1Der Bund hält seine Ausgaben und Einnahmen auf Dauer im Gleichgewicht.
2Der Höchstbetrag der im Voranschlag zu bewilligenden Gesamtausgaben richtet sich unter Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftslage nach den geschätzten Einnahmen.
3Bei ausserordentlichem Zahlungsbedarf kann der Höchstbetrag nach Absatz 2 angemessen erhöht werden. Über eine Erhöhung beschliesst die Bundesversammlung nach Artikel 159 Absatz 3 Buchstabe c.
4Überschreiten die in der Staatsrechnung ausgewiesenen Gesamtausgaben den Höchstbetrag nach Absatz 2 oder 3, so sind die Mehrausgaben in den Folgejahren zu kompensieren.
The federal debt brake regulates how the state manages its finances. It requires that expenditure and revenue be balanced in the long term (BBl 2000 4653ff.). The Confederation may not permanently spend more than it takes in.
The debt brake operates in three steps: First, it determines how much money the Confederation may spend at most. This ceiling is based on expected revenue and the economic situation. During weak economic conditions, more may be spent than is taken in; during good economic conditions, less (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 24f.).
In emergency situations such as natural disasters or severe recessions, Parliament may increase this limit with a qualified majority (Art. 159 para. 3 lit. c BV). If expenditure is nevertheless exceeded, the additional costs must be saved again within six years (Federal Budget Act Art. 16).
An example: If the Confederation takes in 70 billion francs and the economy is performing well (cyclical factor 0.95), it may only spend 66.5 billion. If it nevertheless spends 68 billion, it must compensate for the 1.5 billion difference over the next six years.
The debt brake came into force in 2003, after being adopted in 2001 with 84.7% yes votes (BBl 2002 2291). It has stabilised the federal debt and is also used at the cantonal level. The Federal Budget Act regulates the details of implementation (Art. 126 para. 5 BV).
The rule only binds the Federal Council and Parliament, but not private parties. Judicial enforcement is therefore not possible.
N. 1 The debt brake was adopted in the referendum of 2 December 2001 with 84.7% yes votes and entered into force on 2 December 2003 (BBl 2000 4653ff.; BBl 2002 2291). Lienhard/Marti Locher point out that the debt brake arose as a reaction to the debt crisis of the 1990s, when the Confederation's gross debt almost tripled between 1990 and 1998 from 38.5 to 109.6 billion francs (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 1).
N. 2 The debt brake replaced the former deficit prohibition of Art. 42bis aBV, which had proven inadequate. Unlike the old deficit prohibition, which only concerned the budget estimates, the new debt brake extends to the entire budget process from planning to subsequent correction (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 3f.).
N. 3 Art. 126 BV is the centrepiece of the federal financial system and is closely linked to other financial constitutional norms: → Art. 167 BV (financial powers), → Art. 183 BV (financial powers of the Federal Council), ↔ Art. 159 para. 3 let. c BV (qualified majority for expenditure increases). Together with the Federal Financial Administration Act (FFA), the norm forms the institutional foundation of federal financial policy (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 8).
N. 4 The debt brake stands in a tension with the Confederation's economic policy task under Art. 100 BV. Vallender emphasises that the debt brake is designed as a binding rule that limits discretionary financial policy interventions, but unfolds countercyclical effects through its cyclical component (Vallender, AJP 1999, 693f.).
N. 5Balanced budget (para. 1): «Balance over time» does not require annual correspondence between expenditures and revenues, but rather a medium-term balance over the business cycle. Kirchgässner specifies that structural deficits should be prevented, while cyclical fluctuations remain permissible (Kirchgässner, SVVOR-Jahrbuch 2009, 78).
N. 6Expenditure rule (para. 2): The expenditure ceiling is calculated by multiplying the estimated revenues by a cyclical factor (k = trend GDP / expected GDP). In case of underutilisation (k > 1), higher expenditures than revenues are permissible; in case of overutilisation (k < 1), expenditures must be below revenues (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 24f.).
N. 7Exception rule (para. 3): «Extraordinary financing requirements» exist in case of natural disasters, severe recessions, adjustments to the accounting model, or other extraordinary and uncontrollable developments. Stauffer criticises the broad formulation as a potential gateway for circumventing the debt brake (Stauffer, Instrumente des Haushaltsausgleichs, 2001, 189).
