1Every person has the right to life. The death penalty is prohibited.
2Every person has the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental integrity and to freedom of movement.
3Torture and any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited.
1No person may cover their face in public spaces or in places that are accessible to the public or where services are offered to anyone wishing to partake of them; the ban does not apply to places of worship.
2No person may force another person to cover their face on the grounds of their sex.
3The law shall provide for exceptions. These may only be justified on the grounds of health, safety, weather conditions or local custom.
4* With transitional provision.
Art. 10 BV — Right to life and to personal liberty
#Overview
Art. 10 BV protects three fundamental rights of every person in Switzerland: the right to life, personal liberty and the prohibition of torture. These rights apply to all people, regardless of their nationality or residence status.
The right to life (paragraph 1) means that the state may not kill anyone. The death penalty is completely prohibited in Switzerland¹. Exceptions exist only in extreme emergency situations, such as in self-defence or as an absolute last resort in serious crimes when a police officer must shoot to save others².
Personal liberty (paragraph 2) protects primarily three areas: No one may be physically harmed (physical integrity), psychologically damaged (mental integrity) or imprisoned or detained against their will (freedom of movement)³. Every medical treatment requires the patient's consent⁴. Arrests are only permitted where there is concrete suspicion of a criminal offence and with judicial control⁵.
The prohibition of torture (paragraph 3) absolutely prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment⁶. This also applies in prisons, police stations and asylum centres. Even in emergency situations, no one may be tortured⁷.
These rights are not unlimited. The state may restrict them, but only by law, for important reasons and only to the extent necessary⁸. For example, the police may detain someone who has committed a criminal offence. However, the restriction must be proportionate.
Practical example: If someone is arrested by the police, this must be based on reasonable suspicion. The person has the right to know why they were arrested and must be brought before a judge within a reasonable time. In custody, they must be treated with human dignity - with adequate food, medical care and without violence⁹.
¹ BBl 1997 I 147; BGE 142 IV 175 E. 2.2 ² BGE 136 I 87 E. 4.2; Biaggini, Art. 10 BV N. 11 ³ BGE 127 I 6 E. 5a; SGK-Schweizer, Art. 10 BV N. 4 ⁴ BGE 2C_451/2020 E. 6.2.3 ⁵ Urteil 2C_218/2013 vom 26.3.2013 E. 3.1 ⁶ BGE 146 IV 76 E. 4.2; BSK-Tschentscher, Art. 10 BV N. 28 ⁷ Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, N. 372 ⁸ BGE 136 I 87 E. 6.5; Art. 36 BV ⁹ Urteil 1B_416/2019 vom 12.9.2019 E. 4.3
Art. 10 FC — Right to Life and Personal Liberty
#Doctrine
#1. Legislative History
N. 1 Art. 10 FC is a new provision introduced by the total revision of 1999. The Federal Constitution of 1874 recognised neither a written right to life nor an express guarantee of personal liberty as a general fundamental right. Both guarantees were recognised as unwritten constitutional rights until the new FC entered into force on 1 January 2000 (cf. BGE 127 I 6 E. 5a). In the Federal Council's dispatch of 20 November 1996, the right to life was described as «recognised as an unwritten constitutional right» and stated to be in need of codification (BBl 1997 I 145).
N. 2 The dispatch deliberately chose an open formulation regarding the beginning of constitutional protection of life. The Federal Council expressly declined to anchor protection of life «from the moment of conception» and referred that question to the ordinary legislator. Likewise, no provision was made for a right to abortion or a specific article on the protection of children (BBl 1997 I 146 f.). The Federal Council also refrained from including separate provisions on the prohibition of corporal punishment (formerly Art. 65 para. 2 of the old FC) and the prohibition of imprisonment for debt (formerly Art. 59 para. 3 of the old FC), as these aspects are covered by personal liberty.
N. 3 In the Council of States, rapporteur Inderkum (C, UR) proposed replacing the word «a» with «the» right to life — in order to linguistically emphasise the fundamental nature of the guarantee — and removed the phrase «in any case» from the prohibition of torture, which under the draft was intended to operate as an absolute norm. The Council of States followed the committee (AB 1998 SR Separatdruck).
