1Every person has the right to privacy in their private and family life and in their home, and in relation to their mail and telecommunications.
2Every person has the right to be protected against the misuse of their personal data.
Art. 13 Protection of Privacy
#Overview
Article 13 Const. protects the privacy of every person in four areas: private and family life, the home, and correspondence and telecommunications (para. 1). Additionally, paragraph 2 guarantees protection against the misuse of personal data.
This fundamental right emerged with the total revision of 1999 from the need for comprehensive protection in light of technological development (BBl 1997 I 1, 153 f.). Previously, the Constitution only recognised individual aspects such as the right to respect for the home. The explicit inclusion of data protection reflected the societal importance of protecting personal data in the information age.
Private life encompasses all areas of personal development - from identity through relationships to professional development (BGE 144 I 266 E. 5.1). The Federal Supreme Court determines the scope of protection on a case-by-case basis in accordance with ECtHR case law (Diggelmann, BSK BV, Art. 13 N. 13).
Family life protects relationships between family members, including de facto family relationships. The classification of same-sex partnerships is controversial: While the Federal Supreme Court traditionally assigns these only to private life, the ECtHR recognises them as family (Diggelmann, BSK BV, Art. 13 N. 20). Recent case law is approaching the ECtHR perspective (BGE 150 I 50 E. 5.3).
The home functionally encompasses all spaces of private life - from one's own dwelling through hotel rooms to business premises with private character.
Correspondence and telecommunications protects confidential communication regardless of the medium. This includes emails, SMS and messenger services as well as traditional letters (Diggelmann, BSK BV, Art. 13 N. 29-31).
Data protection (para. 2) guarantees the right to informational self-determination - understood as the «right to be let alone» according to Warren/Brandeis (Diggelmann, BSK BV, Art. 13 N. 16). The protection covers the collection, storage, use and disclosure of personal data by state authorities (BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.2).
Every interference with Art. 13 Const. requires justification according to Art. 36 Const.: legal basis, public interest, proportionality and preservation of the essential content. For particularly sensitive personal data, a formal legal basis is required.
Practical examples: House searches must be proportionate (BGE 141 IV 77 E. 4.2). In migration law, Art. 13 Const. establishes a conditional right to family reunification where private life is well-established (BGE 135 I 143 E. 2.1). Surveillance of telecommunications is only permitted for serious offences and with judicial approval (BGE 129 I 85 E. 3.3). The installation of radio water meters also constitutes an interference with informational self-determination and requires a legal basis (BGE 147 I 346 E. 5.3).
The protection is not absolute: In case of conflicts with other fundamental rights or public interests, a balancing of interests must be undertaken. The provision has close connections to Art. 8 ECHR, but partially goes beyond it through the explicit anchoring of data protection.
Art. 13 FC — Protection of Privacy
#Doctrine
#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 13 FC codifies a protection that was not expressly enshrined in the Federal Constitution of 1874. The Federal Supreme Court had recognised the protection of privacy as an unwritten constitutional right. The Federal Council's dispatch of 20 November 1996 on the new Federal Constitution (BBl 1997 I 152 ff.) described the purpose of the provision as codifying this unwritten fundamental right at the constitutional level and — as a novelty — expressly anchoring data protection in the age of the information society.
N. 2 The two-paragraph structure reflects a deliberate drafting decision: paragraph 1 consolidates the classic protected interests (private and family life, home, confidentiality of correspondence), while paragraph 2 elevates data protection as an independent guarantee (BBl 1997 I 153). The dispatch emphasised that the secrecy of postal and telecommunications communications applies even when these services are no longer offered exclusively by the PTT undertakings — a forward-looking formulation that anticipated the liberalisation of the telecommunications market (BBl 1997 I 154). As a rejected alternative, it should be noted that complete deletion of the article was considered, which would have meant that those affected would have to rely directly on Art. 8 ECHR.
N. 3 In the National Council, Art. 11 of the draft constitution (corresponding to the current Art. 13 FC) was debated controversially. National Councillor Vallender (R/AR) moved for a paragraph 1bis guaranteeing the free choice of the form of communal life («A strong society can afford to extend its protection even to those groups who do not organise their lives according to prevailing morality»), in order to afford constitutional protection to same-sex and cohabiting couples. Federal Councillor Koller responded that no consequences under family law could be derived from such a formulation («There would therefore, for example, certainly be no right to adopt; all of that would have to be clearly and negatively delimited»). The majority rejected the motion. National Councillor Gross (SP/TG) moved to extend the data protection article to include an explicit right to rectification of incorrect data. National Councillor Engelberger (FDP/NW) objected that the «protection against misuse» already implicitly comprised the right to rectification. That motion also failed.