N. 8Compensation rule (para. 4): Overruns of the expenditure ceiling must be booked to the compensation account and reduced within six years. Marti Locher emphasises that this subsequent correction ensures the credibility of the debt brake (Marti Locher, Ausgestaltung und Wirksamkeit, 2015, 78f.).
N. 9 The debt brake unfolds its effect on three levels: preventively through the expenditure rule in the budget estimates, correctively through supplementary credits during the year, and compensatorily through the subsequent settlement of overruns (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 18).
N. 10 The constitutional norm does not establish subjective rights of individuals. It binds exclusively the Federal Council and Federal Assembly in their budget management. Judicial enforcement is therefore not possible; control occurs primarily through political means (Biaggini, in: Kahl, Nachhaltige Finanzstrukturen, 2011, 118).
N. 11Economic policy effectiveness: Frey praises the automatic stabilisers of the debt brake, which allow deficits during recessions (Frey, Finanzpolitik des Bundes, 2007, 92). In contrast, Koemm warns of procyclical effects in case of incorrect economic forecasts (Koemm, Eine Bremse für die Staatsverschuldung?, 2011, 156).
N. 12Investment protection: Mächler criticises that the debt brake does not distinguish between consumption expenditures and investments and thereby disadvantages future-oriented expenditures (Mächler, Finanzrecht, 2015, N. 892). Siegenthaler/Zurbrügg defend the equal treatment as necessary for the simplicity and manipulation resistance of the rule (Siegenthaler/Zurbrügg, in: Kastrop et al., Die neuen Schuldenregeln, 2010, 362).
N. 13Federal dimension: Vallender/Waldmeier call for an extension of the debt brake to cantons and municipalities (Vallender/Waldmeier, AJP 2013, 1612). However, Yerly shows that the great heterogeneity of cantonal debt brakes does not diminish their effectiveness (Yerly, The Political Economy of Budget Rules, 2013, 245).
N. 14 In budgeting, the correct estimation of revenues is central, as it determines the level of permissible expenditures. The Federal Finance Administration uses econometric models for this purpose, involving the Confederation's Expert Group on Economic Forecasts.
N. 15 The qualification as «extraordinary financing requirements» requires careful justification. Past practice shows restrictive handling: Only the recapitalisation of UBS in 2008, measures against the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/21, and support for Ukraine in 2022 were recognised as extraordinary.
N. 16 For cantons and municipalities that wish to introduce a debt brake, orientation to the federal model with adjustments to local circumstances is recommended. In particular, the definition of the cyclical factor and the length of the balancing period require careful consideration (BSK BV-Lienhard/Marti Locher, Art. 126 N. 17).
There is no explicit supreme court case law on the federal debt brake under Art. 126 FC. The Federal Supreme Court has not yet had to decide on the direct application or interpretation of Art. 126 FC. This is due to the fact that the debt brake as a budgetary policy instrument primarily binds the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly and does not establish individual rights that could be claimed before the courts.
#I. Municipal Debt Brakes and Implementation Obligations
The only relevant decisions concern municipal debt brake initiatives that are oriented towards Art. 126 FC:
BGE 149 II 66 of 14 July 2022
The City of Aarau had to implement a popular initiative "Debt brake to secure a balanced financial budget" which demanded that corresponding rules be anchored in the municipal constitution.
«The authorities implementing the regulatory content accepted in a non-formulated initiative must elaborate and adopt regulations that correspond to the ideas expressed in the initiative.»
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that when implementing debt brake initiatives, the basic features of expenditure and debt limitation must be anchored at the level of the municipal constitution itself and may not merely be regulated in an easily amendable ordinance. This shows the constitutional significance of the debt brake as a fundamental budgetary policy instrument.
Since Art. 126 FC itself does not establish justiciable rights and concrete implementation is carried out through the Financial Budget Act, judicial control is limited to procedural questions in budget preparation and approval. The material requirements of the debt brake (expenditure ceiling, compensation mechanism) are designed as political steering instruments and are subject primarily to parliamentary and not judicial control.