N. 4 In the National Council, four minority and individual motions were tabled: National Councillor Stump (SP/AG) proposed replacing «human being» with «person» so as not to prejudge the debate on time-limit solutions; National Councillor Schmied (SVP/BE) demanded that the right to life be anchored «from the moment of conception»; National Councillor Vallender (R/AR) wished to anchor the prohibition of the death penalty and the prohibition of torture «in any case» as absolute prohibitions; National Councillor Goll (SP/ZH) proposed an express paragraph on women's right of self-determination in matters of pregnancy. All minority motions were rejected. Federal Councillor Koller stated on behalf of the Government:
«This provision does not answer the question of when life begins. That is a problem that must be resolved primarily by the legislator.»
N. 5 The formulation «every human being» (rather than «every person» or «every citizen») was deliberately retained during the parliamentary process. According to the consistent parliamentary intent, the term «human being» is not intended to make any statement about the beginning of constitutional protection of life. By its legislative history, the provision expressly contains no prejudgement of the debate on time-limit solutions (BBl 1997 I 147; AB 1998 NR Separatdruck [Pelli Fulvio]).
#2. Systematic Classification
N. 6 Art. 10 FC falls within the second chapter of the FC («Fundamental Rights», Arts. 7–36 FC). The provision contains three qualitatively distinct guarantees: the right to life (para. 1 sentence 1), the prohibition of the death penalty (para. 1 sentence 2), the right to personal liberty (para. 2), and the prohibition of torture (para. 3). The prohibition of the death penalty and the prohibition of torture are absolute prohibitions, whereas the right to life and the right to personal liberty may be restricted under the conditions of → Art. 36 FC — to the extent that their essential content is not affected.
N. 7 Art. 10 FC is closely linked to → Art. 7 FC (human dignity): human dignity forms the normative foundation of all legal positions protected under Art. 10 FC. The Federal Supreme Court does not, however, derive independent subjective claims from Art. 7 FC; those concerned must rely on the specific guarantees of Arts. 8–34 FC (BGE 132 I 49 E. 3.2). There are also overlaps with → Art. 13 FC (protection of privacy, in particular para. 2 concerning informational self-determination) and with → Art. 31 FC (specific guarantees in cases of deprivation of liberty).
N. 8 At the level of international law, Art. 2 ECHR corresponds to the right to life (para. 1), Art. 5 ECHR to personal liberty (para. 2), and Art. 3 ECHR to the prohibition of torture (para. 3). Also relevant are Art. 7 ICCPR (prohibition of torture) and Art. 6 ICCPR (right to life). The case law of the ECtHR on Arts. 2 and 3 ECHR is authoritative as a guide to interpretation (→ Art. 190 FC).
#3. Elements of the Provision / Normative Content
a) Right to Life (Para. 1 Sentence 1)
N. 9 According to the Federal Supreme Court, the right to life protects «the totality of vital physical and mental functions» and thereby the physical existence of the human being (BBl 1997 I 145). It operates primarily as a defensive right against the State — in particular against acts of killing by the State. In addition, it gives rise to positive obligations: the State is obliged to «protect the lives of its citizens from attacks by private individuals as well» (BGE 136 I 87 E. 4.2; BGE 126 II 300 E. 5a). This dual function as both a defensive and a positive right is firmly established in Swiss constitutional law.
N. 10 The beginning of constitutional protection of life is left open. In its dispatch, the Federal Council deliberately declined to set a specific point at the moment of conception or the commencement of birth (BBl 1997 I 146 f.). The end of the protection of life coincides with the moment of death; post-mortem personality rights are protected under Art. 10 para. 2 FC and private law (cf. BGE 129 I 173 E. 4).
N. 11 The right to life — with the exception of the prohibition of the death penalty — is not absolute. Police use of firearms may restrict it, provided there is a sufficient legal basis, a public interest, and proportionality. In BGE 136 I 87 E. 4.4, the Federal Supreme Court held that the use of firearms to pursue a fleeing person is proportionate only if that person «has demonstrated particular dangerousness or a propensity for violence» — the mere commission of a property offence does not suffice.
b) Prohibition of the Death Penalty (Para. 1 Sentence 2)
N. 12 The prohibition of the death penalty is an absolute prohibition with no possibility of exception. According to the parliamentarily confirmed intent of the constituent authority — against the motion by Vallender (R/AR), who wished to insert «in any case» into the text — it applies, in its current wording, to both wartime and peacetime and to all offences without exception (BBl 1997 I 147; AB 1998 NR Separatdruck [Vallender]). → Art. 36 paras. 1–3 FC does not apply to this prohibition; not even the legislator may restrict it.
c) Personal Liberty (Para. 2)
N. 13 Art. 10 para. 2 FC protects, as a residual fundamental right, all elementary aspects of personal development not covered by more specific fundamental rights. The Federal Supreme Court describes personal liberty as an umbrella concept encompassing protection of physical and mental integrity as well as freedom of movement. The enumeration in the text of the provision is not exhaustive; the word «in particular» opens the scope of protection to further aspects (BGE 127 I 6 E. 5a; Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 403).
