#1. Legislative History
N. 1 The three-pillar concept was anchored in the Federal Constitution with the adoption of Art. 34quater old Federal Constitution on 3 December 1972 (BBl 1971 II 1609). The Federal Council message states that Swiss old-age provision should be based on a coordinated system of state basic security, occupational provision, and individual self-provision. The total revision of the Federal Constitution adopted this basic concept unchanged in Art. 111 Federal Constitution.
N. 2 By explicitly anchoring the three-pillar principle, the constitutional legislator wanted to create a clear structure for Swiss social insurance. The Federal Council message on the popular initiative concerning old-age, survivors' and disability insurance of 10 November 1971 emphasised that comprehensive provision could only be achieved through the interaction of all three pillars (BBl 1971 II 1609, 1625).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 3 Art. 111 Federal Constitution is located in Chapter 2 («Social Goals, Education and Research») of Title 3 of the Federal Constitution. It gives concrete form to the social goal of → Art. 41 para. 2 Federal Constitution (social insurance) and forms the constitutional basis for the special provisions → Art. 112 Federal Constitution (OASI/DI), → Art. 112a Federal Constitution (supplementary benefits), → Art. 113 Federal Constitution (occupational provision) and → Art. 114 Federal Constitution (unemployment insurance).
N. 4 Unlike Art. 41 Federal Constitution, which as a programmatic provision does not establish subjective rights, Art. 111 Federal Constitution contains binding structural requirements for the legislator. Some commentators emphasise that Art. 111 Federal Constitution does not merely represent a competence provision, but contains material design principles.
#3. Elements of the Offence / Normative Content
#a) The Three-Pillar Principle (Para. 1)
N. 5 Art. 111 para. 1 Federal Constitution anchors the three pillars as the supporting structure of Swiss old-age, survivors' and disability provision. According to one view in the literature, these pillars are substantive design principles that supplement the competence provision in substance, or substantive guidelines for the legislative mandate.
N. 6 The first pillar (OASI/DI) should secure subsistence needs according to prevailing doctrine (Locher/Gächter, Outline of Social Insurance Law, 4th ed. 2014, § 3 N. 12). It is based on the pay-as-you-go system and covers the entire resident population on a mandatory basis.
N. 7 The second pillar (occupational provision) should, together with the first pillar, enable the continuation of the accustomed standard of living in an appropriate manner (Scartazzini/Hürzeler, Federal Social Insurance Law, 4th ed. 2012, § 15 N. 3). It functions according to the funded system and is mandatory for employees with a certain minimum income.
N. 8 The third pillar (self-provision) supplements the collective measures of the first two pillars according to individual needs. It is divided into tied self-provision (pillar 3a) with tax privileges and free self-provision (pillar 3b) without special tax promotion (Valterio, Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance Law, 2011, p. 45 ff.).
#b) Constitutional Limitations
N. 9 According to one view in the literature, Art. 111 para. 1 Federal Constitution forms «a constitutional limitation for the competences of the legislator in the area of old-age, survivors' and disability provision». The legislator may not abandon the three-pillar principle or completely undermine individual pillars (Tschudi, The New Federal Constitution as the Basis of Social Insurance Law, SZS 2001, 63, 71).
#c) Permanent Purpose Fulfilment (Para. 2)
N. 10 According to Art. 111 para. 2 Federal Constitution, the Confederation must ensure the permanent purpose fulfilment of the first and second pillars. In the literature, this is interpreted to mean that the constitutional legislator intended to stress that the first and second pillars must perform their tasks on a lasting basis within a coordinated system.
N. 11 Permanent purpose fulfilment encompasses both financial sustainability and material goal achievement according to prevailing doctrine (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Swiss Federal Constitutional Law, 10th ed. 2020, N. 789). The Confederation must take action if financing or performance goals are endangered.
#d) Tax Measures (Para. 3)
N. 12 Art. 111 para. 3 Federal Constitution empowers the Confederation to oblige the cantons to grant tax privileges to pension institutions and pension benefits. This competence was implemented in Art. 80 ff. BVG and Art. 81 ff. OASI Act (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Swiss Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 2016, N. 3712).
N. 13 The promotion of self-provision takes place «in cooperation with the cantons» through tax and property policy. This cooperative competence underscores the federalist character of pension policy (Müller/Schefer, Fundamental Rights in Switzerland, 4th ed. 2008, p. 892).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 14 Art. 111 Federal Constitution establishes a legislative obligation of the Confederation. The legislator must design the three pillars and ensure their coordination. A complete dismantling of a pillar would be unconstitutional.
N. 15 For individuals, Art. 111 Federal Constitution does not establish direct subjective rights. Claims only arise from the implementing laws (OASI Act, BVG, BVV 3). The provision primarily operates as an objective legal institutional guarantee (Gächter, Basic Structures of Swiss Social Security Law, ZSR 2014 II 5, 42).
N. 16 The cantons are obliged to cooperate in tax and property policy (para. 4). They can be compelled by federal law to grant tax privileges to pension institutions (para. 3).
#5. Points of Controversy
N. 17 Disputed is the normative force of the three-pillar principle. While Tschudi (The Three-Pillar Principle, SZS 1987, 1, 15) and Brühwiler (Occupational Staff Pension Schemes in Switzerland, 1989, p. 45) assume a strict constitutional obligation, a minority opinion holds that the legislator has wide design latitude as long as the basic structure is preserved.
N. 18 The scope of «permanent purpose fulfilment» (para. 2) is also controversially discussed. Some commentators demand an active monitoring and intervention obligation of the Confederation. Other authors emphasise the primary responsibility of the social partners in the second pillar and warn against excessive state interventions.
N. 19 The equal tax treatment of the pillars is also disputed. While tied self-provision (pillar 3a) is tax-privileged, comparable promotion for voluntary buy-ins to the second pillar is partially lacking. Part of the doctrine sees this as an incoherence of the system.
#6. Practical Notes
N. 20 In legislation in the area of social insurance, it must always be examined whether the envisaged measures are compatible with the three-pillar principle. Reforms must maintain the balance between the pillars and may not structurally weaken any pillar.
N. 21 In legal application, coordination between the pillars must be observed. Over-compensation must be avoided (→ Art. 69 GISA), whereby the constitutionally intended complementary function of the pillars must not be undermined.
N. 22 For advisory practice, it is decisive that clients are informed about all three pillars. Optimal old-age provision regularly results from the coordinated use of all three pillars. In particular, attention should be drawn to tax optimisation possibilities with pillar 3a and the importance of the BVG mandatory scheme.
N. 23 In international situations, it should be noted that only the first and second pillars fall under the coordination rules of the bilateral agreements and the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. The third pillar is fundamentally subject to the national law of the state of residence (→ BGE 140 II 364).