N. 4 In the Council of States, rapporteur Inderkum (C/UR) summarised the debate by stating that Art. 11 of the draft constitution corresponded to Art. 8 ECHR and could be adopted without major discussion. The final text was approved in the vote on the final question on 18 December 1998 after several rounds of conciliation between the National Council and the Council of States, and was accepted by the people on 18 April 1999 (AS 1999 2556).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 5 Art. 13 FC belongs to the catalogue of fundamental rights (Arts. 7–36 FC) and constitutes a classic defensive right: it primarily protects against state interference in privacy (negative dimension). In addition, the provision, as an objective legal guarantee, gives rise to a positive duty on the part of the state to protect against private infringements of privacy by third parties (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 455 ff.).
N. 6 Art. 13 FC is closely related to other constitutional provisions. The protection of physical integrity (→ Art. 10 para. 2 FC) and the data protection entitlement (Art. 13 para. 2 FC) overlap, but must be conceptually distinguished: the former protects the body from physical interference, while the latter protects the right to informational self-determination (BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.2). ↔ Art. 8 FC (equality before the law) must frequently be examined alongside cases of interference with family life. → Art. 36 FC (restriction of fundamental rights) applies as the general limitation provision for all interferences with Art. 13 FC. → Art. 5 para. 2 FC (proportionality) complements Art. 36 FC. The parallel provision at international law level is Art. 8 ECHR; the Federal Supreme Court has largely aligned the Convention-law requirements with those of Art. 13 FC (→ N. 17 f.).
N. 7 Statutory concretisations of Art. 13 para. 1 FC are found in the Federal Act on the Surveillance of Post and Telecommunications (FSPT, SR 780.1) for telecommunications secrecy, in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Arts. 269 ff. CrimPC) for criminal procedural surveillance, and in the Civil Code and Code of Obligations for the civil law protection of personality. Art. 13 para. 2 FC is given statutory form by the Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP, SR 235.1), which entered into force following a total revision on 1 September 2023. The nFADP introduced significant changes compared to the FADP of 1992: extended information obligations upon data collection (Arts. 19 f. nFADP), regulation of profiling including «high-risk profiling» (Art. 5 lits. f and g nFADP), privacy by design and privacy by default as system-level obligations (Art. 7 nFADP), an expanded right of access and data portability, as well as stricter penal provisions (Arts. 60 ff. nFADP). The revision brought Swiss data protection legislation into line with the European GDPR and is to be understood as a key update of constitutionally anchored data protection.
#3. Elements of the Provision / Normative Content
3.1 Scope of Protection under Paragraph 1
N. 8 The term private life encompasses all areas of life in which the individual's personality can develop without entering the public sphere. This includes the intimate sphere, personal circumstances, outward appearance and social contacts (BGE 144 I 266 E. 4.1). The distinction between private and public is not clear-cut: a well-established private life can, in particular, give rise to a right of residence under immigration law for a foreign national who has been present in Switzerland for many years, even in the absence of a family connection to a person with a right of residence in Switzerland (BGE 144 I 266 E. 3.1).
N. 9 The term family life is to be interpreted broadly. According to the dispatch, it is not limited to the traditional family based on marriage (BBl 1997 I 153). The Federal Supreme Court follows the concept of family applied by the European Court of Human Rights under Art. 8 ECHR: what is protected is not primarily legally established but actually lived family life; the decisive factors are cohabitation, financial dependency, close family ties, regular contact and the assumption of responsibility (BGE 135 I 143 E. 3.1). Same-sex couples enjoy the same protection as heterosexual couples, provided a stable relationship exists (BGE 150 I 50 E. 3.2.2). Persons in detention retain their right to respect for private and family life; however, this right is modified by the special legal relationship associated with the deprivation of liberty.
