#Legislative History

N. 1 Art. 152 FC essentially corresponds to the former Art. 79 old FC (Federal Constitution of 1874). The provision was adopted practically unchanged within the framework of the total revision of 1999. The Federal Council Message on a new Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 states: «The organisation of the Federal Assembly undergoes no fundamental changes. The existing regulations on the election of chamber presidencies have proven their worth and will be retained» (BBl 1997 I 386).

N. 2 The annual rotation of chamber presidencies has its roots in the Swiss principle of collegiality and the idea of limiting power. The Helvetic Constitution of 1798 already knew temporally limited presidencies. The restriction to one year with a prohibition on re-election was definitively established with the Federal Constitution of 1848 and has never since been questioned (Ehrenzeller/Schindler/Schweizer/Vallender, St. Gallen Commentary FC, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 152 N. 2).

#Systematic Classification

N. 3 Art. 152 FC is located in Title 3 (Federal Authorities), Chapter 1 (Federal Assembly), Section 2 (Organisation and Procedure). The provision belongs to the parliamentary organisational norms and as such regulates the internal structure of the Federal Assembly. It is closely related to:

• → Art. 151 FC (Sessions)
• → Art. 153 FC (Parliamentary committees)
• → Art. 156 FC (Separate deliberations)
• → Art. 171 FC (Parliament Act)

N. 4 The provision gives concrete form to the principle of parliamentary autonomy (→ Art. 150 para. 2 FC). As an organisational norm it belongs to the area of «interna corporis», which are in principle withdrawn from judicial review (Häfelin/Haller/Keller/Thurnherr, Swiss Federal Constitutional Law, 10th ed. 2020, N 1682).

#Elements of the Provision / Normative Content

N. 5 Electoral body: «Each chamber» refers to the National Council and Council of States respectively and separately. Both chambers elect their presidencies independently of each other. The formulation «from among its members» means that only members of the respective chamber are eligible.

N. 6 Elected offices: The provision requires the election of three persons:

• A president
• A first vice-president
• A second vice-president

The gender-neutral formulation was introduced with the total revision of 1999 and corresponds to Art. 7 para. 2 of the Languages Act (Rhinow/Schefer/Uebersax, Swiss Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 2016, § 46 N. 28).

N. 7 Term of office: The formulation «for the duration of one year» means the parliamentary year, which begins with the winter session each time. The election traditionally takes place in the last week of the winter session for the following year (Art. 8 para. 1 ParlA).

N. 8 Prohibition on re-election: «Re-election for the following year is excluded» means an absolute prohibition on immediate re-election to the same office. After the expiry of one year, however, a new election is permissible. The prohibition applies office-specifically: a chamber president can be elected vice-president in the following year (Graf/Theler/von Wyss, Parliamentary Law and Parliamentary Practice, 2014, § 10 N. 15).

#Legal Consequences

N. 9 The election of presidencies has the following legal consequences:

1. Leadership function: The president chairs the chamber sessions (Art. 33 ParlA)
2. Power of representation: External representation of the chamber
3. Casting vote: In case of a tie in the National Council (Art. 50 para. 2 ParlA)
4. Substitution: The vice-presidents represent in case of impediment (Art. 34 ParlA)

N. 10 A violation of the prohibition on re-election would make the election unconstitutional. However, enforcement does not occur judicially, but through parliamentary self-control and political pressure (Tschannen/Zimmerli/Müller, General Administrative Law, 4th ed. 2014, § 13 N. 42).

#Disputes

N. 11 Legal nature of the prohibition on re-election: In doctrine it is disputed whether the prohibition on re-election is mandatory or dispositive:

• Ehrenzeller (St. Gallen Commentary FC, Art. 152 N. 5) takes the position that the prohibition is absolute and cannot be circumvented even by unanimous chamber resolution.
• Waldmann argues against this, that in extraordinary situations (e.g. pandemic, war) a pragmatic handling would be conceivable.
• Graf (Parliamentary Law and Parliamentary Practice, § 10 N. 18) takes a mediating position: The prohibition applies in principle absolutely, but in case of impossibility of new election, a temporary continuation of office would be permissible.

N. 12 Justiciability: There is agreement that elections according to Art. 152 FC as interna corporis are not justiciable. However, the scope of this principle is disputed:

• Häfelin/Haller (Federal Constitutional Law, N 1683) categorically exclude any judicial review.
• Rhinow/Schefer (Constitutional Law, § 46 N. 30) consider justiciability conceivable in cases of serious fundamental rights violations.

#Practice Notes

N. 13 Electoral procedure: The elections are held secretly and in separate ballots for each office. The order is: 1. President, 2. First vice-president, 3. Second vice-president. The absolute majority of valid votes is required (Art. 130 ParlA).

N. 14 Rotation in practice: An informal rotation has been established: the first vice-president is usually elected president, the second becomes first vice-president. This practice is not constitutionally prescribed, but has proven its worth (Lüthi, The Parliament, 2nd ed. 2018, p. 142).

N. 15 Language-regional representation: In elections, informal attention is paid to appropriate representation of the language regions. This is not a legal obligation, but corresponds to the spirit of Art. 175 para. 4 FC by analogy (Ehrenzeller, St. Gallen Commentary FC, Art. 152 N. 6).

N. 16 Resignation from office: An elected presidency member can resign from office. In this case, a replacement election takes place for the remainder of the term of office. The prohibition on re-election also applies to replacement elections (Graf/Theler/von Wyss, Parliamentary Law, § 10 N. 20).

Art. 152 Cst. governs the internal organisation of the Federal Assembly and is therefore rarely the subject of judicial decisions. The election of the presidents and vice-presidents of the chambers is considered parliamentary self-organisation (interna corporis), which in principle is not subject to judicial review.

#Justiciability of parliamentary organisation

The case law of the Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly held that questions of parliamentary organisation are in principle not justiciable. This concerns in particular:

• The modalities of the election of parliamentary bodies
• The interpretation of parliamentary rules of procedure
• Procedural questions in the constitution of the chambers

No specific case law on Art. 152 Cst. available

A systematic review of the available case law revealed no decisions that deal directly with Art. 152 Cst. or the election of chamber presidents. This corresponds to the general legal situation whereby the interna corporis of the Federal Assembly are exempt from judicial control.

#Related case law on parliamentary organisation

Insofar as the Federal Supreme Court has dealt with questions of parliamentary organisation, it has limited itself to areas with external effects or fundamental rights relevance:

#Parliamentary immunity and indemnity

The Federal Supreme Court has specified the limits of parliamentary privileges in various decisions, without however assessing the internal organisation of the chambers.

#Publicity of parliamentary proceedings

Questions of transparency of parliamentary activity may be justiciable insofar as they concern citizens' information rights.

#Legal protection in case of violation of Art. 152 Cst.

Should violations of Art. 152 Cst. occur (e.g. unconstitutional re-election of a chamber president), legal protection would be problematic:

• Constitutional complaint: In principle excluded for interna corporis
• Parliamentary self-control: Primary control mechanism
• Political accountability: Control by the public and electorate

#Significance for constitutional practice

The lack of case law on Art. 152 Cst. does not mean that the provision would be practically irrelevant. Its observance is ensured by the following mechanisms:

1. Constitutional loyalty of parliamentarians
2. Public control and media reporting
3. Political sanctions in case of constitutional violations
4. Precedential effect of established constitutional practice

Note: This overview is based on a systematic review of the available case law. Should decisions on Art. 152 Cst. be rendered in the future, this section will be supplemented accordingly.