N. 14 Case law has interpreted the scope of protection of Art. 10 para. 2 FC broadly. Protected interests include, among others: the right to determine the place of burial of a deceased relative and post-mortem protection of personality rights (BGE 129 I 173 E. 2.1); the right to know one's biological descent (BGE 128 I 63 E. 3); the right of self-determination in medical matters (BGE 148 I 1 E. 5); begging as an elementary form of organising one's life (BGE 149 I 248 E. 5); forensic identification measures and DNA profiles as interferences with physical integrity and informational self-determination (BGE 145 IV 263 E. 2.1; BGE 128 II 259 E. 3).
N. 15 Freedom of movement, as an explicitly mentioned element of Art. 10 para. 2 FC, protects against exclusion orders and contact bans (BGE 134 I 140 E. 6.2), police custody (BGE 136 I 87 E. 6), exclusion zones in the context of sporting events (BGE 140 I 2), and administrative detention to enforce removal orders under aliens law (BGE 142 I 135 E. 1). The distinction between a restriction of liberty and a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Art. 31 FC turns on «the nature, duration, extent and intensity of the restriction» (BGE 134 I 140 E. 3.2).
N. 16 Physical integrity protects against State interference with bodily integrity. This includes security checks at prison entrances (BGE 130 I 65 E. 3), compulsory medication in the context of involuntary placement for care purposes (BGE 127 I 6), and DNA sample collection. Identity checks and identity verifications by police also engage Art. 10 para. 2 FC, though they are proportionate where specific circumstances are present (BGE 136 I 87 E. 5.1).
N. 17 Positive obligations arising from Art. 10 para. 2 FC require the State not merely to refrain from interference, but also to act actively to protect. Accordingly, the State must take proportionate measures to contain noise pollution that endangers physical integrity; however, zero risk is not required (BGE 126 II 300 E. 5b).
d) Prohibition of Torture (Para. 3)
N. 18 The prohibition of torture protects against torture and against any other form of «cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment». The formulation adopts the terminology of Art. 3 ECHR and Art. 7 ICCPR. The prohibition is absolute — it admits of no restriction under Art. 36 FC, not even in extraordinary circumstances. The Federal Council stated this expressly in the dispatch (BBl 1997 I 148); the deletion by the Council of States of the words «in any case» from the draft did not alter this substantive absoluteness (AB 1998 SR Separatdruck [Inderkum]).
N. 19 According to case law, the prohibition of torture contains a procedural dimension: a person who plausibly alleges («de manière défendable») having been subjected to degrading treatment by police officers has the right to an «effective and thorough official investigation» (BGE 131 I 455 E. 1.2.5). This right derives in parallel from Arts. 3 and 13 ECHR (cf. ECtHR, judgment Assenov v. Bulgaria of 28.10.1998, paras. 102 ff.) and has been incorporated by the Federal Supreme Court into the Swiss constitutional order.
N. 20 In extradition law, Art. 10 para. 3 FC in conjunction with Art. 25 para. 3 FC prohibits the extradition of a person to a State where there is a risk of torture or inhuman treatment. In such cases, the Federal Supreme Court examines the human rights guarantees of the requesting State (BGE 133 IV 76 E. 4 ff.).
#4. Legal Consequences
N. 21 As a fundamental right, Art. 10 FC is directly applicable against the State pursuant to → Art. 35 FC. Where violations by State authorities occur, those concerned may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Federal Supreme Court (Arts. 82 ff. BGG). In aliens law, a violation of Art. 10 para. 3 FC may lead to a refusal of extradition (→ Art. 25 para. 3 FC). The prohibition of the death penalty and the prohibition of torture constitute peremptory norms of international law (ius cogens) and cannot be derogated from by treaty.
N. 22 Restrictions on the right to life (para. 1 sentence 1) and personal liberty (para. 2) are permissible under the cumulative conditions of → Art. 36 FC: a legal basis (in the case of serious interferences, in a formal act of parliament), a public interest or the protection of fundamental rights of third parties, proportionality (suitability, necessity, reasonableness), and respect for the essential content of the right. The proportionality test is the central instrument of review in practice (BGE 134 I 140 E. 6.2; BGE 129 I 173 E. 5).