N. 10 As regards the scope of family life in the context of imprisonment, the Federal Supreme Court clarified in BGE 150 I 50 E. 3.2.1 (3.1.2024) that the guarantees of Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 13 FC give detained persons the right to maintain contact with family members, to the extent this is not precluded by the purpose of the deprivation of liberty. Restrictions require a legal basis and must be proportionate. Intimate visits («marital» or conjugal visits) are not obligatory under Convention and constitutional law, but may be regulated at cantonal level; cantons have considerable discretion in their design. The ECHR does not go further in this regard than Art. 13 FC.
N. 11 The guarantee of inviolability of the home protects the physical space of retreat in which the individual is protected against unwanted intrusion by third parties — in particular state authorities. House searches always constitute an interference that must satisfy the requirements of Art. 36 FC (→ Arts. 246 ff. CrimPC). The right to inviolability of the home also protects business premises and commercial premises used by the person concerned (Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 148 f.).
N. 12 Secrecy of correspondence, postal and telecommunications communications protects confidential communication. The concept of telecommunications is to be interpreted in a technology-neutral manner: it covers telephony, e-mail, messenger services and similar forms of communication. Surveillance of telecommunications constitutes a serious interference requiring a qualified legal basis (BGE 129 I 85 E. 3). The dispatch expressly emphasised that the secrecy of postal and telecommunications communications applies even when these services are no longer offered exclusively by the PTT undertakings (BBl 1997 I 154), thereby anticipating the liberalised telecommunications landscape.
3.2 Scope of Protection under Paragraph 2
N. 13 Art. 13 para. 2 FC guarantees the right to informational self-determination («droit à l'autodétermination informationnelle»): the individual's authority to decide in principle themselves on the disclosure and use of their personal data. Constitutional data protection is a component of the right to personal privacy under paragraph 1 (BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.2). The Federal Supreme Court has clarified that Art. 13 para. 2 FC protects individuals against interferences arising from the state processing of their personal data. For private parties, the provision applies indirectly through statutory data protection legislation (nFADP).
N. 14 «Personal data» within the meaning of paragraph 2 are, according to the statutory definition in the nFADP (Art. 5 lit. a nFADP), all information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Particularly sensitive categories of data, such as health data, biometric data, genetic data, religious and philosophical beliefs, and data concerning ethnicity or political opinions, are afforded enhanced protection (Art. 5 lit. c nFADP, corresponding to Art. 9 GDPR). This enhanced protection also applies at the constitutional level and influences the proportionality assessment under Art. 36 FC.
N. 15 DNA profiles constitute personal data within the meaning of Art. 13 para. 2 FC, as they permit the identification of a person with near-certainty. Their creation and state processing interfere with the right to informational self-determination (BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.2–3.3). The severity of this interference is disputed in legal scholarship and case law (→ N. 18).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 16 An interference with Art. 13 FC is permissible only if the requirements of Art. 36 FC are cumulatively satisfied: (1) a legal basis, (2) justification by a public interest or by the protection of the fundamental rights of third parties, (3) proportionality (suitability, necessity and reasonableness) and (4) preservation of the core essence. In the case of serious interferences, notably with the intimate sphere, the principle of legality requires a basis in formal legislation (Art. 36 para. 1 sentence 2 FC). The core essence of Art. 13 FC — absolute privacy in the innermost sphere of personality — is absolutely inviolable (Art. 36 para. 4 FC; Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 1862 ff.).
N. 17 In immigration law, Art. 13 para. 1 FC, together with Art. 8 ECHR, gives rise under certain conditions to a right to a residence permit or to the cessation of measures terminating residence. The precondition is that a closely related person holds a well-established right of presence in Switzerland (BGE 135 I 143 E. 1.3.1). The balancing of interests must take into account all relevant circumstances: the gravity of any offence committed, the duration of integration, rootedness, family ties and the best interests of the child (BGE 139 I 16 E. 2.2.2; BGE 143 I 21 E. 5.2). In this context, the primacy of the ECHR over subsequent constitutional law applies where a normative conflict arises: the deportation initiative (Art. 121 paras. 3–6 FC) is not directly applicable due to insufficient normative density and cannot replace the individual case-by-case assessment required by Art. 8 ECHR (BGE 139 I 16 E. 4–5).
