ZÖR 2010, 340–343).
N. 24 Politically, the early search for alliances is recommended. Initiatives with broad support (parties, associations, civil society) have significantly higher chances of success. Withdrawal in favor of an indirect counter-proposal can be a successful strategy, as the examples of the Alpine initiative (1994) or the detention initiative (2004) show.
BGE 139 I 16 of 28 November 2010 consideration 5.2
The «Mass Deportation Initiative» exemplifies the limits of popular initiatives. The Federal Supreme Court clarified that constitutional provisions that collide with the ECHR are not directly applicable.
This case law is of central importance for Art. 139 para. 3 BV, as it concretises the substantive limit of mandatory international law.
«In the case of a conflict of norms between international law and subsequent legislation, case law basically assumes the primacy of international law [...]. The ECHR is a state treaty and as such is to be interpreted according to the rules of Art. 31 et seq. VCLT, whereby its particularities and especially its character as a living instrument must be taken into account.»
BGE 131 II 449 of 31 May 2005 consideration 3.2
The 18-month period of Art. 139 para. 1 BV must be strictly observed. The Federal Supreme Court decided that voting rights certificates must be obtained from the competent authority within the collection period.
The decision clarifies the formal requirements for collecting signatures.
«The voting rights certificates must be obtained by the initiators from the competent authority within the collection period. Subsequent certification or rectification of defective certificates by the Federal Chancellery is not possible.»
Judgment 1A.282/2004 of 31 May 2005 consideration 3.4
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that defects in voting rights certificates cannot be remedied subsequently. The Federal Chancellery is not authorised to rectify defective certificates.
This underscores the importance of careful collection during the 18-month period.
BGE 129 I 366 of 27 August 2003 consideration 2
The Federal Supreme Court developed the principles on unity of subject matter for popular initiatives. The principle requires that subject matters not be connected in a way that places voters in a coercive situation.
This case law applies to all popular initiatives, regardless of level (federal, cantonal, municipal).
«The principle of unity of subject matter requires that two or more subject questions and matters not be connected with each other to form a single voting proposal in a way that would place voters in a coercive situation and leave them no free choice between the individual parts.»
BGE 123 I 63 of 22 September 1995 consideration 4b
The Federal Supreme Court summarised its case law on unity of subject matter and clarified that in case of violations of this principle, an initiative can be declared invalid. Division is only possible if cantonal law provides for this.
This principle is directly applicable to Art. 139 para. 3 BV.
«Sanction for non-observance of unity of subject matter; cantonal law may provide for division of the initiative [...]. Invalidity of the initiative because the proposed text [...] is not sufficiently clear and constitutes an abuse of the right of popular initiative.»
BGE 147 I 206 of 7 October 2020 considerations 2-3
The Federal Supreme Court recognised for the first time expressly the possibility of appeal against the withdrawal of a federal popular initiative. Withdrawal is also possible after the annulment of a vote by the Federal Supreme Court.
This case law considerably extends the intensity of review for popular initiatives.
«An appeal to the Federal Supreme Court is possible against the withdrawal of a federal popular initiative. The withdrawal of a federal popular initiative is possible under the conditions of Art. 73 BPR even after the annulment of a vote by the Federal Supreme Court.»
BGE 139 I 292 of 28 August 2013 considerations 3-4
In interpreting formulated popular initiatives, the clear will of the initiators and signatories must be taken into account, without the initiators' will alone being decisive. The reasoning on the signature sheet can be relevant for interpretation.
These principles apply to all popular initiatives under Art. 139 BV.
«Although the initiators' will is not solely decisive for the interpretation of a popular petition, the interpretation must take account of the clear will of the initiators and signatories of the popular petition.»
Judgment 6B_378/2018 of 22 May 2019
The Federal Supreme Court dealt with criminal law aspects in connection with popular initiatives. The decision shows that the collection of signatures is also subject to legal limits.
The high number of citations demonstrates the practical importance of legal frameworks for popular initiatives.