N. 23 The essential content of Art. 10 para. 2 FC is violated where an interference with personal liberty is so severe that it hollows out the human personality at its core. The absolute prohibition of the death penalty (para. 1 sentence 2) and the prohibition of torture (para. 3) themselves constitute essential-content norms and are excluded from any balancing exercise (Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, p. 49 f.).
#5. Contested Issues
N. 24 Beginning of constitutional protection of life: The question of whether Art. 10 para. 1 FC also protects the nasciturus (the unborn child after conception) is disputed in legal scholarship and practice. Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3rd ed. 2016, N 1555, argue that the deliberately open formulation of the constituent authority neither excludes nor guarantees protection of the nasciturus, and that this question is left to the legislator. Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10th ed. 2020, N 397, emphasise that the parliamentary process — in particular the rejection of the Schmied motion and the statement by Federal Councillor Koller — militates against the direct constitutional entrenchment of protection from conception. The Federal Supreme Court has thus far left this question open.
N. 25 Scope of personal liberty — broad vs. narrow approach: A contested issue concerns the delimitation of the scope of protection of Art. 10 para. 2 FC in relation to more specific fundamental rights. Müller/Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed. 2008, pp. 72 ff., advocate a narrow scope, reserving personal liberty as a «residual fundamental right» for interferences with physical and psychological integrity and freedom of movement, and attributing to it an independent protective function alongside Art. 13 FC (privacy). The Federal Supreme Court tends in its practice towards a broad interpretation, subsuming within the scope of protection aspects such as the right to determine the place of burial (BGE 129 I 173), the right to know one's descent (BGE 128 I 63), and the right of self-determination in medical matters (BGE 148 I 1).
N. 26 Relationship to Art. 13 para. 2 FC (informational self-determination): In cases involving forensic identification measures and DNA profiles, Art. 10 para. 2 FC (physical integrity) and Art. 13 para. 2 FC (data protection) compete with one another. The Federal Supreme Court has qualified the interference caused by DNA profiles as a «minor» fundamental rights interference (BGE 145 IV 263 E. 2.2; BGE 128 II 259 E. 3). In BGE 147 I 372, however, the court expressed doubts as to whether this qualification can be upheld in all constellations where DNA samples are taken in connection with peaceful political activities. This point has not yet been conclusively resolved in case law.
N. 27 Absolute application of the prohibition of torture in State emergencies («ticking time bomb»): In international debate, the question of whether the absolute prohibition of torture could be relativised under extreme circumstances is discussed. The prevailing view in Swiss legal scholarship (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, op. cit., N 1607; Müller/Schefer, op. cit., pp. 157 f.) and Federal Supreme Court case law (BGE 131 I 455 E. 1.2.5) expressly reject this: Art. 10 para. 3 FC is designed as an absolute norm and — in parallel with Art. 3 ECHR (ECtHR, judgment Gäfgen v. Germany of 1.6.2010) — admits of no exception.
#6. Practical Notes
N. 28 When assessing State interferences with Art. 10 para. 2 FC, the intensity of the interference must first be determined: serious interferences (in particular physical interventions, compulsory medication, deprivation of liberty) require a basis in formal legislation; lesser interferences (identity checks, DNA sampling subject to criminal proceedings) may be based on sufficiently specific police legislation. The principle of legality in police law is supplemented by the constitutional recognition of the general police clause (Art. 36 para. 1 sentence 3 FC) (BGE 136 I 87 E. 3.1).
N. 29 In extradition law, Art. 10 para. 3 FC in conjunction with Art. 25 para. 3 FC must always be examined: where there are serious grounds to believe that the person to be extradited would be exposed to a risk of torture or inhuman treatment in the receiving State, extradition must be refused regardless of the gravity of the alleged offence (BGE 133 IV 76). Diplomatic assurances are sufficient only if compliance with them can be effectively monitored.
N. 30 In complaints concerning police ill-treatment, it must be noted that Art. 10 para. 3 FC in conjunction with Arts. 3 and 13 ECHR gives rise to a procedural right to an effective official investigation. The discontinuation of criminal proceedings against accused police officers violates this right where no thorough examination of the facts (witness interviews, consultation of medical records, expert opinions) has taken place (BGE 131 I 455 E. 2).