#5. Contested Issues
N. 18 Severity of interference in the case of DNA profiles: Since BGE 128 II 259 E. 3.3, the Federal Supreme Court has classified the creation of a DNA profile from non-coding DNA segments as a minor interference with Art. 13 para. 2 FC, on the grounds that no conclusions about hereditary traits are possible and that the processing is carried out in largely anonymised form. In BGE 147 I 372 E. 2.3, the Federal Supreme Court subjected this case law to critical scrutiny without overturning it: it acknowledged that the potential uses of DNA analysis have expanded considerably since 2002 (phenotyping, kinship searches) and that legal scholarship had voiced criticism from the outset. Blonski («Biometrische Daten als Gegenstand des informationellen Selbstbestimmungsrechts», 2015, p. 219) and Fay (digma 2/2002, p. 147) argue that a DNA profile should be classified as a serious interference, since the risk of stigmatisation and the state's potential for control are the opposite of what informational self-determination aims to achieve. The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in S. and Marper v. United Kingdom (4.12.2008), placed particular emphasis on the risk of stigmatisation in the case of minors. The issue has not yet been conclusively decided by the highest courts; in light of new technical possibilities and the introduction of phenotyping under the revised DNA Profiles Act, a reassessment appears imminent.
N. 19 Right of residence under Art. 13 para. 1 FC / Art. 8 ECHR: It is disputed under what conditions private life — without a family tie — establishes an independent right of residence. BGE 144 I 266 E. 3 affirms this where there is a particularly intense economic and social rootedness. Zünd/Hugi Yar (EuGRZ 2013, p. 1 ff.) consider this case law to be coherent with Strasbourg practice; others (e.g. Spescha/Thür/Zünd/Bolzli, Migrationsrecht, 4th ed. 2015) call for more generous consideration of the duration of integration. In the context of the deportation initiative (Art. 121 paras. 3–6 FC), BGE 139 I 16 E. 4.3.3 confirmed the primacy of ECHR guarantees over the automatism of expulsion, which was largely welcomed in legal scholarship (Hangartner, AJP 2011, p. 475; Uebersax, Asyl 4/2011, p. 13), but criticised by some as judicial overreach (Reich, ZSR 127/2008 I, p. 514 f.).
N. 20 Family life of unmarried and same-sex couples: Although the parliamentary minority motion by Vallender seeking an explicit constitutional guarantee of the free choice of the form of communal life was unsuccessful (→ N. 3), practice has integrated the broad concept of family into constitutional law through ECHR case law. BGE 150 I 50 E. 3.2.2 has confirmed that stable same-sex or heterosexual partnerships — irrespective of cohabitation — fall within the concept of family life under Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 13 FC. This finding is consistent with the legislative decision to leave the detailed design to the legislature (BBl 1997 I 153).
N. 21 Data protection and the nFADP: The revision of the Data Protection Act (nFADP, in force since 1 September 2023) has profoundly transformed the statutory framework for Art. 13 para. 2 FC. It is disputed whether the nFADP fully satisfies the requirements of the GDPR (Rosenthal/Jöhri, Handkommentar zum Datenschutzgesetz, 2nd ed. 2022; Purtschert/Jakob, digma 2023, p. 4 ff. with regard to adequacy decisions of the European Commission). The nFADP deliberately does not provide a private law claim for damages in the event of data protection violations, a position that evolved systematically from Art. 15 of the former FADP; for criticism see Rosenthal (digma 2022, p. 14 ff.).
#6. Practical Notes
N. 22 Immigration law: The interference assessment follows a two-stage approach: first, it must be determined whether a closely related person holds a well-established right of presence that actually activates the scope of protection of Art. 13 para. 1 FC / Art. 8 ECHR. A comprehensive balancing of interests must then be carried out. The best interests of the child under Art. 3 CRC is an essential, though not exclusively determinative, element (BGE 143 I 21 E. 5.5.1). In the case of «reverse family reunification» (a foreign parent of a Swiss child), the reasonableness of departure for all parties concerned must be carefully examined; compelling a Swiss child to leave Switzerland requires reasons of public order or security (BGE 135 I 143 E. 4.1). In cases of post-marital hardship (Art. 50 para. 1 lit. b FNIA), the interests of the common marital children take precedence (BGE 143 I 21 E. 4.1).
N. 23 Imprisonment: Detained persons may invoke Art. 13 FC; however, the guarantee applies in restricted form within the special legal relationship of custody. Restrictions on visiting rights — including the denial of intimate visits — require a formal or material legal basis and must be proportionate (BGE 150 I 50 E. 3.2.1). Cantons have considerable discretion in designing visiting arrangements; the ECHR does not oblige Contracting States to introduce rights to intimate visits.