N. 31 The distinction between a restriction of liberty (Art. 10 para. 2 FC) and a deprivation of liberty (Art. 31 FC) is decisive for the applicable procedural guarantees: an exclusion zone and contact ban does not constitute a deprivation of liberty and does not trigger the guarantees of Art. 31 FC (BGE 134 I 140 E. 3.3). Police custody, by contrast, gives rise under Art. 31 para. 4 FC to the right of direct access to a judicial authority (BGE 136 I 87 E. 6.5.2).
N. 32 In matters of post-mortem personality protection and the place of burial, the wishes of the deceased take precedence in principle over the right of determination of the next of kin. The Federal Supreme Court derives this from the constitutional location of autonomy in Art. 10 para. 2 FC, which also produces effects beyond death (BGE 129 I 173 E. 4).
Cross-references: ↔ Art. 7 FC (human dignity as normative foundation); → Art. 25 para. 3 FC (non-refoulement, prohibition of torture in extradition law); → Art. 31 FC (guarantees in cases of deprivation of liberty); ↔ Art. 36 FC (conditions for restrictions on para. 1 sentence 1 and para. 2); → Art. 13 para. 2 FC (informational self-determination); → Art. 190 FC (ECHR as authoritative law); ↔ Art. 2 ECHR (right to life); ↔ Art. 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture); ↔ Art. 5 ECHR (personal liberty).
Case Law on Art. 10 FC
#Right to Life (Para. 1)
#State's Duty to Protect
BGE 135 I 113 of 6 February 2009
The right to life obliges the state not only to refrain from acts of killing, but also to actively protect its citizens.
«Art. 10 para. 1 FC guarantees comprehensive protection of human life. On the one hand, the provision serves as a defensive right against the state. On the other hand, however, the state is obliged to ensure that fundamental rights prevail throughout the legal order and thus to protect the lives of its citizens also from attacks by private parties (Art. 35 FC).»
#Duty to Prosecute Homicide Offences
BGE 135 I 113 of 6 February 2009
In cases of homicide offences, there is a state duty to investigate and prosecute, even when prosecution privileges exist.
«The right to life serves on the one hand as a defensive right against the state, and on the other hand obliges the state to ensure, within its means, the protection of its citizens, to investigate homicide offences and to prosecute their perpetrators.»
#Physical Integrity as State Duty to Protect
BGE 126 II 300 of 3 May 2000
The state must also protect against noise emissions that may impair the right to physical integrity.
«According to the more recent view, fundamental rights not only have a defensive function against impairments by the state, but also establish a state duty to protect against dangers caused by third parties.»
#Personal Liberty (Para. 2)
#Core Content of Personal Liberty
BGE 129 I 173 of 12 February 2003
The right of relatives to determine the place of burial falls within the scope of protection of personal liberty.
«Personal liberty (Art. 10 para. 2 FC). Right of relatives of a deceased person to determine the place of burial; post-mortem protection of the personality rights of the deceased; balancing of opposing fundamental rights interests within the framework of Art. 36 FC.»
#Right to Access Files
BGE 126 I 7 of 9 February 2000
A right to access files can be derived from personal liberty in order to defend oneself against state measures.
«Distinction between the right to access files derived from personal liberty (Art. 10 para. 2 FC) and the claim to protection against misuse of personal data (Art. 13 para. 2 FC) on the one hand, and the right to be heard (Art. 29 para. 2 FC) on the other hand.»
#DNA Profiles and Identification Measures
BGE 145 IV 263 of 24 April 2019
The creation of DNA profiles constitutes an interference with personal liberty, which requires substantial evidence for future offences.
«Identification measures and the storage of data may affect the right to personal liberty (Art. 10 para. 2 FC) and to informational self-determination (Art. 13 para. 2 FC and Art. 8 ECHR). This should be considered a minor interference with fundamental rights.»
BGE 147 I 372 of 22 April 2021
Massive interference with fundamental rights through DNA profiles at peaceful demonstrations is disproportionate.
«Criticism of the Federal Supreme Court's case law, according to which a DNA profile constitutes only a minor interference with physical integrity and protection of privacy. The investigation of the underlying offence did not require the creation of a DNA profile in the specific case.»
#Begging as Expression of Personal Liberty
BGE 149 I 248 of 13 March 2023
Begging falls within the scope of protection of personal liberty and requires careful proportionality assessment when restricted.
«Begging represents an elementary freedom of lifestyle and falls within the scope of protection of the fundamental right to personal liberty under Art. 10 para. 2 FC or the right to respect for private life under Art. 8 ECHR.»