N. 24 Criminal procedural law and data protection: Surveillance of telecommunications under criminal procedure law (Arts. 269 ff. CrimPC) constitutes a serious interference with Art. 13 FC and requires a basis in formal legislation, a sufficient suspicion of an offence and judicial authorisation (BGE 129 I 85 E. 3). In the context of the unsealing of seized electronic data, proportionality must be examined with particular care; the unsealing judge must clarify the investigative relevance of the files (BGE 137 IV 189 E. 4). Medical records enjoy enhanced protection by reason of professional secrecy; the Federal Supreme Court nonetheless emphasises that this does not constitute an absolute bar to unsealing (BGE 141 IV 77).
N. 25 Forensic identification measures and DNA profiles: The creation of a DNA profile for the purpose of solving criminal offences requires, pursuant to Art. 255 CrimPC, a sufficient suspicion in relation to a misdemeanour or felony. Routine DNA profiling is impermissible. In the case of peaceful assemblies, the conditions for DNA collection are not met where the forensic identification measures are neither necessary for investigating the triggering offence nor justified on the basis of concrete indications of future offences; the «chilling effect» on the freedom of assembly (→ Art. 22 FC) must be taken into account (BGE 147 I 372 E. 4.4.2).
N. 26 International administrative assistance in tax matters: Art. 13 para. 2 FC also affords protection in the context of international transmission of information. In the case of administrative assistance under double taxation agreements, affected third parties (holders of bank accounts standing in the name of the taxable person) must be included in the procedural guarantees (BGE 146 I 172 E. 4). The right to informational self-determination may be asserted in administrative assistance proceedings through the ordinary legal remedies.
N. 27 Data protection in practice (nFADP): Since 1 September 2023, controllers have been subject to extended information obligations when collecting personal data (Arts. 19 f. nFADP). «High-risk profiling» (Art. 5 lit. g nFADP) — the automated processing of personal data for the assessment of significant personal aspects with considerable risks — requires express consent or another legal justification. The requirements of privacy by design and privacy by default (Art. 7 nFADP) apply to all newly developed systems that process personal data. Data protection violations must be reported to the FDPIC (Art. 24 nFADP). Authorities and courts must take the new statutory requirements into account when assessing interferences with fundamental rights under Art. 13 para. 2 FC.
Case Law
#Foundations and Scope of Protection
BGE 128 II 259 (29.05.2002)
DNA profiles in criminal proceedings. The Federal Supreme Court defines the scope of protection of Art. 13 para. 2 Cst. for the first time.
Fundamental for the distinction between physical integrity (Art. 10 para. 2 Cst.) and the right to informational self-determination.
«Art. 13 para. 2 Cst. protects the individual against impairments arising from state processing of their personal data (right to informational self-determination). Constitutional data protection is part of the right to a private and personal sphere of secrecy (Art. 13 para. 1 Cst.).»
BGE 126 I 7 (01.01.2000)
Access to police files. Distinction between the right to access files and the right to be heard.
Significant for the practical enforcement of data protection in the police sector.
«If the person concerned can demand correction or deletion of incorrect data in police files under the applicable cantonal law, they must also have the possibility to access these files, unless there is an overriding public interest to be proven by the authority.»
#Private and Family Life (Art. 13 para. 1 Cst.)
BGE 135 I 143 (02.02.2009)
Family reunification and private life. Claim to residence permit based on Art. 13 Cst.
Groundbreaking for the balancing between private autonomy and state interests in immigration law.
«Art. 13 Cst. guarantees both the right to respect for private life and that for respect for family life. These rights are not absolute but may be restricted in the public interest and with due regard for proportionality.»
BGE 144 I 266 (08.05.2018)
Cohabitation and private life. Right of residence based on the right to respect for private life.
Central for the definition of private life outside traditional family structures.
«The separation between scope of protection and interference must be strictly observed. The protection of private life encompasses all areas in which the individual's personality can unfold and develop.»
BGE 150 I 50 (03.01.2024)
Intimate visits in prison. Right to respect for private and family life of incarcerated persons.
Latest supreme court case law on the scope of Art. 13 Cst. in the correctional context.
«From the perspective of Art. 8 ECHR, Art. 13 Cst. and Art. 84 SCC, 'conjugal' or intimate visits are primarily reserved for relatives of the incarcerated person. The cantons are responsible for regulating the visiting rights of incarcerated persons.»