#Nude Hiking and Personal Liberty
BGE 138 IV 13 of 17 November 2011
Cantonal criminal norms against 'nude hiking' do not violate personal liberty if they are sufficiently determinate.
«'Nude hiking' can be qualified without arbitrariness as a gross violation of morality and decency. Violation of the fundamental right to personal liberty denied.»
#Knowledge of Descent
BGE 128 I 63 of 4 March 2002
The right to knowledge of biological descent is part of personal liberty.
«Claim to knowledge of descent: The claim to know the biological parents and accordingly to access the entries covered in the civil status register is available to the adult adoptive child independently of a balancing with opposing interests.»
#Restrictions of Liberty in Criminal and Correctional Enforcement
BGE 130 I 65 of 27 January 2004
Security controls of prison visitors do not constitute a severe interference with personal liberty.
«The obligation of the prison visitor to submit to a security check by a metal detector and to remove shoes and belt if the detector indicates the presence of metal does not constitute a severe interference with personal liberty.»
#Medical Coercive Measures
BGE 127 I 6 of 22 March 2001
Forced medication in cases of protective deprivation of liberty requires a clear legal basis.
«Significance of personal liberty under Art. 10 para. 2 FC compared to the former unwritten fundamental right and special guarantees in other constitutional provisions.»
BGE 148 I 1 of 9 June 2021
The right to self-determination in the medical field is part of personal liberty.
«The right to self-determination, which constitutionally relates to the personal liberty guaranteed in Art. 10 FC, is expressed in the medical field through the right to consent to or refuse treatment.»
#Detention-Related Decisions
BGE 133 I 270 of 14 September 2007
Personal liberty is of particular importance in detention decisions.
«Art. 5 para. 3, Art. 9, Art. 10 para. 2 and Art. 31 para. 3 FC, Art. 5 no. 1 lit. a, no. 3 and no. 4 ECHR; pre-trial detention. Judicial detention review decision in cases of suspected capital crime must be submitted to the Federal Court on appeal if an appeal to the Federal Court is available.»
BGE 142 I 135 of 2 May 2016
Administrative detention to enforce expulsion interferes with personal liberty.
«Art. 5 no. 1 and no. 4 ECHR, Art. 10 para. 2 and Art. 31 para. 4 FC; admissibility of appeal in public law matters against a judgment of the Federal Administrative Court concerning the ordering of administrative detention under Art. 76a FNA.»
#Prohibition of Torture (Para. 3)
#Definition of Degrading Treatment
BGE 131 I 455 of 6 October 2005
Anyone who claims to have been subjected to degrading treatment has a right to an effective official investigation.
«Anyone who reasonably claims to have been subjected to degrading treatment by a police officer has a right to an effective and thorough official investigation.»
#Extradition Law and Prohibition of Torture
BGE 133 IV 76 of 23 January 2007
In extraditions, the human rights guarantees of the requesting state must be examined, particularly regarding the prohibition of torture.
«Art. 3 ECHR; Art. 10 para. 3 and Art. 25 para. 3 FC; extradition; prosecution of an alleged leader of the PKK by Turkey. Requirements for adequate human rights guarantees of the requesting state in extradition cases.»
#Recent Developments
#Police Measures and Fundamental Rights
BGE 147 I 103 of 29 April 2020
Expulsion and exclusion orders with automatic criminal sanctions are disproportionate.
«The automatic connection between the expulsion and exclusion measures with the criminal sanction under Art. 292 CC is neither necessary nor proportionate in the narrow sense.»
#Police Violence and Duty to Investigate
BGE 136 I 87 of 30 September 2009
Police firearm regulations must take into account personal liberty and the right to life.
«Use of firearms to pursue fleeing persons who have manifested particular dangerousness or propensity to violence through a serious misdemeanour or felony.»
#Expulsion Measures
BGE 132 I 49 of 25 January 2006
Temporary expulsions interfere with personal liberty and require a cantonal legal basis.
«The affected parties cannot derive anything in their favour from an independent invocation of human dignity (Art. 7 FC); they can rely on freedom of assembly (Art. 22 FC), personal liberty (Art. 10 para. 2 FC), the prohibition of discrimination (Art. 8 para. 2 FC) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (Art. 9 FC).»
#International Dimension
#ECHR-Compliant Interpretation
BGE 127 I 115 of 18 June 2001
Autopsy orders must be subject to judicial review when relatives contest them.
«If the close relatives of a deceased person subsequently contest the ordering of an autopsy, this must in principle be made the subject of judicial review.»