#Protection of the Home
BGE 131 I 272 (03.05.2005)
Prohibition on use of unlawfully obtained evidence. Protection of privacy in criminal proceedings.
Fundamental for the balancing between criminal prosecution interests and personality protection.
«The appellant invokes the guarantee of fair proceedings (Art. 29 para. 1 Cst. or Art. 6 ECHR) and asserts the right to protection of private life (Art. 13 Cst. or Art. 8 ECHR) as well as the principle of legality according to Arts. 5, 35 and 36 Cst.»
BGE 141 IV 77 (21.11.2014)
Unsealing of medical records. Protection of privacy and medical confidentiality in criminal proceedings.
Important for the balance between criminal prosecution and personality protection for particularly sensitive data.
«When the physician directly affected by the coercive measures is himself accused, his professional secrecy does not constitute an absolute legal obstacle to seizure and unsealing. Nevertheless, the constitutional requirements of Art. 13 Cst. must be observed.»
#Data Protection (Art. 13 para. 2 Cst.)
BGE 147 I 372 (22.04.2021)
DNA profiles and identification procedures at demonstrations. Proportionality of surveillance measures.
Critical review of previous case law on DNA profiles.
«Clarifying the underlying offense does not necessarily require a DNA profile of every person present. The principle of proportionality demands restrictive handling of identification measures at peaceful assemblies.»
BGE 146 I 172 (13.07.2020)
International administrative assistance in tax matters. Right to informational self-determination and duty to inform.
Groundbreaking for the protection of third parties in administrative assistance proceedings.
«The right to informational self-determination flowing from Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 13 Cst. can in principle be effectively protected by other legal means. Nevertheless, procedural guarantees must be observed.»
#Secrecy of Letters, Post and Telecommunications
BGE 129 I 85 (04.04.2003)
Surveillance of foreign-language telephone conversations. Constitutional requirements for judicial use.
Fundamental for the requirements on surveillance of telecommunications traffic.
«Surveillance of telecommunications traffic constitutes a serious interference with the privacy protected by Art. 13 Cst. The use of surveillance results is subject to strict constitutional requirements.»
BGE 137 IV 189 (04.04.2011)
Unsealing of electronic data. Protection of privacy for seized computer files.
Significant for data protection in the digital age.
«The protection of privacy requires careful examination of the investigative relevance of seized electronic files, particularly private image files. The unsealing judge must safeguard proportionality.»
#Relationship to the ECHR
BGE 139 I 16 (12.10.2012)
Deportation initiative and family life. Direct applicability of new constitutional provisions.
Central for the relationship between Swiss constitutional law and ECHR guarantees.
«Art. 13 Cst. and Art. 8 ECHR guarantee protection of private and family life in parallel. In balancing interests, both constitutional and conventional requirements must be observed.»
BGE 129 I 232 (09.07.2003)
Naturalization by ballot. Violation of the prohibition of discrimination and the right to private life.
Groundbreaking for the democratic limits on personality rights.
«Negative naturalization decisions are subject to the duty to give reasons according to Art. 29 para. 2 Cst. (right to be heard) in conjunction with Art. 8 para. 2 Cst. (prohibition of discrimination) and may affect private life protected by Art. 13 Cst.»
#Family Reunification and Immigration Authorities
BGE 130 II 281 (01.06.2004)
Family reunification and consolidated right of presence. Combined scope of protection of private and family life.
Fundamental for case law on immigration law protection of family life.
«The right to respect for family life is not guaranteed without limits. Restrictions are permissible if they are provided for by law, serve a legitimate aim and are necessary in a democratic society.»
BGE 143 I 21 (17.11.2016)
Family reunification under new custody law. Consideration of the child's welfare in protecting family life.
Important for the development of family reunification law considering the new children's rights.
«In post-marital hardship cases, a comprehensive balancing of interests must be undertaken that includes both the right to respect for family life under Art. 13 Cst. and the child's welfare according to Art. 3 CRC.»
#Police Law and Surveillance
BGE 136 I 87 (30.09.2009)
Zurich Police Act. General principles of police law and fundamental rights protection.
Comprehensive presentation of constitutional requirements for police measures.
«Police law measures that interfere with the scope of protection of Art. 13 Cst. require a sufficient legal basis and must comply with the principle of proportionality. The principle of legality must be strictly observed.»